Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (MONEY) BILL (By Order)

Order for Third Reading read.

To be read the Third time upon Thursday 15 July at Seven o'clock.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

Labelling of Food Regulations 1980

Mr. Shersby: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he is yet in a position to announce the outcome of his correspondence with the European Commission concerning the date of implementation of the Labelling of Food Regulations 1980; and if he will make a statement.

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Peter Walker): I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave him yesterday on this subject.

Mr. Shersby: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the decision that he announced yesterday will be widely welcomed by both food manufacturers and consumers? What progress has been made by other European countries towards implementing the directive, and what will be the position on 1 January in respect of goods from overseas that do not comply with it?

Mr. Walker: I delayed the decision to put pressure on the Commission to take action against countries which, seemingly, were not going to comply. I now have confirmation that the Commission will take legal action against countries which will not comply. The goods of any country that does not comply with the directive, but endeavours to export to this country, will not be allowed in.

Mr. Bright: Will my right hon. Friend clarify his intentions so that food processors and retailers are left in absolutely no doubt about their obligations?

Mr. Walker: My hon. Friend will not have seen the full text of the written reply that I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Shersby) yesterday. It fully satisfies the food processors and manufacturers. They are now clear as to the manner in which the regulations will be applied.

Agricultural Tenancies

Mr. Maclennan: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he is now in a position to make a statement on his policy towards making available more land for agricultural tenancies.

Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food when he expects to complete his consideration of the action required to encourage new lettings of farms; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Peter Walker: I have nothing to add to the replies that I gave to the hon. Member for Norfolk, North-West (Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler) on 10 June.

Mr. Maclennan: It is many months since the Minister first gave that stalling answer. Does he intend to introduce legislation, or has he simply rejected the arguments put forward by both the Country Landowners Association and the National Farmers Union that measures are urgently needed to increase the supply of tenant land?

Mr. Walker: It is not months since I gave that "stalling" answer. It is slightly less than one month. I have since then made it clear that we approve the basic principles of the NFU-CLA agreement. We shall consider when to introduce legislation.

Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler: In addition to legislation, will the Minister consider discussing with his right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the tax concessions that might encourage landlords to let more land instead of taking it back when old tenants leave?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Heddle: Does my right hon. Friend agree that, notwithstanding the answer that he gave, the proposals of the Labour Party to nationalise agricultural tenancies will be disastrous for the farming industry and expensive for the taxpayer and consumer?

Mr. Walker: Yes, completely disastrous.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Why does the Minister not forget his deep prejudices about selective public ownership of land and introduce a land bank, using land that could be made available, by capital transfer tax settlements with the Treasury in lieu of payments in cash?

Mr. Walker: Because my deep prejudices are based on the appalling record of nationalisation.

Mr. Pollock: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the provisions in last year's Finance Act and in this year's Finance Bill regarding Scottish agricultural leases and the clawback provisions of CTT illustrate the Government's commitment to the expansion of tenant farming?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Buchan: Does the Minister agree that the NFU was absolutely right to support the Labour Government's legislation in 1976? The NFU argued that, far from any change in succession leading to more farms to let, it would lead to landlords taking over vacant farms for direct farming, and that therefore an element of public ownership was almost the only way in which tenancies could be made available? Were there not two heads to the agreement—one on rates and the other on succession?
Will the Minister introduce legislation to reduce rents based on the proposals put forward by both the NFU and the Labour Party?

Mr. Walker: No, Sir. There is no evidence that the land nationalisation advocated by the hon. Gentleman would be other than disastrous. I am delighted that the Labour Party manifesto contained such proposals.
There is an agreement between the NFU and the CLA, and I note that the Labour Party is unwilling to support it, which is wrong.

Mr. Geraint Howells: Is not now the opportune time for the Minister to urge his colleagues to give extra financial aid to local authorities to buy more land in Britain to let to young tenant farmers?

Mr. Walker: I do not believe that that is a desirable role for local authorities or a correct use of public resources.

Agricultural Land

Mr. Heddle: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what steps he will take to ensure that good quality agricultural land is not lost to the industry.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mrs. Peggy Fenner): My Department will continue to ensure that Government policy for the protection of agricultural land is applied in accordance with Department of the Environment circular 75/76.

Mr. Heddle: As nearly 1,000 acres of good agricultural land are lost each week to roads, runways, reservoirs, houses and factories, is it not of prime importance that the planner's pen ploughs a furrow through the poorest quality land before it alights on the best quality land?

Mrs. Fenner: I wholly agree. Paragraph 3 of the DOE circular seeks to ensure that higher quality land is not used where lower quality land is available and that no more is taken than is needed for the development.

Mr. Newens: Is the Minister aware of the strong criticism of the supine evidence that the Ministry advanced about the loss of good agricultural land through the massive expansion of Stansted? Will she consider the issue and reassure the House that the Ministry will take a stronger line in future?

Mrs. Fenner: I do not accept the criticism of the Ministry's stand on Stansted. Ministry representatives try to ensure that there is no loss of high quality land. They battle for agricultural land in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests they should.

Mr. Neil Thorne: Has my hon. Friend seen the discussion paper on forestry and land use issued by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, of which I am a member? Does she feel that it has a contribution to make?

Mrs. Fenner: Such a distinguished body always has a contribution to make.

Mr. Chapman: In the close consultation between the Ministry and the Department of the Environment on the development of good agricultural land, will my hon. Friend make the sensible representation to the Secretary

of State for the Environment that all good agricultural land that is subject to planning application should be called in under section 35 of the 1971 Act as a matter of course?

Mrs. Fenner: My Ministry is consulted at all stages in the preparation of structural and local plans and on all planning applications affecting more than 4 hectares of agricultural land that do not conform to an agreed development plan.

European Community (Spanish Entry)

Mr. Farr: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if, preparatory to any final decision being made by the United Kingdom on the terms of membership of the European Economic Community of Spain, so far as they concern agriculture, he will undertake a study and issue a report on the effect of Spanish membership of the European Economic Community on each sector of the agriculture and horticulture industries in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Peter Walker: A considerable body of information and research now exists on Spanish agriculture, its effect on the United Kingdom market and the likely consequences of Spanish accession to the European Community. I have considered carefully the need for a further study, but have concluded that this would not be justified at present. My Department continues to monitor developments and changes in Spanish agriculture and horticulture.

Mr. Farr: Is my right hon. Friend aware that about 2 million acres of land in Spain are suitable for irrigation and that once Spain joins the EEC and the land is irrigated our markets for many domestic products will cease to exist? Will he consider again the real threat in Spain's application?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir. In any judgment we would consider the impact of such irrigation policies. However, the Spanish market also offers a considerable outlet for our agricultural products which Spain does not produce.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Might there not be further indirect costs to the British taxpayer of Spanish accession to the EEC, as it could lead to calls for a new regime in other areas—for example, olive oil, which is the mainstay of rural Italy?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir. That is why discussions are taking place on olive oil production in the existing Community. The British Government have put forward proposals which take those dangers into consideration.

School Milk

Sir Anthony Meyer: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what percentage of liquid milk production is consumed under school milk subsidised consumption.

Mrs. Fenner: Subsidised school milk represents about 1 per cent. of liquid milk sales and about ½ per cent. of total milk production.

Sir Anthony Meyer: Does not the scheme put the best of all possible foods into children's stomachs and a good deal of cash into farmers' pockets at a minimum cost to the British taxpayer? Is it not a pity that so few local authorities have taken advantage of the scheme? Will my hon. Friend use her best offices to persuade them to do so?

Mrs. Fenner: On the contrary, of 126 local authorities and education boards involved, only six have refused to take up the subsidy. Four have yet to respond.

Mr. Maclennan: Why does the Minister not introduce a national scheme?

Mrs. Fenner: It is a good Community scheme, from which in 1981 we derived £18 million. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would not grumble about that.

Mr. Mark Hughes: Does the hon. Lady agree that the quality of the scheme does not prevent it being a national scheme? Will she introduce a national scheme and not allow some reprobate local authorities to get out of it?

Mrs. Fenner: Each local education authority should decide its own spending priorities, including the importance that it attaches to school milk.

Sir Peter Mills: Will my hon. Friend encourage the consumption of all milk products, bearing in mind the immense danger to the industry from the new synthetic cheese that is selling at 50 per cent. below the cost of normal cheese?

Mrs. Fenner: We have tried to make it as easy as possible for authorities to take full advantage of the subsidies that are available. Last year we negotiated an aggregate scheme that included semi-skimmed flavoured milk and cheese and yoghurt with a 12½ per cent. local authority contribution.

Common Agricultural Policy

Mr. Proctor: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will make a further statement on his attempts to reform the common agricultural policy.

Mr. Peter Walker: I continue to seek improvements in the operation of the common agricultural policy designed to tackle the problem of surpluses, restrain the growth of expenditure and ensure fair competition within the Community.

Mr. Proctor: After three years of Conservative Administration and attempts to reform the CAP, does my right hon. Friend now agree that, because of the power balances in the EEC, it is not possible to get a fundamental reform of the CAP?

Mr. Walker: No, Sir, I do not agree. During those three years the growth in expenditure has been 26 per cent. compared with 260 per cent. under the Labour Government, and the proportion of CAP benefits going to Britain has doubled.

Mr. Hardy: Does the Minister accept that whatever hopes he may entertain are likely to be confounded and that whatever admirable efforts he may make are likely to meet disappointment, not least as a consequence of the recent Community majority decision? Can he yet tell the House how much the subsidy and structure of agriculture will dominate the EEC budget in the ensuing 12 months?

Mr. Walker: I cannot give the exact forecast for the next 12 months. During the past three years the proportion of the budget devoted to the CAP has declined considerably.

Sir Anthony Meyer: Would it not be regrettable if reform of the CAP resulted in Europe becoming a food deficiency area?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Buchan: That would hardly be reform of the common agricultural policy. Will the Minister listen to the wise words of his hon. Friend the Member for Basildon (Mr. Proctor)? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that this year's settlement marked the final destruction of any attempt or hope to reform the common agricultural policy in any sensible way? Does he further agree that the near surrender point was overcome by events when majority voting took place? Has not the time come for us to operate a policy suitable for British farming and the British consumer without the nonsense of high prices, surpluses, export levies and the other bureaucratic paraphernalia of the Common Market?

Mr. Walker: I am glad that the views of the farming industry are in complete conflict with those of the hon. Gentleman. The farming industry is increasingly recognising, particularly with the reversal of the Labour Government's green pound policy, the considerably enhanced opportunities for exports and growth in the British economy.

Food from Britain

Mr. Greenway: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what progress has been made by Food from Britain since his recent announcement of its creation.

Mr. Peter Walker: As I informed the House on 8 June, I shall seek to introduce the necessary legislation to transform the Central Council for Agricultural and Horticultural Co-operation into the new marketing organisation, Food from Britain, as soon as possible. Meanwhile, those invited to serve on Food from Britain have begun preparing its marketing strategy and formulating plans for joint marketing initiatives to promote British food and fresh produce at home and abroad.

Mr. Greenway: Is my right hon. Friend satisfied that food processing companies will gain the full benefit of this campaign for their exports?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir. Indeed, food manufacturers and processors have warmly welcomed this initiative. The food industry has guaranteed its full co-operation and agreed that its export efforts should be incorporated in it.

Mr. Freud: I welcome the concept of Food from Britain, but will the Minister also consider food from the regions? Is the rig at hon. Gentleman aware that there is considerable regional excellence? With offices in the regions, this should not be beyond his Department's capabilities.

Mr. Walker: No, Sir. I know that the hon. Gentleman has a keen interest in this topic. I agree that there is much promotion to be done on food from our regions.

Mr. Speller: Will my right hon. Friend do his best to ensure that the livestock marketing, meat processing and packaging industries, which are an integral part of the whole concept, are given ail possible support in these troubled times?

Mr. Walker: We shall be giving this topic similar attention. As my hon. Friend knows, one of the members of the new council will be the chariman of the Meat and Livestock Commission.

Potatoes

Mr. Bill: Walker asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what proportion of the 1981 United Kingdom potato crop was exported (a) as ware and (b) as seed.

Mrs. Fenner: Overseas trade statistics are not yet available for this period, but figures from the Potato Marketing Board and the Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland suggest 1 per cent. and 2 per cent., respectively.

Mr. Walker: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Does she recognise that the potato trade is a vital part of the Tayside economy? How are Government plans progressing towards improving the marketing and processing of potatoes?

Mrs. Fenner: I am sure that my hon. Friend will have observed the beginning of the Great Brits programme for high quality potatoes, because I understand that it started in Scotland. Everyone in the industry agrees about the importance of improving the quality of potatoes. We welcome the name "Great Brits" which the Potato Marketing Board and the new bodies in Scotland and Northern Ireland have chosen for seed potatoes.

Dairy Industry

Mr. Geraint Howells: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he is satisfied with the present state of the dairy industry; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Peter Walker: Yes, Sir. I believe that both sides of the industry can look to the future with confidence.

Mr. Howells: Will the Minister comment on the EEC proposal to give a £4 million rebate to small dairy farmers in this country? Who will administer the scheme?

Mr. Walker: We are having discussions, but the scheme will be administered by the Milk Marketing Board.

Mr. Colvin: Bearing in mind the damage that can be done to the dairy industry by tuberculosis and brucellosis, will my right hon. Friend either confirm or deny that he has authorised the cessation of the gassing of badgers? If his reply is in the affirmative, what discussions has his Ministry had with the RSPCA on acceptable humane methods of control?

Mr. Walker: My hon. Friend will know that I asked Lord Zuckerman to produce a report on this subject. He strongly confirmed that it was important to carry out an eradication policy or there would be a considerable spread of tuberculosis. He also pointed out that there would otherwise be a threat to the long-term prospects for the badger population. He asked for further research to be undertaken into the form of gassing used. I recently received a report showing that the form of gassing used was causing hardship to badgers beyond that expected. I therefore stopped that form of gassing. We are now having urgent discussions on the most humane and best methods of eradication.

Mr. Hardy: I do not dissent from the right hon. Gentleman's action on bovine tuberculosis. However, is the Minister aware that his optimism about the dairy

industry is slightly misplaced, given the effect on the price of butter of the common agricultural policy and the less than scrupulous approach of the margarine advertisers?

Mr. Walker: The decline in butter consumption over the years has added to the surplus in the Community. There are areas where consumption of dairy products is likely to increase. The consumption of cheese and yoghurts has been increasing and the consumption of flavoured milks is likely to increase considerably. I agree that there is a battle between the margarine and butter interests on the health aspect. It is not a judgment that I am qualified to make.

Mr. Newens: Is the right hon. Gentleman still as steadfast in his resistance to any threats to the dairy industry's doorstep delivery system? Is he confident in our ability to continue to resist such threats?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir.

Milk, Butter and Beef

Mr. Teddy Taylor: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will publish a table showing the percentage increase or decrease in the average consumption per head of milk, butter and beef since 1970.

Mr. Peter Walker: The percentage changes in average household consumption per head between 1970 and 1981 are as follows:



per cent.


Milk*
-13·4


Butter
-38·4


Beef
-10·8


* Including welfare and school milk.

Mr. Taylor: Does my right hon. Friend accept that at least some of these alarming reductions in food consumption are because many people, particularly pensioners and those on low incomes, cannot afford to pay the artificially high prices required by the common agricultural policy? Does he also accept that, at a time of high prices and falling consumption, it was criminal for the Minister of State to tell me yesterday that our exports of cheap subsidised food to Russia in 1981 were more than 3 million tonnes compared with 2 million tonnes in the previous year and less than 1 million tonnes in 1979?

Mr. Walker: I do not accept my hon. Friend's premise. He has chosen those three items, but I could choose other items also affected by the common agricultural policy, such as cheese, the consumption of which is up by 8·4 per cent. and pork, which is up by 35 per cent. There has been a considerable variation in eating habits. As the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Hardy) pointed out, the battle between margarine and butter has been based on the health aspect, not on the price factor.

Mr. Jay: Does the Minister regard as one of the blessings of Common Market membership the fact that the British public's consumption of butter has been reduced by 40 per cent. since we joined?

Mr. Walker: The fact is that as a result of health campaigns during that period there was a considerable switch to margarine. It is interesting to note that the market price for beef for most of that time has been above the


guaranteed price in the Community. The reason, as beef producers know, is that the fixed price has been below production cost, and that has created a shortage of beef.

Mr. Colin Shepherd: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the increase in the price of milk is less than the increases in the retail price index and the food price index, and that both increases are less than the increase in average wages since we entered the Community? Does he further agree that there has been a failure in the marketing of milk and that no blame can be attached to the Community for the fall in milk consumption?

Mr. Walker: As my hon. Friend knows, the price of milk in this country is nothing to do with the CAP intervention price. It is an agreed price with the Dairy Trade Federation to retain the doorstep deliver service.

Mr. Buchan: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that his policy has probably done more to reduce butter consumption in Britain than the entire U-boat campaign in the Second World War? Have not two factors come together: first, a general decline in the standard of living, brought about by the Government, and, secondly, artificially high prices because of the Minister's adherence to a crazy policy of agriculture support? Will he bear in mind that as well as being the Minister of Agriculture he is the Food Minister and, as such, responsible for the consumer?

Mr. Walker: I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on that good U-boat phrase. It is a remarkable phrase to use, as my one achievement in regard to butter has been to double the subsidy compared with what the Labour Government did.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the wholly unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I give notice that I intend to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible opportunity—[Interruption]—and the Minister should stop laughing.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: Another Exocet missile.

Inshore Waters (Fishing Vessels)

Sir Albert Costain: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food how many United Kingdom registered fishing vessels now fish in United Kingdom inshore waters; and how many there were in June 1978, June 1970 and June 1960, respectively.

Mr. Peter Walker: The number of commercially active fishing vessels registered in the United Kingdom which are under 80ft in length are as follows:


Year
Vessels


1960
7,278


1970
5,410


1978
6,765


1981
7,106

Sir Albert Costain: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the increase indicated by those figures will be a surprise to many people? Does it not demonstrate that there is still some life in the fishing industry? Will he continue with his valiant efforts to conserve the stock of young fish, which is so necessary?

Mr. Walker: The figures show both an important switch to inshore fishing and that investment has continued in that industry.

Mr. Austin Mitchell: In view of the general decline in the British fishing fleet, when will the right hon. Gentleman stop giving aid in a hand-to-mouth fashion, as a lure to encourage the industry to accept his forthcoming sell-out on the common fisheries policy? When will he announce a plan for restructuring the industry so that it can compete on equal terms with the new vessels that have been built by the French, the Dutch and the Danes?

Mr. Walker: I am sorry that my original answer did not fit in with the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question. It showed that since 1970 there has been an increase of about 1,600 vessels in the inshore fleet. We are aware of the decline that took place in the long-distance fleet and of the period in which that took place. The hon. Gentleman may complain about my aid, but it is double that given by the last Government and he should have complained more often then.

Mr. Maclennan: In view of the increased catching capacity and the fact that, if that capacity is to be fully used, we should need access to 54 per cent. of the Community's total allowable catch, what proposals is the right hon. Gentleman considering with the Sea Fish Industry Authority for long-term restructuring and aid that is necessary?

Mr. Walker: We are having talks with all sections of the fishing industry about the longer-term programmes for restructuring and we are preparing the industry to take advantage of future opportunities.

Mr. Myles: In view of the considerable economic difficulties that are faced particularly by the pelagic sector, will my right hon. Friend introduce his aid package as soon as possible?

Mr. Walker: We are currently reviewing applications for the aid package. My hon. Friend will be pleased to know that in the first six months of this year there has, both in volume and price, been a substantial improvement in income compared with a year ago.

Mr. Mark Hughes: What provision does the Minister envisage to enable this increased fleet to catch fish if he agrees with the Community's proposals, to be discussed next week, for the British fishing industry?

Mr. Walker: 'The hon. Gentleman knows that I shall agree to proposals that have the approval of the fishing industry.

Sugar (European Community Production)

Mr. Richard Shepherd: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what are the anticipated costs in the coming crop year of (a) storing the surplus European Economic Community production of sugar and (b) the producers' contribution in the form of export subsidies levied on excess output.

Mr. Peter Walker: It is not yet possible to forecast the amount of surplus production from the 1982 crop that will be eligible for storage payments, or for how long it will be stored. On the second part of the question, if the levies by which producers contributed to the cost of export subsidies are imposed at the maximum rate during 1982–83, they are likely to raise about 550 million ECU, which is equivalent to £304 million at the current market rate of exchange.

Mr. Shepherd: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that answer. Will the maximum permissible producers' contribution on the beet crop in 1981–82 cover all the costs of exporting from the Community? If not, what sort of deficit will arise to the Community?

Mr. Walker: It is estimated that a deficit of about £52 million will be incurred on exports of the 1981–82 crop. That deficit will be carried forward to be met from the producers' levy on the 1982–83 crop.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: In fixing such a high price for sugar at about £250 a tonne, did the CAP Ministers, including my right hon. Friend, take into account the enormous damage done to the economies of some of the poorest countries by the dumping of EEC sugar on the world at a cost of about £100 a tonne?

Mr. Walker: In our negotiations we also took into account the improved price for ACP country exports to the European market.

Fishing Industry

Mr. Strang: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what consultations he has had with representatives of the fishing industry since the last Council of Ministers meeting.

Mr. Peter Walker: The main organisations representing the catching industry have been consulted about the Commission's latest proposals for total allowable catches and quotas put forward after the Fisheries Council on 29 June, and I expect to meet the leaders of the industry again before the next meeting of the Council in the week beginning 19 July.

Mr. Strang: Is the Minister aware that Scottish fishermen attach particular importance to the future of the north North Sea herring fishery? While it is true that stocks there have not recovered sufficiently for fishing to resume, it is vital that some agreement be reached on the future percentage share-out of fish in those waters before a settlement is reached.

Mr. Walker: I am well aware of the importance of that matter to the Scottish fishing industry. We are at present awaiting the conclusions of third country agreements that affect the availability of the herring stock. I agree that it is important to obtain a good percentage of those stocks for our fishermen.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: If the Soviet Union and Polish shipping fleets can apparently make such a reasonable profit out of fishing around the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic, what discussions has my right hon. Friend had with the British fishing industry about potential fishing in the South Alantic, particularly in respect of kryll, hake and other fish that are in abundance there and which, apparently, offer tremendous potential for the British fishing fleet?

Mr. Walker: On a number of occasions—indeed, prior to the current Falklands crisis—I have discussed the possibilities of South Atlantic fishing with our industry. Alas, I must report that it has not shown any great enthusiasm because it considers that the quality of some of the fish involved, combined with the cost, does not make it a potentially commercial operation. I am willing to discuss this matter further with the fishing industry.

Mr. McNamara: As the right hon. Gentleman was somewhat agitated when he made his statement on the fishing agreement to the House last week, may I put something to him calmly and objectively? What will he do to compernsate the deep-water ports such as Hull, Fleetwood and Grimsby? What will he do to get alternative employment for fishermen who have lost their jobs? What will he do to make sure that communities that have lost a great deal, not only as a result of the 200 miles but because of the CAP, are able to have a decent living standard? Is he aware that many of our constituents are now without a decent standard of living?

Mr. Walker: We have been negotiating quota arrangements that will be of interest to the long distance fleet. We shall also be negotiating restructuring arrangements that will be of considerable importance. I am optimistic that in that sphere there will be considerable improvement on the proposals that were previously made.

Poultry (Health Standards)

Mr. Colin Shepherd: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether he has had discussions with the British Poultry Federation on health standards of the British poultry industry.

Mrs. Fenner: Close contact is maintained with representatives of the British poultry industry, both on health standards and on all related matters. We shall continue to seek to maintain existing policies to protect the health status of the national flock, in consultation with poultry interests.

Mr. Shepherd: Is my hon. Friend aware that the poultry industry places great importance on the maintenance of the highest possible health standards within the industry, especially with regard to Newcastle disease? Will she confirm that the Government believe that a policy of eradication is far better than a policy of vaccination? If perchance the European Court should continue to disregard the veterinary evidence, will the Government develop an adaptation of the Danish system, which will sustain the high health standards in the British poultry industry?

Mrs. Fenner: I cannot comment on the basis of the case in Europe, but my hon. Friend will know that we feel strongly about the correctness of our Newcastle disease policy. We shall continue to defend that policy vigorously.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Will the Government endeavour to ensure that the Common Market does not impose differential arrangements with regard to Newcastle disease upon Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom?

Mrs. Fenner: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Mark Hughes: Did the Minister listen carefully to what the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Shepherd) has just said? In the absence of a proper solution from the European Court, should we not be prepared to take the Danish line on Newcastle disease, and do it ourselves?

Mrs. Fenner: I reiterate my answer to my hon. Friend. I listened to his comments very carefully. I am not prepared to accept the hon. Gentleman's pessimistic view. We intend to defend our policy vigorously.

Straw (Burning)

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food how many tons of straw have been disposed of by burning on land over each of the past four years.

Mrs. Fenner: Detailed records of the tonnage of straw which has been burned in each of the past four years are not available. Estimates, which are based on surveys carried out in 1976 and 1977, show that the average tonnage burnt in England and Wales is about 3·9 million tonnes per annum.

Mr. Wainwright: Is the hon. Lady satisfied that that is the best way to dispose of straw and that the benefits derived from burning are far greater than any other method that could be adopted? If she agrees that other methods should be adopted, what advice will she give to the farmers to make sure that they make better use of their straw?

Mrs. Fenner: Research into alternative uses for straw has been carried out for many years and is still being actively pursued. There is little hope that such uses will account for more than a fraction of surplus straw in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Haselhurst: Can my hon. Friend confirm that, failing any other method of disposal, there is an appreciable cost saving to farmers in being able to dispose of their straw by burning? If there is to be strong public reaction against this, will she consider asking her Ministry to make more of an effort to see whether a more effective alternative can be found?

Mrs. Fenner: I pointed out that research into alternative uses has been going on for some time and is still going on. My hon. Friend will know that the National Farmers Union, in consultation with my Department, has revised and strengthened the code for the burning of straw to provide additional safeguards where burning takes place.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Could not grassland used for straw burning be turned to more productive use if more effective marginal land schemes were in operation? Why is the Minister dragging his heels over the application to Brussels concerning the marginal land scheme that has been drawn up by his Department?

Mrs. Fenner: The question that the hon. Member for Dearne Valley (Mr. Wainwright) addressed to me was on the subject of straw burning and I think that I should be out of order if I attempted to answer the hon. Gentleman's questions.

Sir Peter Mills: Will the Minister bear in mind that this is a growing and serious problem and give every encouragement to the development of straw briquette-making, which could help considerably and would mean that there was not so much reliance on the coal industry. Does she agree that it is better to rely on agriculture in this regard?

Mrs. Fenner: My right hon. Friend visited a factory in Sittingbourne in Kent recently, which is using straw for making packaging equipment. We hope to see an extension of this good experiment.

Scientific Civil Servants

Mr. Sheerman: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food how many scientific civil servants were employed in the Ministry of Agriculture in May 1982, May 1981 and May 1979, respectively.

Mr. Peter Walker: The information requested is not available for the dates stated. However, the number of scientific civil servants in the Ministry on 1 April of the three years in question was 1,895, 1,961 and 1,804 respectively.

Mr. Sheerman: Is the Minister aware that this vital Department is at the centre of research and development for the whole of our agriculture industry? Is the Minister further aware that many people working in that service are worried about its future, are concerned about their tenure, and are worried that the services that they are able to provide to agriculture will be far less in the future?

Mr. Walker: Having recently visited all of the regions and met the staff concerned, I am glad to say that I found morale high. I know that the hon. Gentleman will rejoice at the fact that the figures that I have given him show that there has been an increase in staff since the Government came to power.

Maedi-Visna Accredited Flocks

Sir Michael Shaw: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what interest has been shown by flock owners in the voluntary schemes for the establishment of Maedi-Visna accredited flocks.

Mrs. Fenner: Flock owners have shown a considerable interest in the Maedi-Visna accredited flocks scheme since its launch on 1 May this year. Over 300 inquiries have been received from prospective scheme members representing the various breeds of sheep in this country.

Sir Michael Shaw: Will my hon. Friend confirm that
she will do everything that she can to encourage the continued interest in these schemes, because the disease is imported and difficult to discern and such schemes are important to safeguard our flocks?

Mrs. Fenner: There is evidence, I assure my hon. Friend, of considerable interest by flock owners, although it is not possible to say how many of the current inquiries will result in accredited flocks.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Mr. Dover: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 8 July.

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House I shall be having further meetings later today.

Mr. Dover: Does my right hon. Friend accept that the recovery of the country will depend to a great degree on the productivity and performance of engineering firms, particularly the smaller ones? If so, will she find time today to discuss with her right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Industry the possible reintroduction of the


small engineering firms investment scheme, which was withdrawn a few weeks ago because it was too successful, and under which firms could obtain a one—third grant towards investment in new machinery?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend that the small engineering firms investment scheme introduced in the Budget was very successful. The allocation for it then was £20 million, which has had to be increased to £30 million. However, we have had to close the scheme to applications from the end of May. I shall have a word with my right hon. Friend, but, in the meantime, other funds are available for high technology engineering and I hope that applications will be made for those.

Mr. Ashton: Will the right hon. Lady find time to look at Tuesday's Hansard, in which she condemned ASLEF for trying to stick to a 1919 agreement? Why is it fine for her to fight to the bitter end in the Falklands for an 1832 agreement and have a full inquiry into the matter, but refuse to do anything about the ASLEF strike?

The Prime Minister: The two things bear no comparison to one another.

Mr. Adley: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, while many people will feel that the wrangling over responsibility for the Falklands has certain party political overtones, there is, none the less, universal acclaim for our forces? Can she say whether any decision has yet been made on the award of a campaign medal for those forces who took part?

The Prime Minister: Yes. The Queen has approved the institution of a South Atlantic medal for those who served in the South Atlantic. At present, the details are contained in a White Paper which is at the printers, and which I hope will be laid before the House next week.

Mr. James Hamilton: With regard to the point made by the hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Dover) about the engineering industry, will the Prime Minister concede that the first casualty in any economic crisis is the construction industry, particularly in Scotland, where there are hundreds of thousands of people unemployed? Is she aware that if public funds were made available these people could be used to the best possible advantage of the country, getting them off supplementary benefit and working for the benefit of the country?

The Prime Minister: My right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced a package for the construction industry in the last Budget. I know that the hon. Member and many other hon. Members wish that it could be larger. However, it could be larger if we spent less on current expenditure and allocated more for investment.

Mr. Cockeram: May I remind the Prime Minister of two recent public inquiries, neither of which has been followed up, and ask her whether she shares the uneasy feeling of the country that the Falklands inquiry could have a similar ending? Perhaps she will recall the Bingham inquiry into sanction—breaking in Rhodesia, and the Crown Agents inquiry, which cost the British taxpayer over £100 million, both of which revealed grave misdemeanours, but neither of which was followed through? Is she aware that there is concern in the country that the Falklands inquiry could lead to the same result?

The Prime Minister: Certainly the Crown Agents inquiry was prolonged, but it really consisted of two inquiries. I agree with my hon. Friend in his criticsm of the length of time. The Bingham inquiry, too, was quite long, and it was suggested that it should be followed by another, but that suggestion was not approved by the House. There has been a widespread demand for an inquiry over the Falklands. A number of people were involved—some of whom resigned—in the Falkland Islands issue, and they feel that they should have the privilege of an inquiry. I must take that fact into account, together with the widespread demand for an inquiry.

Mr. David Steel: Are the Government still hoping to bid for the Nissan car company to set up its European manufacturing basis in this country? If so, what will be the right hon. Lady's response to the executives of that company who have criticised British industrial relations and our social class system?

The Prime Minister: I understand that the Nissan car company has not yet decided whether to continue its efforts to find a plant in Europe, whether to continue its efforts to come here, or whether it should postpone its searches for the time being. On the whole, Japanese management, when it has come to this country, has been most successful, and I hope that the Japanese will take the recent improvements in industrial relations in the private sector very much into account in any decisions that they make.

Mr. Leighton: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 8 July.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Leighton: Will the Prime Minister tell the House today whether the shameful projected sale of Britoil will be by fixed price or by tender?

The Prime Minister: Such decisions are not taken until much nearer the time. We shall decide in the light of all previous experience and the advice that we receive.

Mr. Shersby: Will my right hon. Friend take time today to study the wise words of the hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Johnson), which appear on the Order Paper as an amendment to early—day motion 596, in which he condemns the unjustified nature of the ASLEF strike and the hardship that it is causing to thousands of commuters?

The Prime Minister: I agree that the ASLEF strike is causing hardship to the travelling public and to many people whose small businesses depend on the railway service for freight or for getting supplies to their business. It is also very much against the future interests of the railways themselves. I hope that those who are having ASLEF meetings shortly will take that factor into account.

Mr. Foot: In the light of the reply that the right hon. Lady gave a minute or two ago about the sale of Britoil, will she say how she intends to ensure that the Government avoid the scandal that was associated with Amersham International? In view of the legislation that the Secretary of State for Energy has framed, will she make sure that he will make a statement to the House on how the matter is to be dealt with in the coming weeks, so that the country is not subjected to a similar scandal when the House is not sitting?

The Prime Minister: One can either put a sale out to fixed price or to tender. Many people are sometimes very wise in retrospect about the fixed price process. It is astonishing that many who are wise in retrospect do not criticise that same price when it is published in prospect.

Mr. Foot: Is the right hon. Lady really proud of what happened with Amersham International? Will she attempt to satisfy the House on the other matter, and get the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House before the recess about how the Government propose to proceed?

The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friend may not be ready to make such a statement before the recess. Nevertheless, it is important, if the market is right, that we should proceed with the sale. One thing is particularly important, and it is that those who work in the company should have a chance to purchase the shares. That factor should be taken into account in the method that is chosen. I say again that far more questions were asked of me after the sale of Amersham International than were ever asked of me about the price before the sale.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there are Conservative members who are concerned about the terms of reference of the inquiry into the Falklands Islands conflict, and that many of us believe that the inquiry should go back over at least 20 years, so that the civil servant niggers in the woodpile in the Foreign Office who have sold British interests down the river over many years are identified and their names made public, and so that not only Ministers resign, but that civil servants are moved to lesser positions where they cannot continue to damage British interests?

The Prime Minister: We shall be debating this matter later, but my hon. Friend will notice in the terms of reference that the Committee can take into account all such factors from previous periods as may be relevant to the questions that it has to decide.

Mr. Winterton: And made public?

The Prime Minister: It is for the Committee to make public what it wishes, subject to the conditions that we shall put on publication of items such as Cabinet papers or security documents with a classification. I shall go into detail on the matter in the debate.

Mr. Cunliffe: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 8 July.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Cunliffe: Is the Prime Minister aware of the serious anomaly that would exist if nurses were to accept the Government's revised pay offer? Now that phase 2 of the Government's fees and lodging allowance is to be activated, it means that some auxiliary nurses will be 68p a week worse off, staff nurses will be 1p a week better off, the average nurse will be 30p a week worse off, and ward sisters 69p a week worse off. Does the right hon. Lady agree that this is a serious anomaly and that it is rather unjust? As 60,000 out of 420,000 nurses will be affected, will she ask the Minister to reconsider the position?

The Prime Minister: The precise pattern of the pay award under the general 7½ per cent. increase is worked out by the Whitley council, and the offer is made by it. How the percentage varies from one grade of nurse to another is again a matter for the council to work out.
As for charges and prices, we all have to face increased charges and prices, and that is perhaps a good reason for trying to keep down some of the public sector increases.

Mr. Peyton: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) that the Foreign Office is a nest of spies and incompetents is more useful as a reflection of the state of his mind than as an indication of the true state of affairs?

The Prime Minister: I think that it would be as well to await the conclusions of the review, the setting up of which we have not yet debated.

Mr. Foster: Is not the Prime Minister betraying the trusteeship of the national interest that is placed in her hands by the country by refraining from bringing together the two parties in the railway dispute? If the British Railways Board is looking after the railway's interests and ASLEF is rightly looking after its members' interests, who is looking after the country's interests? Is that not the right hon. Lady's job?

The Prime Minister: The responsibility for running British Rail for the benefit of the travelling public and those who use British Rail for freight purposes is vested in the British Railways Board. It is for that board to run the railways according to the terms with which it is charged. Many people who work for the railways—indeed, the vast majority—are ready and willing to carry on, and I hope that that will soon apply to ASLEF—as it does at the moment to the NUR.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, along with hundreds of others, I travelled here today from Southend by train? Does my right hon. Friend think it appropriate to offer a word of encouragement and congratulation to the increasing number of train drivers who are continuing to serve the travelling public?

The Prime Minister: We were very pleased when the NUR took the decision that it did. As my hon. Friend suggests, I should like to offer encouragement and congratulations to those ASLEF drivers who are at work, carrying out their duties to the travelling public. They are serving themselves, their families and the railways far better than those who are out on strike.

Mr. Meacher: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 8 July.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Meacher: Will the Prime Minister explain what sense it can possibly make to give such unquestioning support to the British Railways Board when the introduction of seven—to—nine hour flexible rostering will, according to British Rail's figures, save less that £ ½ million this year, which is less that one—tenth of 1 per cent. of the likely British Rail deficit, and when savings over the next three years will still be only £9 million, when the dispute is costing £9 million a day? Is that not a ludicrously false economy? Does it not suggest that the Prime Minister's real purpose in this dispute is to break ASLEF?

The Prime Minister: No. It suggests that those who are charged with the responsibility of running the railways should be allowed to get on with it. Conservative Members have not the arrogance to assume that they know how to


run everything better than those charged with the duty of managing. The flexible rostering issue has been through all the railway negotiating procedures, including a lengthy and detailed examination by the Railway Staff National Tribunal under Lord McCarthy. The hon. Gentleman's strictures presumably apply to Lord McCarthy as well.

Mr. Jack Straw: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. During Prime Minister's Questions the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) described the

generality of civil servants in the Foreign Office as "niggers". May we have a ruling, Mr. Speaker, on whether that is accepted parliamentary language when the officials concerned cannot answer back?

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) used the phrase that has been used many times and on which I do not wish to rule. The expression he used was "Nigger in the woodpile".

Prayer Cards

Mr. Christopher Price: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I raise the matter of the rules concerning prayer cards? I have not been able to give you notice of this because the incident has arisen only since the beginning of Question Time.
The rules for prayer cards have been laid down firmly in "Erskine May" and, in the early years, in Hansard. As I understand the ruling, it is that prayer cards reserve seats for the Member concerned and that it is an abuse for him to use them simply to take part in prayers and to hand over his seat to another right hon. or hon. Member who is unable to rise early enough to get to his seat in time.
It has always been a principle of prayer cards—which in many ways are a rather childish device—that early birds catch worms. If they are simply to be used to reserve seats for other hon. Members, that is an abuse of the process upon which I ask you, Mr. Speaker, to rule.

Mr. Speaker: Prayer cards apply to the person who places them. The House understands that. I know of nothing within the rules of the House which precludes any hon. Member giving way to another of his right hon. or hon. Friends if he wishes so to do.

Business of the House

Mr. Michael Foot: Will the Leader of the House state the business for next week?

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY I2 JuLY—Progress on remaining stages of the Finance Bill.
Motion on the Coal Industry (Limits on Grants) Order.
TUESDAY I3 JULY—Completion of remaining stages of the Finance Bill.
WEDNESDAY I4 JuLY—Supply (24th Allotted Day). Debate on an Opposition motion on the failure of the Government's regional and industrial policies.
Motion on the Industrial Development (Northern Ireland) Order.
THURSDAY I5 JuLY—Supply (25th Allotted Day). A debate on common fisheries policy. The relevant European Community document numbers will be printed in the Official Report.
Motion on the Army, Air Force and Naval Discipline Acts (Continuation) Order.
The Chairman of Ways and Means has named opposed private business for consideration at seven o'clock.
FRIDAY I6 JULY—Motions on Northern Ireland Orders on Appropriation (No. 2) and on agricultural marketing.
MONDAY I9 JULY—Supply (26th Allotted Day). A debate on the Royal Navy on a motion for the Adjournment of the House.
Motions on Supply procedure.

[Fisheries debate: Documents 7787/82; 7786/82; 7788/82; 7863/82; 7954/82.

Relevant reports of the European Legislation Committee.

24th report of Session 1981–82, paras. 2 to 6 (HC 21—xxiv).

26th report of Session 1981–82, para. 3 (HC 21—xxvi).]

Mr. Foot: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the rearrangements that have been made in the Government's proposed business following our request.
May I put to the right hon. Gentleman two matters arising from replies which were given earlier today? First, may we have a statement from the Secretary of State for Energy in the next few days, or at any rate before the House goes into recess, about the sale of the British National Oil Corporation in order to avoid the fiasco of Amersham International?
Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman ensure that there will be further statements about the railways dispute? It is a question no longer of returning to 1919 or some such date, but of whether the British Railways Board is prepared to return to the arrangements that it was prepared to make on 25 June. There is now close agreement on the proposals for a settlement that were put forward by the British Railways Board on 25 June. Will the Government make an effort to achieve a settlement on that reasonable basis?
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, in response to a request that I have made on previous occasions and which I repeat now, to give an undertaking that there will be a debate on unemployment in Government time before the House rises for the recess? I hope that he will be able to do that today.

Mr. Biffen: I shall certainly bear in mind the right hon. Gentleman's request that there should be a debate on unemployment in Government time, although that is a much—spent asset at this time of the year. There could be no such consideration in respect of business for next week.
I shall draw to the attention of my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Energy and for Transport the right hon. Gentleman's requests about the railways dispute and the possible sale of BNOC's assets. I think that the right hon. Gentleman will admit at once that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Transport has been anxious to keep the House informed on the railway dispute, and I have no doubt that he will wish to continue in that way.

Mr. David Steel: When does the Leader of the House intend to table the motions for the debate on Monday 19 July on Supply procedure? When he does so, will he bear in mind his responsibilities as Leader of the House to the House as a whole? In particular, will he safeguard the right of those 58 hon. Members who are members of the Opposition but not of the official Opposition?

Mr. Biffen: I hope to be able to table the motions by the end of this week.
As the right hon. Gentleman will know, there has already been a debate in the House on the Select Committee's report. My predecessor gave his views on the topic to which the right hon. Gentleman refers and my views are close to those.

Sir Paul Bryan: Has my right hon. Friend noted early—day motion 531 about overseas students' fees?
[That this House welcomes the report of the Overseas Student Trust as a basis for an enduring policy for overseas students' fees; recognises its recommendations as a responsible balance between British interests and obligations, and the needs of overseas students; urges Her Majesty's Government to accept in particular the recommendation that students from British dependent territories should pay the home level of fees thus removing the anomaly by which a student from, for example, Hong Kong or the Falkland Islands, can be asked to pay up to 12 times as much for a course as a student from the European Economic Community; and supports the proposal that concessionary levels of fees should be considered for Cyprus.]
It has been signed by no fewer than 150 hon. Members on both sides of the House. In view of the great interest in the subject, will my right hon. Friend arrange a debate before the recess?

Mr. Biffen: My hon. Friend raises an important point. I am sure that he appreciates that the Government, in the form of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, pays tribute to the quality of the report. I cannot guarantee Government time for such a debate. It is the kind of topic that is eminently suitable for discussion on the Consolidated Fund.

Mr. Charles R. Morris: Has the right hon. Gentleman seen early—day motion 580?
[That this House, deeply concerned to achieve balanced economic growth throughout Great Britain, and believing that the proposed massive expansion of Stansted Airport would produce unjustifiable urban growth and congestion in North West Essex and East Hertfordshire,

calls upon Her Majesty's Government to opt now for a policy which, while providing for a modest increase in activity at Stansted, subject to a fixed ceiling, would place the greater emphasis on taking all possible steps to expand the use of provincial airports to meet demand in the region of its origin, the case for which has been well documented and shown to be financially viable by various groups, notably the North of England Regional Consortium.]
The motion, signed by 120 hon. Members on both sides of the House, seeks to promote the interests of regional airports in preference to the establishment of a third London airport at Stansted. Bearing in mind the volume of support in the House for an early end to the inquiry into the Stansted airport proposals, will the right hon. Gentleman give undertaking that an early debate will take place on the issue?

Mr. Biffen: The right hon. Gentleman is one of a posse of distinguished advocates of the virtues of Manchester airport. I think that he will appreciate that there are difficulties about having the kind of debate that he proposes when there is still a detailed inquiry taking place into the Stansted proposals.

Sir William Clark: Now that the Megaw report has been published, and in view of the wide public interest in the subject of civil servants' index—linked pensions, will there be a debate before the recess on the Scott report, which is now 18 months old?

Mr. Biffen: I would be happier saying that I hope that it will take place this Session rather than before the recess.

Mr. John Roper: I refer to the business next Monday week. Will the Leader of the House accept that hon. Members understand why the days for debating defence this year are so close together? Will he try to ensure in future that they are more fairly spread throughout the year?

Mr. Biffen: I accept at once the inconvenience that has been caused. On the other hand, it was not just a matter of procedure. There was the whole question of the difficulty of having debates taking into account the Falklands problem.

Mr. David Ennals: Does the Leader of the House recall that several weeks ago I raised with him early—day motion 342?
[That this House expresses its concern at the slaughter of 200,000 baby seals in Northern Canada and, bearing in mind that the United Kingdom is one of the largest importers of seal pelts, welcomes the resolutions passed overwhelmingly by the European Parliament (160 votes to 10) on 11th March calling for a ban on the importation into the European Economic Community of all skins and products derived from young harp and hooded seals and on products coming from seals whose stocks are depleted, threatened or endangered; and calls upon Her Majesty's Government not only to accept this proposal at the Council of Ministers but also, following the example of the United States of America, France, Holland, Italy and Sweden, to take action itself to introduce such an import ban as soon as possible.]
The motion has now attracted over 300 signatures of Members on both sides of the House. It concerns the importation of certain types of seal skins. The right hon.
Gentleman showed an interest when I raised the matter. Can he assure me that a positive statement will be made before the House rises for the recess?

Mr. Biffen: Since then, we have had a debate. Admittedly, it arose on the Adjournment, but it was nevertheless a debate. The Minister had to answer many of the questions implicit in the motion.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: My right hon. Friend will be aware that the Government have published an exceptionally interesting, important and controversial White Paper in response to the report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology. This raises matters that many of us regard as being among the most fundamental and important that we discuss in the House. How soon may we have an opportunity to discuss the report and the Government's response?

Mr. Biffen: I should like to consider as sympathetically as I can the issue that my hon. Friend raises. With all the sympathy that I can muster, I cannot say that there will be a debate next week.

Mr. Donald Coleman: Has the Leader of the House seen early—day motion 602?
[That this House fully supports the joint shop stewards committee of British Steel Stocksbridge and Tinsley Park in their endeavours to make sure that the replacement for the 'Atlantic Conveyor' is built in a British shipyard and made from British steel, and requests the Government to pay compensation to the owners of 'Atlantic Conveyor' on these conditions.]
Will the right hon. Gentleman arrange for a statement by the Government requiring that the replacement for the "Atlantic Conveyor" should be made of British steel and that it should be built in a British shipyard? Does he agree that the statements by the chairman of the Cunard company seemed to indicate failure by the Daily Express to promote the spirit of patriotism to which it seems to have devoted itself?

Mr. Biffen: I shall resist the temptation to answer the second part of the question. The issue that the hon. Gentleman raises is one of great validity. I should have thought that it was particularly suitable for consideration in the debate on Wednesday.

Mr. Neil Thorne: Does my right hon. Friend remember my early—day motion 232?
[That this House believes that those who have been convicted of an indictable offence, other than a traffic offence, for which a term of imprisonment is an option open to the sentencing judge, should be ineligible for jury service for a period of 10 years.]
Has he seen recent reports in the Daily Mail referring to Mr. John Luck, a frequently convicted criminal who alleges that he served on the jury at Snaresbrook Crown court? In view of the scandalous behaviour of Opposition Members serving on the Administration of Justice Bill Committee in blocking the action necessary to revise the conditions of jury service, will my right hon. Friend provide an early opportunity for a debate on the matter?

Mr. Biffen: My hon. Friend raises an important point about qualification for jury service. Many hon. Members will regret that it has not been possible to incorporate the provisions to which he refers in legislation which is before the House. I know that my right hon. Friend the Home

Secretary has this matter very much at heart and that he will be considering what may be done in the next Session of Parliament.

Mr. Bob Cryer: Will the Leader of the House arrange a debate next week on the major topic of the day, the rail strike, especially as the Government are backing the British Railway s Board which appears to be acting as poodle on behalf of the Government to the tune of being provided with £9 million a day to save an alleged £1·5 million in a full year of operation of new rostors? Should not these arguments be deployed by the Government? Is it not pressure from the Government that has brought about the strike? Should they not be accountable to Parliament through a debate?

Mr. Biffen: I have already said to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that I will refer to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Transport the interest that has been shown about a statement being made.

Mr. John Stokes: In view of the exchange that took place yesterday during foreign affairs questions, will my right hon. Friend find time for a debate before the recess on the work of Members of the European Assembly so that we in this House may evaluate the work of those Members and of the Assembly?

Mr. Biffen: That is a most intriguing subject for debate. I must confess that there is no time available for it next week. It is possible that we shall again debate European affairs before the recess when my hon. Friend could perhaps make his speech.

Mr. Joan Evans: Has the Leader of the House given further consideration to the request made to him by hon. Members on both sides for a debate on disarmament to coincide with the United Nations special session on that subject? Although the right hon. Gentleman has suggested that it can be discussed during defence debates, this is not entirely satisfactory, although he is presumably recommending that the matter could be raised on the Army, Navy and Air Force Estimates.

Mr. Biffen: I think that is true. In the defence debates so far, a number of contributions have been made precisely on the question of where controlled disarmament should take place. Given the grave shortage of Government time, I cannot hold out much hope for a separate debate.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: When my right hon. Friend arranged next week's business, was he aware that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food would be revealing this morning that exports of cheap subsidised food to Russia in 1981 exceeded 3 million tonnes, an all—time high? The figure compares with 2 million tonnes in the previous year and less than 1 million tonnes in the year before that. The announcement coincided with information released this afternoon that there has been an alarming reduction in the average consumption per household of meat, butter and milk. Does my right hon. Friend not think it would be right to have an early debate on the cost of food?

Mr. Biffen: No, I was not aware of that. Next week's programme is saturated with very important business. My hon. Friend can pursue the topic that he raises in a free enterprise fashion on the Consolidated Fund Bill.

Mr. Les Huckfield: As the British Railways Board has lost in each of the past three days the same amount of money as it might gain by the introduction of fully flexible rosters over the next three years, and as the Secretary of State for Transport has already made an announcement outside the House which will affect fundamentally the future of British Rail's finances, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it is about time that the Secretary of State for Transport told the House about it?

Mr. Biffen: I do not accept the implication that my right hon. Friend has been negligent in his duties to the House in respect of the dispute. However, as I said to the Leader of the Opposition, I shall draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the anxiety that a further statement should be made.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: Will my right hon. Friend arrange for a Minister from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to make a statement in the House next week about Professor Pinder Wilson, the eminent archaeologist, who was detained and subsequently imprisoned by the Afghan regime? He should inform the House of the action that the Government are taking to obtain the early release of this distinguished archaeologist, who has made a great contribution to his profession.

Mr. Biffen: I shall draw to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary the matter that has been raised by my hon. Friend. I know that anxiety about it is not confined to him.

Dr. J. Dickson Mabon: In view of the right hon. Gentleman's encouraging reply to the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes), may I take it that, because the Select Committee on European Legislation &c. has made a positive recommendation and the matter is urgent, we shall be debating the proposals for unitary elections to the European Parliament?

Mr. Biffen: I was not aware that so innocent a reply as mine could open up such chasms.

Mr. John Silkin: In view of the discussions between the Secretary of State for Defence and Mr. Ian Sinclair of Australia about the future of HMS "Invincible", will the Leader of the House ensure that the Secretary of State for Defence makes a statement to the House on that matter before the Royal Navy debate next week?

Mr. Biffen: I am not sure that my right hon. Friend will have anything to report as soon as that, but I shall draw his attention to the matter.

Social Services (Steering Group's Report)

Mr. David Ennals: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
today's report of the Expenditure Steering Group for Personal Social Services".
The matter is urgent because decisions must be taken soon on proposals involving the slashing of local authority social services by 9 per cent. in 1983–84 and up to 12·8 per cent. in 1985–86, with catastrophic consequences for the most deprived people in our society. The issue could hardly be more specific since the cuts will involve the loss of 11,000 residential places in old people's homes, 3,300 places in children's homes, 1,400 places in homes for the mentally handicapped, 80,000 meals on wheels and 70,000 home helps. The consequence will be a cut of 28,000 jobs in social services departments.
If that is part of the new post—Falklands spirit, it is deplorable and should be stopped but should be debated.

Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Member for Norwich, North (Mr. Ennals) gave me notice before 12 noon today that he would seek leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a matter that he believes should have urgent consideration, namely,
today's report of the Expenditure Steering Group for Personal Social Services".
I listened carefully to what the right hon. Gentleman said. As the House knows, I am directed to take into account the several factors set out in the Order but to give no reason for my decision. I must rule that the right hon. Gentleman's submission does not fall within the provisions of the Standing Order, and, therefore, I cannot submit his application to the House.

Falkland Islands Casualties (Burial)

Mr. George Robertson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I have for written answer on the Order Paper today question No. 50 which asks whether the Prime Minister has yet made a decision about bringing back the bodies of Servicemen killed in the Falkland Islands. I would have expected a written answer to the question later this afternoon, but at 3.35 pm there was no answer on the board.
However, The Standard today has the front page headline:
Our war dead to come home".
It also says:
Families can choose where burials take place—Maggie".
The report states:
The bodies of British servicemen killed in the Falklands war and buried on the islands will be brought home for reburial in all cases where this is the wish of the next of kin.
However, I draw attention to the next sentence:
Mrs. Thatcher was telling MPs of the decision this afternoon.
Although I welcome the decision that the Prime Minister has apparently made, I ask for your guidance, Mr. Speaker, on whether Members of Parliament who table questions should obtain answers to them before the press gives the information to everyone else in Britain.

Mr. Speaker: First, the hon. Gentleman did not give me notice of his point of order. Secondly, I never comment on the contents of Ministers' replies—

Mr. Robertson: I have not had a reply.

Mr. Speaker: —although I gather that that is not the burden of the hon. Gentleman's complaint. I cannot comment as long as the question is on the Order Paper. If the information gets out elsewhere, I cannot comment on it.

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I, too, am

distressed about what I read in the newspaper. Until a few moments ago, my worry was that I might have been asked that question orally, knowing full well that a written reply would be given. I had prepared exactly what I would say in those circumstances. It is remotely possible that the report is speculation, because letters arrive frequently at 10 Downing Street and at the Ministry of Defence. However, I am sorry that it has occurred, especially when we were meticulous not to reveal anything beforehand. I shall try to find out precisely what has happened.

Members of Parliament (Dress)

Mr. Robert Banks: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will be aware that considerable expense was incurred in providing the Chamber with air conditioning. Do you agree that it is appropriate that hon. Members should dress in a way that befits hon. Members and that they should wear jackets and ties?

Mr. Speaker: That is the custom in every Parliament.

Business of the House

Ordered,
That, at this day's sitting, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (2) of Standing Order No. 18 (Business of Supply), the business of Supply may be anticipated by the Motion in the name of the Prime Minister relating to Falkland Islands Review and that the provisions of paragraph (1) of Standing Order No. 3 (Exempted business) shall apply to proceedings on that Motion; and if proceedings on that Motion have not been concluded at the expiry of Three hours after they have been entered upon, any Amendments which have been selected by Mr. Speaker may thereupon be moved, the Questions thereon shall be put forthwith and Mr. Speaker shall then put the main Question; and that thereafter the business of Supply may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour and any Motion for the Adjournment of the House made during such proceedings shall not lapse at Ten o'clock.—[Mr. Biffen.]

Falkland Islands Review

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): I beg to move,
That this House approves the decision of Her Majesty's Government to set up a Falkland Islands review as announced by the Prime Minister in her reply to a Question by the right honourable Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, on 6th July 1982.

Mr. Speaker: I have not selected any amendments.

The Prime Minister: As early as 8 April, I announced in reply to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) that there would be a review of the way in which the Government Departments concerned had discharged their responsibilities in the period leading up to the invasion of the Falkland Islands.
Since then, although a few have argued that it is not necessary, there is widespread agreement that a review of some sort should be conducted and that there should be prior consultation with the Leader of the Opposition and the leaders of other opposition parties in the House who are Privy Councillors. It would be fair to say that the consultations led to broad agreement on the nature, scope and composition of the review.
Accordingly, I set out the form of the review and its terms of reference in my reply of Tuesday to the Leader of the Opposition, and I welcome the opportunity to explain to the House today the reasons why the Government have decided to appoint a Committee of six Privy Councillors to conduct the review and to give it the terms of reference set out in my answer to the right hon. Gentleman.
I wish to deal in turn with the nature of the review, its scope and its composition. As to its nature, the overriding considerations are that it should be independent, that it should command confidence, that its members should have access to all relevant papers and persons and that it should complete its work speedily. Those four considerations taken together led naturally to a Committee of Privy Councillors. Such a Committee has one great advantage over other forms of inquiry. As it conducts its deliberations in private and its members are all Privy Councillors, there need be no reservations about providing it with all the relevant evidence—including much that is highly sensitive—subject to safeguards upon its use and publication.
A Committee of Privy Councillors can be authorised to see relevant departmental documents, Cabinet and Cabinet Committee memoranda and minutes, and intelligence assessments and reports, all on Privy Councillor terms. Many of these documents could not be made available to a tribunal of inquiry, a Select Committee or a Royal Commission.
The Committee will also be able to take evidence from any Ministers or officials whom it wishes to see, and I hope that former Ministers or officials and others who may be invited to assist the Committee will think it right to do so.
There are several precedents for a Government setting up a Committee of Privy Councillors to look into matters where the functioning of the Government has been called in question and sensitive information and issues are involved.
I will refer to just one. A conference of Privy Councillors was established in November 1955 to examine security procedures in the public services as a result of the defection of Burgess and Maclean. The results of the inquiry were reported to the House by the then Prime Minister on 8 March 1956, although he stated that it would not be in the public interest to publish the full text of the report or to make known all its recommendations.
In the case of the present review, information made available to the Committee whose disclosure would be prejudicial to national security or damaging to the international relations of the United Kingdom will need to be protected. The Government will therefore suggest to the Committee that it should seek to avoid including any such information in its main report which is to be published, and that, if it needs to draw conclusions or make recommendations which, if published, would entail the disclosure of such information, it should submit them to the Government in a confidential annex which will not be published.
In the last resort the Government must retain the right to delete from the Committee's report before publication any material whose disclosure would be prejudicial to national security or damaging to the international relations of the United Kingdom. But I very much hope that the arrangements that I have just described will make it unnecessary for the Government to do that. However, should it be necessary I can give the House the following assurances.
First, the Government will make no deletions save strictly on the grounds of protecting national security or international relations. Secondly, Ministers will consider any proposals for deletions individually and critically and will accept such proposals only on the grounds I have specified. Thirdly, the Chairman of the Committee will be consulted if any deletions have to be proposed. The fact that the Committee would know what deletions had been made from its report offers the best assurance to those who might believe that the Government would try to make unjustified deletions.
Nevertheless, I repeat that it is the Government's aim to present to Parliament the report of the Committee in full.
So much for the nature of the review. I turn now to its scope. First, geographically, it includes the dependencies—that is, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Secondly, the review will be directed to the events leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April. If these events are to be fairly viewed, they must be seen against the background of negotiations, actions, intelligence and other assessments over the years. For that reason the terms of reference given to the Committee empower it to take account of all such factors in previous years as are relevant.
For this purpose the Committee will need to have access to any relevant documents of previous Administrations, as well as to documents of the present Administration. I have consulted Mr. Harold Macmillan, my noble Friend Lord Home, the right hon. Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson), my right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath) and the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), and they have agreed that the Committee should have access to the relevant documents of their Administrations, subject to the following conventions, which are consistent with what has been done in the past.
First, documents will be made available to members of the Committee by virtue of their being Privy Councillors and solely for the purposes of this review.
Secondly, any member of a previous Administration who is invited to give evidence to the Committee will be able to exercise his normal right to see documents which he saw as a member of that Administration.
Thirdly, serving and former officials and members of the Armed Forces invited to give evidence to the Committee will be able to see documents which they saw as advisers to Ministers on matters covered by the review.
Fourthly, documents of previous Administrations will not be disclosed to members of the present Administration or to any other persons not entitled to see them.
Fifthly, documents made available to the Committee, and any copies made of those documents for the use of members of the Committee, will be returned to the Departments from which they came as soon as they are no longer required for the purposes of the Committee's review.
Sixthly, it is understood that the Committee may need to describe in its report the gist or purport of documents made available to it, so far as that can be done consistently with the protection of national security and the international relations of the United Kingdom. But no part of Cabinet or Cabinet Committee documents or other documents which carry a security classification may be reproduced in the Committee's report or otherwise published without the agreement of the Government and that of the former Prime Minister of the Administration concerned.
So that there is absolutely no misunderstanding on this point, I repeat that no member of the present Government can or will see any documents of any previous Administration unless he or she, himself or herself, was a member of such an Administration and is entitled for that reason to see those papers.
There is one other procedural matter on which I should say a few words. Although it will be for the Committee itself to determine its own procedure, it will be suggested to the Chairman that should the Committee wish to criticise any individual it should, before incorporating that criticism in its report, give the person concerned details of the criticism, and an opportunity to make representations, orally or in writing. At that stage the Committee would have to decide whether to allow the individual concerned to be legally represented.
Even though the review will be conducted in private, it is important that individuals should not be inhibited in giving evidence to the Committee through fears of making themselves vulnerable to criticism which they may think unjustified and which they might not be given an opportunity of rebutting before the Committee.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: The Prime Minister has outlined a massive amount of work for the Committee. Will she tell us about its staff? Are they to be drawn exclusively from the Cabinet Office and the Civil Service, or may members of the staff be brought in from outside?

The Prime Minister: The staff of the Committee are being provided under the leadership of the Home Office. The Home Office civil servants have not been connected either with Foreign Office work or with Ministry of Defence work, but they have been accustomed to handling

intelligence. It seems right and proper to make arrangements for them to provide the secretarial assistance to the Committee
Finally, I turn to the composition of the review—the membership of the Committee.

Mr. Andrew Faulds: rose—

The Prime Minister: I shall, with your permission, Mr. Speaker, be replying to the debate this evening and will hope then to answer arty questions that have arisen. Does the hon. Gentleman still wish to persist?

Mr. Faulds: Is it intended that the inquiry should be free to examine the political advisability of the Prime Minister's recent exercise in the South Atlantic? That is very important.

The Prime Minister: The Committee will act within its terms of refere ace as it construes them. The terms of reference are:
To review the way in which the responsibilities of Government in relation to the Falkland Islands and their dependencies were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, taking account of all such factors in previous years as are relevant; and to report.
Judging by the distinction of those who have agreed to serve on the review, I think that we can leave them to interpret the terms of reference as they think best fitted to the discharge of their duties.
I come to the membership of the Committee. As I announced in my reply to the right hon. Gentleman on Tuesday, Lord Franks has agreed to be the Chairman. I know that that choice is acceptable and indeed welcome to those whom I have consulted. Lord Franks will bring an unrivalled breadth of experience to the work of his Committee, and we are fortunate that he is ready to take on the task.
As I also announced on Tuesday, the other members of the Committee will be my noble Friend Lord Barber, Lord Lever of Manchester, Sir Patrick Nairne, the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) and my noble Friend Lord Watkinson. The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve that Sir Patrick Nairne be sworn a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition proposed the names of the right hon. Member for Leeds, South and Lord Lever. I hope that the House will share my view that a Committee with this membership gives us the best possible assurance that the review will be carried out with independence and integrity.

Mr. Dick Douglas: Does the right hon. Lady agree that there might be an outside impression that this coterie is comfortable, conservative and clubable, as there is no female member on the Committee? Do only males understand war and its events? Why does not the right hon. Lady appoint someone suitable from her own sex to the Privy Council such as Mary Goldring, who might bring in an outside view, away from the claustrophobic atmosphere of Westminster and Whitehall?

The Prime Minister: All those concerned with choosing those who should be on the Committee have been anxious to select people who have the right experience, sagacity and integrity to conduct the review. I believe that that is how it will be seen outside.

Mr. Dalyell: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must not keep interrupting. The Prime Minister has not given way, as far as I know. Is the Prime Minister giving way?

Mr. Bob Cryer: Of course she is.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Prime Minister can speak for herself.

Mr. Dalyell: The Prime Minister is a lawyer. Is there not a case for having either an international lawyer or a Queen's Counsel on the Committee? Is there not a case for having someone representing the view of what one might call the awkward squad?

The Prime Minister: My noble Friend Lord Barber is a distinguished lawyer, who practised for many years. Lord Lever is also a barrister. They will be well able to sift the facts from the opinions and to make a judgment upon the evidence and not upon the imagination.
The Committee must be given the time it needs to carry out its work thoroughly. But the review also needs to be completed as quickly as possible, and it is my hope that it can be completed within six months.
I have confined my comments to the setting up of the review, because that is the subject of the motion. We are not concerned today with the substance of the events that led up to the invasion of the Falkland Islands. That is for the review itself and for the debate that will follow publication of the Committee's report. I hope that hon. Members will welcome the review, and I commend the motion to the House.

Mr. Michael Foot: Since a review of the matter that we are debating was first raised in the House and outside, the Opposition have taken a view about the way in which it should be approached. We have believed from the beginning that there should be an inquiry or a review. We have believed that it should be directed predominantly to the events leading to the invasion at the beginning of April. We have believed that it should be reasonably swift in making its report to the House and the country. We have believed that the review must be likely to secure general support in the House. In particular, we have believed that the House should support the way in which the final publication of the review is to be made.
I shall respond to the Prime Minister's remarks. I shall say how far we think those requirements that we have always thought to be right have been fulfilled and how far we may proceed along those lines. The House would be wise to accept the Government's motion, and I shall give the reasons.
Major constitutional questions are involved in the establishment of a Committee of this nature. If in any quarter of the House there were any doubt on such a point, the possibility of misunderstanding was removed by the intervention of the right hon. Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath) a few days ago when he gave a fine display of his customary perception and bonhomie. In the manner in which he presented his case he showed that there was an important background to such reviews and that we should examine it carefully. In the main, I agree with what the right hon. Gentleman implied in his intervention. Important constitutional matters are involved. I do not seek to minimise them. The speech by the Prime Minister showed that she, too, accepted the importance of those constitutional questions.
There is the question of rummaging in the pigeon holes and other places where the work and deliberations of previous Governments may be found. I agree with what the right hon. Member for Sidcup implied. It would be an inhibition to good government if every incoming Administration were to spend considerable time examining what the previous Administration did, with special access to matters that the previous Administration had been most eager to keep quiet. That would not assist the processes of good government, although I know that some people think that that would be advantageous. In centuries gone by that was the practice of British Governments.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century incoming Governments spent a considerable part of the beginning of their period in office drawing up the measures of impeachment or Bills of attainder that they wished to make against their predecessors. No doubt they had good grounds to do so. I am not saying that any such possibilities have evaporated now.
In the early part of the eighteenth century a great barrier was placed against the way in which the Government conducted their affairs. Over a period, particularly in this century, not by any precise enactment—that does not make it any worse under our constitution—but by the general usage of Cabinet Government, there grew up the practice that Governments should not have access to the documents of their predecessors. That is a good rule. If it is to be abandoned, it should be done so only if there is a clear statement of proceedings, in circumstances that are fully understood.
There remains the issue that the right hon. Member for Sidcup underlined in his intervention—ministerial responsibility in these matters. If the proceedings of previous Governments are ransacked, ministerial responsibility to the House will be injured. I strongly favour sustaining ministerial responsibility. It is essential to parliamentary government. Ministers should not be allowed to shelter behind the claim that civil servants have offered them incorrect advice. They should take absolute responsibility for what they say. That principle could be injured if matters are not dealt with in the scrupulous way that the right hon. Gentleman suggested.
Civil Service responsibility may arise in the inquiry. Civil servants are not necessarily absolved from the advice that they give. Ministers who accept advice must take responsibility for it, but, in an incident such as this, it is right that the advice, suggestions and propositions about a course of action that a civil servant may have suggested should be examined. I do not refer to civil servants in any one Department, although I noticed that the Prime Minister was diffident about clearing the Foreign Office a little earlier. I hope that she will be a little more generous as we proceed—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"]—Because I favour being generous to everyone if I can—even the Foreign Office.
We are debating a matter of great concern to the whole country, as was demonstrated by the debates on 2 and 3 April. We are concerned to a considerable extent about the type of intelligence that was provided for the Government and what judgment was made on it by both Ministers and civil servants. There is no absolution for Ministers in the proposed inquiry. If we are to use any information that may be discovered about the failures of the intelligence service, it will involve civil servants. The matter must be examined. It is one of the central features of such an inquiry.

Mr. Robert Adley: As I understand it, the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting that it is not necessary, when considering the way in which the Government reached their decision, to compare the present decision-making process with previous decision-making processes. How is that so?

Mr. Foot: I am not suggesting that. I agree with the terms that the Prime Minister proposed and the interpretation that she placed upon them in her speech. I am not suggesting that there should be no comparisons between what happened on this and on previous occasions about the interpretation of intelligence. The Opposition have no desire, nor did we when we were in Government, to suppress, circumvent or hide information. The more the report brings the matter into the open, the better we shall like it and the better will be the service done to the nation.
I have not heard the right hon. Lady's statements on the rights of individuals who may be charged or accused or whose conduct may be criticised by the report. I was gratified to hear that they will have the right, prior to the report being published, to see what is said about them so that they will have an opportunity to comment. I assume that they will also be able to present their own views to the inquiry.
I have heard much in the past about various forms of tribunals of inquiry. I participated in some of the debates after which we set up the inquiries into tribunals of inquiry. We set them up because grave injustice had been done to individuals in many tribunals. It was the overwhelming opinion of the House—certainly on the Labour side—that there must be protection for people in those circumstances. Should anyone question what I say, they should examine the debates on the inquiry after the Vassall tribunal, for example, or earlier ones. People were implicated in inquiries at which they did not have the chance to defend themselves. Gross injustice was done to some of them. Some were excluded or driven from public life as a result of charges that they had not seen before they were published in newspaper headlines. I am opposed to British citizens, even if they are civil servants or in the Foreign Office, being subjected to that type of trial. The inquiry may have presented a different picture. Therefore, I warmly welcome what the right hon. Lady said.
It may be thought that inquiries are always to be approved and that they always have been. That is not so, partly for the reasons that the right hon. Member for Sidcup hinted at in his intervention and partly for others. The House has rejected the idea of inquiries on important occasions. In the main, the Opposition have always supported them. In circumstances of great national concern such as this, we have consistently argued for such inquiries. I warmly welcome the fact that the right hon. Lady and the Conservative Party now accept the necessity for an inquiry in present circumstances. It is a conversion. I say that as one who, together with my right hon. and hon. Friends, for many years argued for an inquiry into the Suez fiasco. There has been no such inquiry from that day to this. The Falklands crisis was solved by a considerable military success, but what preceded it cannot be called a diplomatic success.
It is wise for the House to have learnt about these matters. The Suez catastrophe led to the loss of British lives. This country's reputation was injured and great damage was done to our international affairs. That is why the Labour Party, with the Liberals of those times, pressed

hard for an investigation into Suez. I am glad that there has been a conversion. It would have been much better for the country if it had listened to what the Labour Party said on the matter some 20 or 25 years ago.

Sir Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): If the Opposition are so keen on inquiries now, why was there no inquiry into the invasion of Cyprus? That invasion was widely expected when the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends were in Government. They refused any inquiry or information.

Mr. Foot: The hon. Gentleman is misinformed. There was a Select Committee on the matter, on which my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) played a most distinguished and independent part. He was not silenced in any way. The Committee revealed many facts that were of great importance to the country. There was no suppression of the inquiry. We are now to have the type of inquiry that best suits the present circumstances. That is wise.

Mr. James Callaghan: Is my right hon. Friend a ware—I am sure that if he charges his memory he will recall it—that not only was there an inquiry, but the Foreign Secretary of the day and his officials appeared before the inquiry and gave evidence?

Mr. Foot: My right hon. Friend shows how unwise I am to give way to Conservative Members and how wise I am to give way to my right hon. and hon. Friends I shall follow that principle for the rest of my speech.

Sir Bernard Braine: The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) is a great parliamentarian. Would he consider it proper that the inquiry should investigate whether, in the course of this unhappy affair, the House of Commons was deceived? I refer particularly to the fact that, in undertaking diplomatic talks with representatives of the Argentine junta, Ministers but not Parliament were aware that among some 15,000 people who had disappeared in Argentina itself, most of whom must now be presumed dead, there were also British subjects. Should not that information have been conveyed to Parliament, and would it not have been justification for calling off talks with the Fascist junta?

Mr. Foot: I fully accept w hat the hon. Gentleman says. I only wish that greater attention had been paid to the disgraceful state of affairs in Argentina at that time. The hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Sir B. Braine) must also be more careful, because he was one of those who opposed an inquiry into Suez. I welcome his conversion. —[Interruption.]—I have been so forbearing that I did not mention that the right hon. Member for Sidcup was Chief Whip at the time. Such matters, of course, cannot be overlooked.
The inquiry will deal with a serious and important matter, and it will be of great benefit to the country if the matter is probed in the way in which the House is determined that it should be. I believe that the names of those appointed to the Committee are the guarantee that that will be so.

Mr. Douglas: I in no way impugn the integrity or excellence of the people chosen but this is a House of Commons matter. Will my right hon. Friend therefore give us some idea of the criteria on which he chose those representing the Labour Party?

Mr. Foot: I wish to carry my party with me on this matter. I realised that in picking two names out of such a comprehensive selection I might involve myself in some difficulties. I think that is better for us to consider the two who have in fact been selected. I am sure that all Labour Members will have absolute confidence in the two people selected to perform this important function.
My hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) is always eager to ensure that the "awkward squad" is properly represented. I can assure him that, if he had been a member of the last Labour Cabinet, he would know that my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Lever qualifies for that appellation better than anyone else in the country, rising even to the high standards of my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian.
As I have said, the inquiry will investigate extremely important matters. I believe that it should be conducted speedily. If there is any difference in emphasis between me and the right hon. Lady about the way in which she presented this matter to the House, it is on timing. I do not believe that the inquiry need take six months. I believe that the work could be completed considerably more speedily and that it would be better for the country and the House and for those who wish to judge these matters that that should be so.
For the rest, I believe that what the right hon. Lady has proposed is right and that the House would be wise to support it. I emphasise what she said, and what we have always understood in our discussions, about the fullness of the report to be made to the House and to the country. That is an absolute requirement, but I do not believe that there has been any difference between us on that.

Mr. Cryer: My right hon. Friend has put forward the names of two Privy Councillors. Does he accept that people may get the impression, first, that those representatives are in a minority and, secondly, that if the entire membership of the inquiry consists of Privy Councillors, who are thereby close to the Establishment, the necessary zeal to pursue the inquiry may be lacking? There seems to be an undercurrent to the effect that only Privy Councillors can be entrusted with a task of this kind, which is plainly not true.

Mr. Foot: I am not making any reflection upon those who are not Privy Councillors. Indeed, I have my eye on my hon. Friend as a prospective Privy Councillor at some later stage. Until the convention is changed, there are certain qualifications that Privy Councillors have to sustain and to which they must subscribe. That is why I believe that in these circumstances it is wise to choose them, but I repudiate entirely any suggestion that the two spokesmen who will be there on behalf of the Labour Party will not prosecute these matters with sufficient zeal and independence. Of course they will. Moreover, as I understand it, in a case such as this they retain the right to make their own independent assessment and to produce their own report if they so wish. It does no service to the country to suggest that the inquiry will in any sense be conducted by a coterie. It will be conducted on behalf of the House of Commons. That is why I ask the House to vote for it now. I believe that it is the right course to take and that the House should give its confident support for it.

Mr. Nigel Spearing: I do not know whether it was a slip of the tongue. My right hon. Friend said that the inquiry was being conducted on behalf

of the House of Commons. The Prime Minister may claim that that would be the effect, but, constitutionally, it is clearly being set up by the Government for the Government to edit at their discretion.

Mr. Foot: I do not accept that. If that had been the case, the first requirement that I laid down and on which we have always insisted throughout our discussions would not have been fulfilled. If the Prime Minister had said that she intended to set up a Committee on this without securing the approval of the House, that would have been an error. In the circumstances, the House has the opportunity to decide whether it wishes the inquiry to proceed on this basis. I believe that that is the right way to proceed. The House of Commons has the opportunity to state its view. If my hon. Friend is saying that the whole nature of the inquiry must be changed to ensure that the Prime Minister's position in such a matter should be abandoned in accordance with precedent, I do not agree. We have asserted the right of the House to judge the matter. No service is done by suggesting that an inquiry of this kind, on which some of my right hon. Friends will serve, will do anything other than seek to carry through the task that the House wishes it to fulfil.
Having watched events in the past months since the beginning of the Falklands crisis, I have been reminded occasionally of a scene in Victor Hugo's book, "Ninety-Three", in which a sailor lets loose a great battering ram against a ship. When it looks as though the ship will be destroyed by it, by a skilful piece of agility and manoeuvre at the last minute, he manages to prevent it from doing the fatal damage. I sometimes see the Prime Minister as the heroine of that scene. The hero in the book was first decorated and then shot. I believe that that would be a proper way to apportion responsibility. I speak, of course, in political and electoral terms.
I welcome the inquiry. I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends will support it. I believe that the report may be of great consequence for the country. It may help us to avoid the terrible errors that landed us in this crisis. It may also help to sustain the vigilance with which the House of Commons exercises its rights over the Executive.

Mr. John Peyton: After the undertaking given by the Government at the start of the Falklands expedition, I can see that the inquiry is inescapable. I agree that, if we are to have one, its terms of reference and the form that it is to take are the least undesirable.
In this country we are habitually given to a great preoccupation with the past. That frequently clouds our interest in the future. We should reflect on who is likely to benefit from this inquisition and who is likely to be injured by it, both individuals and the nation. A collection of wise and venerable men will make their services available. I hope that they will bear in mind that such inquisitions can have a damaging and dampening effect upon discussion. They tend to make Ministers cautious, officials careful, records scarce and discussion shallow. They must be careful that attention is not diverted from what has been magnificently achieved by raking over the ashes.
I hope that I shall be forgiven if I refer to some of those in my constituency who have made a notable contribution. The Harrier pilots were mainly based there. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will agree that the


families of those who were killed in action should not be unduly prejudiced by their irreparable loss. The Westland helicopters played an important role in the prodigiously successful campaign.
I hope that the inquiry will remember the danger of hindsight when considering the difficulties that confronted those who took part in the events that led to the rape of the Falkland Islands by Argentina. I hope it will not be deceived into making the same facile use of hindsight as have so many of the Government's critics.
I recall the doubts that I had at the outset of the campaign. I wondered whether it was wise for us to take such a huge risk, whether such a military expedition was feasible under such appalling conditions, whether we should keep the staunchness of our friends—our friends stood by us magnificently, although no one had high hopes of Mr. Haughey, and such high hopes would not have been justified—and whether our resolve and determination would survive, not only the long delays and uncertainties, but the inevitable grim toll of casualties.
I hope that the inquiry will consider carefully how many of the Government's accusers, both inside and outside the House, are immaculate. There is a danger that its report may become a fertile quarry for those who habitually scavenge for material that can be used to discredit their country.
I do not believe that there are many countries—given the events of the past few months—that would turn their backs so readily on what was done on our behalf and indulge this passion for raking over bitter ashes. Easy and plausible arguments can be adduced for holding such inquiries, but I believe that the longer-term consequences of such exercises are damaging.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that the investigations into the conduct of the generals in the First World War had a profound effect in changing attitudes to military tactics in the Second World War, thereby saving lives? It was demeaning to those who were the subject of the inquiry, but it was surely right that it should have taken place.

Mr. Peyton: The parallel is not exact and I do not wish to take up the time of the House by going so far back into history. I believe that such exercises can easily do far more damage than good. I fear that that is likely to be the case with this inquiry, even given the wide reservations that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has placed on the Committee's powers.

Mr. James Callaghan: The right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) has only this is in his favour: previous such inquiries, going back to the Crimea, and even before, have rarely produced a satisfactory answer. That is not the only point with which we are involved, and I differ from him in his conclusions.
Once the task force had been despatched, I was not willing either to give comfort to the Argentines by showing that there were differences in the House or to make our men, who were steaming towards the Falklands, feel that there was disunity here. I believed that it was right that criticism of the Government, which I had expressed before, should be suspended, but only suspended. I do not believe that it would be right to ignore entirely what took place before the task force set sail. My view is shared. I

am influenced by the voluminous correspondence that I have received from the public on this matter. I do not recall receiving such a volume of correspondence for many years, and certainly not since I was Prime Minister—and a Prime Minister, of course, always receives a great deal of correspondence. There is a real feeling of shock and alarm among the public, if my correspondence is representative. I shall be happy to supply any part of it to the inquiry to show why the issue should not be allowed to trickle on and dwindle away without an answer.
It came as a shock to the British people that Britain should find herself at war with another sovereign State for the first time for at least 30 years, that all three Services of our Armed Forces—the Army, Navy and Air Force—should be involved and that when battle was joined many lives should be lost, men wounded, some maimed for life, and aircraft and ships lost, all at immense cost. We cannot brush all that to one side.
In addition, two senior Cabinet members resigned and a third member of the Government, a junior Minister, resigned. Another member of the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for Defence, offered his resignation. It was refused by the Prime Minister on the ground that his Department was not responsible for policy, which pointed the finger clearly at the Foreign Office. But the Prime Minister has an overall responsibility for everything that takes place. However, when she gave that reply in her letter to the Secretary of State for Defence, I do not believe that she was implicating herself.
All those matters have alarmed public opinion. The gallantry and professional skill of all our men in the South Atlantic have not washed away the alarm and doubts. They should be resolved now. Hence the need for the inquiry, which has been conceded—almost volunteered—by the Prime Minister. I assume that she shares at least some of the views that I hold about why those matters should be inquired into.
I have read suggestions that the inquiry should make a long and leisurely investigation into affairs over the previous 20 years. I do not know whether such reports are accurate, but the Prime Minister's emphasis in the terms of reference is different.

Mr. David Ennals: While my right hon. Friend is dealing wiht the question of the Ministers who resigned, I recall the former Foreign Secretary's statement that the matter had been a great national humiliation. Are not Lord Carrington and the others involved entitled to hear the inquiry and its conclusions? Is not an essential part of the inquiry to give them an opportunity to explain the circumstances and not just to point an accusing finger?

Mr. Callaghan: My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made that point clearly. Lord Carrington and the others are entitled to have their explanations and actions fully examined and to make what reply they can; then, as the right hon. Lady said, if it is thought that injustice is being done to them, to have the opportunity to comment. A similar proposition was put by my right hon. Friend when he was Leader of the House on the question of the commission of inquiry to follow the Bingham report. I believe that the precedent has been correctly followed by the Prime Minister today.
I believe that hon. Members are entitled to offer guidance to the inquiry on what people are anxious about.
It will start with a blank sheet. The point in the correspondence that I have received can be summed up in one general but central question. Nearly every letter comes back to the question whether a prudent Government should have taken more positive and firmer action at an earlier date to forestall an invasion. That is the central issue with which the inquiry should concern itself.
It is generally put to me that more positive action would have been to have had sufficient force on hand early enough to anticipate an armed attack. The test of firmer action is important. I start from the belief that the junta would not have invaded had it known what our response would be. I cannot prove that, but I believe it strongly.
When the Government were finally convinced that an invasion would take place only a matter of days before it happened, they were incapable of getting men, ships, aircraft and other equipment to the area in time. What action did they take? President Reagan was approached by the Prime Minister. We read in the press that she had several conversations with him. I have no doubt that she put her point with great urgency. We understand that President Reagan urged Galtieri not to invade the Falklands. That was the action of a friend. Indeed, President Reagan had other interests to consider in Latin America.
Did the Government convey to General Galtieri, or ask President Reagan to convey to Greneral Galtieri, that in the event of an invasion Britain would not only protest peacably but would use armed force to retake the islands? That is a central question. I never had any doubt about what we would do. I was certain that we would send the task force. Although I was not in the House on that famous Saturday, I was certain about that. We all know our instincts. The Prime Minister is not the only patriot in the House. There are 635 of us. We all knew that that would be the instinctive response of the Government and the House, but did Galtieri know that we would send a task force to retake the islands? If not, the Government are open to grave criticism.
In considering whether the junta understood what our reaction would be, the inquiry will also want to consider the events involving HMS "Endurance" and the proposal by the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) to consider transferring sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to the Argentines, subject to a leaseback arrangement. What signals were those? What was the junta supposed to conclude from such actions? To what extent did the Prime Minister endorse the offer of a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina with a leaseback arrangement, or did the hon. Gentleman make the suggestion on his own account when he was discussing the matter with his opposite number? [Interruption.] I have no hesitation in saying that I have a fixed view. I would be unfit to be a member of the inquiry. I would not have offered myself; in any case, I was not asked! Until my dying day I shall never get out of my head the belief that, as I said on the day that the task force sailed, this was an unnecessary war. I hold the Prime Minister responsible for what took place.

Sir Hugh Fraser: The right hon. Gentleman should go back a little further and explain why his Government failed to build a military airfield on the Falkland Islands in 1977.

Mr. Callaghan: I fear that that was a question of expenditure, and we did not do so. But I am prepared to go over all those matters in detail.

Mr. Edward Rowlands: The present Government did not do so for three years.

Mr. Callaghan: As my hon. Friend says, nor did this Government.

Mr. Peyton: I hope that in addition to saying that we must not brush the affair aside the right hon. Gentleman will tell us what benefits he expects to flow from the inquiry.

Mr. Callaghan: I am not sure that the Prime Minister will learn much from the inquiry, but I hope that she will. We need a new Government if we are to develop a better manner of conducting our affairs. [Interruption.] I am not playing games. I feel very deeply about this, and I have a right to do so.
The Labour Government decided to have discussions about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, beginning on 13 December 1977. Because we did not know what form those discussions would take, we decided to make our analysis of what might happen. We did so. It was our belief that the Argentines wanted, naturally, a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, but if there were no prospects of real progress towards Argentine sovereignty there would be a risk of a resort to forceful measures, including direct military action against British shipping and the establishment of an Argentine presence on the dependencies, especially South Georgia, in addition to the scientific station already on Southern Thule.
We also believed that there was the prospect of some private venture activity on one of the dependencies, possibly South Georgia, and that if that took place the Argentine Government would be under such pressure from public opinion that it would have to follow it up. There was internal pressure on the Argentine Government at that time to divert attention from their internal problems.
As a result, we took legal opinion on whether we could establish an exclusion zone of 25 miles. We worked out rules of engagement, authorising a challenge to Argentine ships coming to within 50 miles of the islands to declare their intention. We decided that "Endurance", which the Ministry of Defence wanted to withdraw, should not only be kept on station but should be refitted.
We sent my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands) to the talks that began on 13 December, but we made certain that on that day there was a naval presence off the Falkland Islands to strengthen his hand in the event of a breakdown in the talks leading to our beliefs being fulfilled.
That was what the Labour Government did. When my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition asked questions about this recently, the Prime Minister's response was to hurl across the Dispatch Box—"sneer" is the correct word—that if a Labour Government had been in power we would not have fired a shot. I tell the right hon. Lady, if we had been in power we would not have needed to.

Mr. Speaker: Before I call the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. Whitney), I remind him that the terms of the motion before us are whether we should have an inquiry.

Mr. Raymond Whitney: I welcome this opportunity to comment on the terms of the inquiry, which is a matter of great public concern. Although serious problems have been raised about the mechanics of the inquiry and the constitutional issues, it is essential, for the political health of the country, that the air should be cleared and as many facts as possible relating to previous years brought out. It is important for the country to know whether it has been adequately served by all the Government agencies that have been involved in this sad adventure.
Some years ago I was involved in the Falklands and in Argentina. I offer to the House a few thoughts to justify the Committee's taking account—it is eminently qualified to do so—of all relevant factors from previous years. It is not enough to recognise the facts of the three months that led to the events of 2 April.
I give two or three examples to justify that assertion. We have heard a great deal, in our debates and in the press, about Argentine press comments in January, February and March of this year. It is impossible to make a fair judgment and analysis of the significance of such press reports in Buenos Aires newspapers unless comparisons are made with similar flurries of tension over the previous 10, 15 or 20 years.
Some years ago there was an incident which became known as the "Cronica landing". Cronica is a Buenos Aires newspaper. It sponsored and paid for the landing of an aircraft on Port Stanley airstrip. At that time, to put it mildly, tempers were running high and the apprehensions of those concerned in the British Government, and elsewhere in the world, were intense. Therefore, if an examination is conducted into press comments during the past few months, a comparison must be made with what happened on previous occasions.
Another matter that received considerable prominence recently—the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) made some mileage from this—was the comments of the present captain of "Endurance". In a television interview some days ago he said that when the "Endurance" visited Ushuaia in January he found a certain coolness in the atmosphere, which worried him. It is important that the inquiry should establish the amount of alarm that was sounded in the reports that he sent back to the Government on that occasion.
It is also important for the inquiry to consider other incidents in the past—remembering, of course, that the present captain of "Endurance" was not the captain at the time. I believe that the present incumbent has held the post for about 18 months. The inquiry should recognise that in 1976 "Endurance" was forbidden to visit Ushuaia. There was a period of heightened tension on that occasion.
Lord Franks and the Committee of Inquiry should also take into account an occasion in earlier years when shots were fired across the bows of the research ship "Shackleton".
Those examples—and I can offer many more—suggest that it would be inadequate to look only at the events of this year. It is essential to go back a long way. That will, in many ways, be regrettable, because of the understandable difficulties about constitutional propriety, but the composition of the Committee and the terms of reference announced by the Prime Minister will ensure that

none of us need have any fears about those constitutional issues. We can all be confident that they will be handled properly.
It is not for me or any other hon. Member to prejudge the outcome of the inquiry, but I should like to offer one thought. Things often go wrong in life, and there is no doubt that they went badly wrong over the Falklands. However, sometimes they go wrong, not because of some immense miscalculation, moral turpitude or fatal inadequacy of any particular individual or even a particular service, but because of a blind and determined refusal by countries to face realities. For reasons that we shall no doubt explore, even after the Committee has reported, it just may be that our two countries, and we in this House, refused to face realities.
If there is telephonic communication between two people and the individuals concerned do not have their ears to the handset, it is not much good blaming either the instrument or the wires that connect them. If this is a case of deafness between two countries, the way to wisdom is to restore the connection, to make sure that the deafness is removed and that our ears go back to the handset. That is the sort of lesson that we should learn.
The inquiry must not be turned into a political dogfight. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) talked about the country not forgiving. I doubt whether he would disagree with my view that the country will not forgive if this issue is turned into a political dogfight. After the brilliant courage and heroism that have been shown, the nation and this House must rise above that.

Mr. Roy Jenkins: The responsibility for not turning this issue, on which there has been a substantial measure of national unity, into a party political dog-fight rests on both sides of the House and on all parties, including the Government. That must be carefully borne in mind in the future.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), and not with the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) that an inquiry is necessary. However, I share some of the views of the right hon. Member for Yeovil about the unhappy history of inquiries of this sort, partly because they are inquiries into unhappy affairs. That is not the only reason, and I shall return to it in a moment.
As the Prime Minister probably recognises, an inquiry has always been part of the bargain. It was understood that there should not be criticism during the operation while British lives were at risk, but that she would agree to the fullest inquiry as soon as the operation was concluded. It has been satisfactorily concluded, and we are all grateful for that.
The Prime Minister indicated that view in reply to a question from my right hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grirnond) as early as 8 April. In that reply, she talked about an inquiry into the work of Departments. I think that she had that in her mind until quite recently. That would have been a mistaken approach, because what is involved is not merely, or even primarily, Departments but the responsibility of Ministers and the Government as a whole. It is wrong to pretend that Ministers or the Prime Minister herself can distance


themselves by talking about Departments and inquiries into Departments. If we did that, we would get ourselves into a dangerous constitutional position.
I do not wish to pursue that point too far, because the terms of reference are now about right. They are approximately what they should have been all along—principally to tell us what went wrong in the runup to the Argentine invasion on 2 April 1982.
I wholly accept that it is appropriate for the inquiry, if necessary, to look back for purposes of comparison or clarification. It would be reasonable, if it judged it right, for the inquiry to bring together a review of the facts about successive attempts at negotiation. However, I believe that they are already very much more in the public domain than what happened in the immediate run-up to 2 April. I do not think that there is any great obscurity about those negotiations, but, if there is, let the cloak of obscurity be lifted and let us see absolutely clearly what happened—indeed, back to 1967 and intervening times. Let us see what happened when the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, who was then at the Foreign Office, nearly brought off a settlement in 1980. Still more relevantly, let us see what happened in the negotiations in New York conducted by the hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce).
None the less, let us be absolutely clear that the central point at issue is why an invasion was allowed to take place on 2 April 1982. It is not why an invasion did not take place on a limitless number of occasions in the past. It is no good pretending that there is an equality of status between non-events and events.
As to the composition of the inquiry, the Chairman is a good choice. He is certainly a man of outstanding ability and experience. He has been criticised for having some Foreign Office connections. I do not share the view of the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) about the Foreign Office. In any event, Lord Franks was very much a non-Foreign Office ambassador to Washington as long ago as 1949, and his only connection with the Foreign Office was that for four years he prevented a Foreign Office official from getting that highly coveted job nearly 30 years ago. I do not think that that amounts to a disqualification. Lord Franks is admirably qualified, not least by being a member of the Liberal Party, having taken the Liberal Whip in another place for a number of years.
I turn to the politicians, because Lord Franks is not a politician. [Interruption.] Perhaps I should say that he is not primarily a politician. I doubt very much whether the Prime Minister would have appointed him Chairman had he been so.
Everybody can produce his favourite or non-favourite list of politicians. I notice that the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) has put forward an alternative list. We can all argue about that, but, however it is done, I see no way of avoiding the fact that under a whipping system the representatives of the two major parties are chosen by the Government and Opposition Front Benches. I make no point about that.
Sir Patrick Nairne, the sixth member of the inquiry, is a former civil servant. He was an outstanding civil servant. At one time I worked closely with him and found him to be a man of great power, decision and effectiveness. He will be a useful, perhaps outstanding, member of the inquiry. However, I take issue on one thing, and,

surprisingly, I partly agree with one or two of the hon. Members—not hon. Friends—who sometimes share this Bench below the Gangway in such neighbourly proximity.
I have no objection to Sir Patrick Nairne being made a Privy Councillor on the ground of his services to the State, which are great. However, there is a danger of making a fetish of Privy Councillorhood. It does not make great sense to pretend that a man's discretion and sense of secrecy cannot be trusted if he is not a member of the Privy Council, but if he is made one it is absolute. People who are not Privy Councillors, such as permanent secretaries in the most sensitive Departments, receive information of great secrecy. Staff will have to be appointed to this Committee who will be members of the Home Office who are certainly not Privy Councillors and whose discretion will need to be absolute.

Mr. J. Grimond: In his capacity as historian and not politician, can the right hon. Gentleman throw any light on when this custom concerning Privy Councillors grew up? Is it of recent origin that no one can speak to anyone who is not a Privy Councillor, that they are the only people who can be trusted to keep a secret, and that it is only when one is 70 or so that one is respectable enough to become a Privy Councillor?

Mr. Jenkins: It is fairly recent, although I hesitate to speak with absolute authority. The Prime Minister referred to a precedent from 1955, but that was specifically a security inquiry. The two inquiries that were rather similar to this one, those into Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles, were not confined to Privy Councillors and there was no suggestion that they should be so confined.
It is a curious concept that a man has a different sense of responsibility to his nation if he is a Privy Councillor than if he is not. As far as I can recollect, part of the Privy Councillor's oath may be more honoured in the breach than in the honouring, for it is hardly the case that if ill is spoken of another member of the Council it is never passed on unless disclosed to him in Council. [HON. MEMBERS:"Order."] What are we talking about? We do not live in a world of secret societies in which we should not know even what oaths people are bound by.

Mr. Dalyell: As one who was twice Home Secretary, is the right hon. Gentleman happy that the talented civil servants of the Home Office should exclusively provide the crucial staffing? Is there not a case for having some members of staff who are from outside lawyers' offices, the academic world or the trade unions?

Mr. Jenkins: That is a point for the hon. Gentleman to make himself, which I am sure that he can do with great power. I am satisfied that, from my experience of the Home Office, there are people there who are fully capable of discharging the responsibility that is here involved.
The history of inquiries has not been an inspiring one, and it is difficult to say that a wholly satisfactory formula has emerged over a substantial period. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East referred to the Crimean war inquiry. That was conducted by the whole House sitting as a Committee of inquiry. I doubt whether anyone would propose that that should be done for this inquiry. All hon. Members were not made Privy Councillors for that.
There was the Jameson raid inquiry, about which the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) is


a considerable expert as the biographer of Joseph Chamberlain. That was a Select Committee of 15 members, but with the Minister whose conduct was principally at issue playing a great part in appointing the Committee, drawing up terms of reference and sitting on the Committee together with three other members of the Government, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Attorney-General. The Leader of the Opposition also sat on the Committee, but that did not prevent Joseph Chamberlain, it is generally assumed, from withholding three vital telegrams. Thus, that, too, was not a good example of how the truth should be arrived at.

Mr. Christopher Price: rose—

Mr. Jenkins: There was then the Marconi Select Committee which, by sheer partisanship, devalued the whole concept of Select Committees. For the inquiry into the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia we had a different form not too dissimilar from that which is here proposed, except that members were not all Privy Councillors. The House added certain members and later added the right to send for persons and papers, which was not in the original resolution. The House also made the resolution rather more precise that it was previously. That, too, is not a particularly good example.
The Mesopotamian inquiry led to the resignation of Austen Chamberlain, who probably ought not to have resigned, although perhaps his father should have resigned 20 years before. The Dardanelles inquiry is not judged by historians to have led to any very close approach to the truth. Certainly Sir Winston Churchill did not accept it. Following that, because of the reaction against the Select Committee, we had the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. I am unaware of the form set out in that Act having been usefully used in any proceedings similar to that with which we are here concerned. Probably its most notable use was the Lynskey tribunal, which had great disadvantages.
The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East referred to the recent proposal for a Committee, rather similar to this one, following up the Bingham inquiry. That was passed by the House of Commons, rejected by the House of Lords and died between two Governments. Thus, we do not have a vastly inspiring record, and it cannot be pretended that a perfect formula has been worked out.
Various amendments have been tabled which you have not called, Mr. Speaker, including one from the right hon. Member for Farnham (Mr. Macmillan), which deals in great detail with points relating to confidentiality of the papers of previous Administrations. My impression was that that was largely covered by the qualifications that the Prime Minister set out in her opening statement. Those propositions seem to me to make good sense and to strike about the right balance between the needs of proper investigation and those of adequate confidentiality.
There is need for a certain degree of confidentiality in Government. The Prime Minister said the other day that she was attached to the 30-year rule. I do not necessarily go as far as that. There is nothing sacrosanct about 30 years and it may well be changed in the future, as the 50-year rule was changed. On the whole, we are moving towards rather more open government, not least in the Cabinet of the right hon. Lady. Rarely have we heard more from within an Administration about what went on in the Cabinet, about what Ministers think about each other and

what the right hon. Lady thinks about Ministers individually from time to time. [Interruption.] We have the precedent of certain diaries, but they were published a few years after events, although nothing like 30 years after the event. That is different a few days after the event. However, a degree of confidentiality in Government is essential. We should lose a great deal without that.
I deplore the attacks made by the hon. Member for Macclesfield upon the Foreign Office. If officials could not allow their minds to play around a problem—I am not talking about exercising executive responsibility—and offer Ministers advice without feeling that they would be pilloried subsequently, we should lose a great deal. One human freedom that is important in Government, even for Ministers, is the right to change one's mind in private. If that freedom were removed, we should find that more wrong decisions were stubbornly stuck to than if Ministers are allowed to take a tentative view of a subject, then have another look at it, with free advice from officials acting honestly, and then decide that it is perhaps better to proceed in a different way.
There is much to be inquired into. There is much that we need to know. We do not have a perfect formula for inquiries, but this seems about as good as we can get in the present circumstances. I hope that the inquiry will get on with its work expeditiously, fearlessly and frankly. In my opinion, six months is the maximum—it may be even too long—but certainly it should not be allowed to go on longer than that. We wish it well in its work, and we look forward with interest to its report.

Mr. Humphrey Atkins: This is, I think, the first occasion since last Friday on which the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) has addressed the House. Perhaps I should congratulate him, at any rate on filling the Opposition Benches below the Gangway with slightly unusual and in some ways more agreeable faces than one normally sees there. I was particularly interested to hear the right hon. Gentleman describe the distinguished Member of the other House who takes the Liberal Whip as not being a politician. We shall have to see how relations between the two parties develop.
I shall detain the House for only a few minutes. I am one of those into whose activities before the events of 2 April the Committee that is being set up will inquire. I very much welcome the setting up of this inquiry. As the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) said a few minutes ago, on 2 April the House and the country had a very disagreeable shock. No one likes an unpleasant surprise. The immediate reaction of all of us when we have an unpleasant surprise is to say, first, "Why was l not warned?" and, secondly, "Could not something have been done to stop it happening?" That is what the country is asking, and that, I suspect, is what the country will want this inquiry to discover.
However, there is one flaw—a completely unavoidable flaw—in any inquiry or other body that can be set up by the Government, this House, or in any other way in this country, and that is that it cannot question General Galtieri. It takes two to make a bargain, and it takes two to make a quarrel.
The inquiry can—and I hope will—delve deeply into everything that happened in this country. It can review the decisions of Ministers. It can scrutinise the advice given by officials to those Ministers. It can study the messages


sent to this country by our representatives overseas. It can peruse the intelligence reports—and I shall return to that matter in a moment. It can investigate the liaison between Ministries and Departments in this country. All those things it can do. What it cannot do is to assess accurately the impact of what we did here on the Argentine President, the junta, the generals, admirals and air force officers, or whoever it was who took the decision to invade on 2 April.
Obviously, what we did—or did not do—here had a powerful effect, because the Argentines did invade. That, as we all now know, was a reckless decision which caused considerable loss of life, led to a humiliating surrender and an enormous loss of material and an even greater loss of confidence in that country's leadership. But what led it to take that decision? Was it because it thought that it would have an easy victory? Did it perhaps take an outside gamble to distract attention from pressing problems at home? Or were there other considerations?
Many people, with or without axes to grind, have already given their opinions. I have no doubt that over the next weeks and months many more will give their opinions. But do they know? No, they do not. Will this inquiry know? I have to say that I doubt it. Nevertheless, as I said, I am certain that it is right to hold it, and I welcome the motion before us, which sets it on its way.
I am more than ready to give the inquiry every help that I can, and I hope that its report will produce lessons for the future. The inquiry may or may not apportion blame. That is for it alone to decide. However, I venture to suggest that if it can point out ways in which the Government machine in this country, from Ministers down, can be made to work better and minimise the chance of this kind of thing ever happening again, that will be the best service that it can render its fellow citizens.
If I may say so, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has got the terms of reference of the inquiry exactly right. Most people are interested in the events of the weeks and months leading up to 2 April, and no doubt the inquiry will concentrate mainly on that, but it would be wrong to attempt to confine the inquiry to an arbitrary period. It may well be—in my view, it is almost certain—that events before the beginning of this year had a powerful influence on what happened.
The most extreme example of that is that in 1965 the United Nations passed a resolution calling on this country and Argentina to discuss together our difficulties and settle them. It may be that the passage of 17 years, without any real noticeable progress, led to a gradual build-up of resentment in Argentina which may have created almost irresistible pressures. It may be that something else done before 1982 caused the Argentines to make up their minds about their course of action. I do not know, but it is clearly right to empower the inquiry to pursue this or other points if, in its judgment, they are relevant.
It is also right—indeed, essential—that the inquiry should be able to see every document having a bearing on the matter, including the most sensitive and secret of all, the intelligence reports. The motion before us does not state precisely that it can do that, but my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spent a good deal of time spelling out the precise terms on which the inquiry will operate. I am delighted that the inquiry will be able to see everything that it needs to see. The whole proceeding would be futile if it could not do that.
The necessity to do that places some restriction on the number of people who can serve on the new body. I take a rather different view from the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead about Privy Councillors. I believe that there is a compelling reason for believing that the discretion of Privy Councillors can be trusted, and that is because they take an oath. Unlike the right hon. Gentleman, I pay some attention to the oath that I took, and the fact that I took that oath on becoming a member of the Privy Council weighs heavily with me, as I think it does with most others.

Mr. Roy Jenkins: I of course pay great attention to that. Surely the right hon. Gentleman is not saying that had he not been a Privy Councillor, and had be been required to deal with highly secure matters, as he may well have done in the Department before becoming a Privy Councillor, he would have been careless about the information with which he was dealing in the interests of the State.

Mr. Atkins: I like to think not, any more than the right hon. Gentleman would have been careless before he became a Privy Councillor. However, the fact that somebody has become a Privy Councillor and is known to have taken the oath means that outsiders can place reliance upon him.
I place reliance upon those who have been chosen to conduct the inquiry. I rely not only upon their discretion, but upon the way in which they will approach their task. It is my belief—hon. Members may challenge it if they wish—that Privy Councillors, bound by the Privy Council oath, will have the necessary credibility outside the House. Two of the members are unknown to me, but their reputations speak for themselves. I am as confident in them as I am in any of the others.
I am glad that my right hon. Friend resisted the temptation to appoint a judge to the inquiry. It is not that I do not have the highest respect for Her Majesty's judges, I do, but this is not an inquiry for a judge. There is no justiciable issue. There is a great need for an understanding based on experience of how the Government machine works. Without such knowledge it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to know the right questions to ask. If the right questions are not asked, the right conclusions will not be drawn and the right lessons will not be learnt.
I am glad that the inquiry has been proposed by my right hon. Friend. I hope that the House will support the motion before it tonight and that the inquiry, once it is under way, will proceed with all possible speed.

Mr. George Foulkes: I greatly welcome the opportunity for the House to debate this subject. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) said, I hope that we shall be able to give some guidance to the members of the inquiry before they begin their task.
I greatly welcome the fact that there seems now to be general agreement that there should be an inquiry, although I do not agree with the terms and some of the details of it.
I welcome the privilege of being called to speak in the debate, particularly as I am the first Labour Member to be called who is not a Privy Councillor.
I welcomed the opportunity of participating in the debate on 3 April. On that occasion, amongst other rather more controversial remarks, I said that everyone, except the United Kingdom Government, seemed to know that the Falkland Islands were to be or were in danger of being invaded by the Argentines. That is becoming increasingly clear.
We now know that the captain of HMS "Endurance" warned that the Falkland Islands were in danger of being invaded. We know that even Mrs. Madge Nichols was worried about the Falkland Islands being invaded. We also know the kind of dismissive reply that the Prime Minister gave to Mrs. Madge Nichols. I asked the Prime Minister how many other people had written to her expressing concern about the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance". She said that she could not provide that information because it would cost too much. That she was not willing to spend some money and to give her staff time to discover the extent of the opposition to that withdrawal does not bode well for the inquiry.
I welcome the scope of the review that the Prime Minister has agreed to institute. The right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) seems to have misinterpreted the scope of the inquiry. Under pressure from my right hon. and hon. Friends, it is to concentrate on the events leading up to the invasion. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition shold be congratulated on that achievement. It is only incidents previous and relating to the invasion that the inquiry will look at.
There, I am afraid, my welcome must end. I have serious reservations about the inquiry that we have heard about today. First, we must consider how the inquiry measures up to the principle of natural justice. It does not measure up to the principle of natural justice. It does not measure up very well. The Prime Minister has said that it is to review the action of Government Departments. That matter was raised by the right hon. Member for Hillhead. My understanding—the Madge Nichols letter and other evidence point in this direction—is that the actions of the Prime Minister herself must come under scrutiny.
If the actions of the Prime Minister are to be among the principal subjects of the inquiry, is it in accord with the principles of natural justice that she should choose the members of the inquiry, set its terms of reference, receive its report and finally have the power to delete any part of the report that she wishes on grounds, as she said, of national security or international relations? Those two broad grounds have been misinterpreted and misused by Governments in the past. On those tests, this inquiry does not measure up to the principle of natural justice. That is why I am unhappy.
I move with some trepidation to the membership of the inquiry. I suppose that I should not question the age, experience and distinction of the members of the Committee, particulary as I used to work for Age Concern. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) is the youngest and most militant member of the inquiry, which says a lot about its membership.
I do not question that people of experience and distinction have an appropriate part to play in the inquiry. However, there should be some people with more inquiring minds as well. There should be some members who are less a part of the Establishment. I question the myth that respectabilty, age and experience equate with objectivity. The Establishment has a self-protection mechanism. One has only to recall the way in which the

misdeeds of—dale I mention the names?—Philby, Blunt, Burgess and Maclean were covered up by their fellow members of the Establishment to realise that the Establishment has a powerful self-protecting mechanism.
Without criticising the individuals, I would argue that the attitude of mind, background, education and experience of most of the members of the inquiry lead them to a predisposition to defend the Establishment. Their experience in the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office will lead them to protect those who in many cases were their former colleagues—people whom they appointed and worked with.
Why is no one.—perhaps the right hon. Member for Hillhead came nearest to doing so—arguing strongly that we have now set up a system of powerful and, I hope, experienced Select Committees? [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear".] My fellow members of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs agree with me. The Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committees have already agreed to set up their own inquiry into the circumstances leading up to the invasion. There will be problems in that regard.

Mr. Christopher Price: At least the Select Committee into the Jameson raid, which the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) was criticising, was able to take evidence in public. One member, Henry Labouchere, made a minority report which put on the record what happened. If the Prime Minister were to give evidence to a Select Committee, whether some matters have to be sidelined or not and whether it is in public or private, at least far more would be made public than with the present inquiry.

Mr. Foulkes: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who has experience of getting to the bottom of some of these matters.
I am surprised, for example, that the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee are not arguing that their Committees, which they chair with great distinction and experience, should deal with the matter. They have experience of interrogation. They have experience of the two Departments and of Ministers and of officials appearing before them. They seem appropriate Committees. In the United States, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be dealing with the issue in public with the Executive appearing before it. We would be all the better for that.

Mr. Anthony Grant: As a fellow member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, who has perhaps not such a grandiose view of its ability and experience compared with the distinguished members of the inquiry, I invite the hon. Gentleman not to overlook the fact that the Falklands inquiry, composed as it is of Privy Councillors—whether one likes it or not—will have access to material that would not be available to our Select Committee. Does he agree that any inquiry by the Select Committee would inevitably go off at half-cock and would be much more second rate than what is proposed?

Mr. Foulkes: I have considered that important point. I understand from the Clerk to the Select Committee that special arrangements have been made in the past for both the Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committees to see and to read privileged, confidential and, in some cases, even more highly classified information as part of their


exercise. I am sure that can be done without the necessity of swearing in people as Privy Councillors. I have no wish to be included with my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) as a candidate for the Privy Council.

Mr. Cryer: It was not my wish. It was the response of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) in a highly jesting manner. The point I made was that all the members of the Committee are recipients of patronage, which puts them right in the middle of the Establishment.

Mr. Foulkes: I am glad that my hon. Friend has made it clear that it is not his desire to be a Privy Councillor. I am also glad that he made the second point, which is important. I agree with the right hon. Member for Hillhead. I do not know what magical transformation occurs when the oath is taken that makes someone who was dishonest before into an honest man or someone who was honest before into a dishonest man.
I am glad that the Prime Minister is to reply to the debate. I did not gather from her introduction what pledge of action she was giving about the inquiry report. I have expressed my reservations about the power of deletion. The right hon. Lady seemed to talk a great deal about deletion. She did not give any indication of what action would result from the report. I hope that she will tell us how the report will be made to the House and what will be the procedures to enable the House and the Government to take action upon it. This may seem a technical matter. I know, however, that my hon. Friends who serve on the Select Committee are anxious to be made aware of exactly what will happen. So many reports, not just of Select Committees, but of other inquiries have gathered dust with no action arising from them.
I have made clear my reservations. I know that I am not alone in having serious doubts about the independence of the inquiry and the confidence that it will command in the House and in the country as a whole. Two of the criteria that the Prime Minister set herself in establishing the inquiry were that it should be independent and that it should command confidence. On both counts, it is seriously wanting.

Mr. Edward Heath: The Prime Minister reminded us that it was on 8 April, three months ago, that she told the House that there would be an inquiry into the Falklands affair. I am sure that my right hon. Friend was absolutely right not only to make that announcement but to make it so early after the start of operations.
I am one of those who believe that the inquiry is necessary, for a number of reasons. It is necessary in fairness to my right hon. Friend Lord Carrington and to the two other Foreign Office Ministers who resigned. It is necessary to enable hon. Members, once the inquiry has been approved, to concentrate their minds on the other great issues that face this country instead of pursuing constant trails of what happened before or during the invasion of the Falkland Islands.
It is also necessary in order to try to remove some of the bitterness, anguish and heartbreak of those who lost relatives in the war and of those who have been injured. So far as I am able to ascertain, no one in my constituency was directly affected. Like the right hon. Member for

Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), I have received letters from all over the country from those who have been deeply affected and are obviously puzzled and sometimes very bitter about what happened before their own sons or relatives were subjected to all the risks and hazards of war. For those reasons, I believe that it is right to have the inquiry.
I do not share the view of my right hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Atkins) that the inquiry is flawed by the fact that it is unable to summon General Galtieri before it. In foreign affairs we have constantly to make decisions affecting other countries and affecting international relations without being able to cross-examine those concerned on the other side about their motives or intentions. We have to form our own assessments and our own judgments. With great respect to my right hon. Friend, this Committee will have to do that, assisted by seeing the papers and being able to invite those concerned to give evidence before it.
This brings me to the nature of the inquiry. The hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing), who interrupted the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition when he said that this was a parliamentary inquiry, is right. It is not a parliamentary inquiry. It is not a parliamentary inquiry in the sense that following the publication of the Bingham report the then Attorney-General of the Administration of the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East put a motion before the House, which was clearly a case of the House setting up its own inquiry and establishing its own procedures. This is an inquiry established by the Government, for which they are asking approval. The plain fact is that we have never succeeded in finding the perfect form of inquiry. An exchange has occurred on the inquiry into the Jameson raid and about entrusting the inquiry to a Select Committee.
If my recollection serves me right, the Select Committee inquiry into the Marconi scandal just before the First World War was the occasion of so much abuse that it led to the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 and therefore the introduction of that form of legally established tribunal. It was, I think, the Salmon commission that examined the workings of tribunals over a period of 60 years and pointed out the grave weaknesses and injustices that followed from the use of that machinery. I am prepared to accept the motion before the House to set up a Government inquiry with the approval of Parliament if Parliament decides so to approve. To judge from the debate, although some right hon. and hon. Members have reservations about some aspects of it, the great majority are prepared to approve the inquiry.
I find myself in a very difficult position in what I have to say next. I find, in the terms of reference and in the letter that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister kindly sent me, that the Government are now in agreement with what I proposed. I also find myself the recipient of compliments from the Leader of the Opposition. It is difficult, at short notice, to assess which is the more damaging to me.
I welcome the fact that the terms of reference announced on Tuesday referred to the responsibilities of the Government in relation to the Falkland Islands instead of to the responsibilities of Departments, as was previously said. I am sure that that is right. In her reply to me last Thursday, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister emphasised that one reason why the inquiry had to look back was the importance of the intelligence


services. These are the responsibility not of a Department, but of the Prime Minister. The budget for the intelligence services is also the responsibility of the Prime Minister.
No doubt one matter that the Committee will wish to examine is whether the intelligence services were given the necessary resources to carry on their activities properly at a time of economic difficulty. The Committee may also wish to examine the performance of the intelligence services. But when I hear from some hon. Members that it is necessary to go back over many years in order to compare the results of the intelligence services and the policies of other Governments, it leads to the question whether the present Administration, in reaching whatever decisions they took before the invasion by the Argentines, studied all the intelligence reports of the past 20 years and examined all the papers of previous Administrations and the policies that they pursued. If they did, I ask myself how they had access to all that secret information on the policies of previous Administrations. Obviously, the answer is that no Government behaves in this way.
If the Committee of Inquiry wishes to go back, we now have a procedure by which it can make comparisons. But, as was said by the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins), there is a severe limitation on the advantage of so doing, which is that it will prolong the Committee's deliberations.
Based on experience, I am not as optimistic about the time that this inquiry will last as some hon. Members who have spoken today. I have been reading the report of the Committee that examined the memoirs of former Ministers, a report that one would not have thought was the most difficult, lengthy or engaging of tasks to compile. That Committee took nine months to produce a straightforward and simple report. In fairness to the three Ministers at the Foreign Office who resigned, this Committee of Inquiry should do its job as speedily as possible, without, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said, our setting a time limit upon it.
I now deal wih the other matter that I raised previously—the papers of a previous Administration. I wish to comment briefly on this issue, because I am glad that the Government have now fully accepted my point of view. In the letter that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister sent to me, which is not confidential, she said:
I hope therefore that you will be able to agree that the Committee should have access to any relevant documents of the Administration for which you were responsible,
This is not a matter of courtesy. It is a matter of the constitutional practice of Parliament, which has been established since 1917, when Cabinet minutes were first kept. I am not sure that the Leader of the Opposition was accurate in his description of what happened in olden days. Of course Ministers were impeached, but not on the basis of their papers, because they either took them away or burnt them. The practice was that if one did not wish another Administration to see such papers one simply got rid of them. It is now accepted that such a practice ended in 1917.
For those who are still in doubt about the matter, I draw their attention to the Bingham report in which, as long ago as 1954, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Herbert Morrison both agreed that
there is a general custom … that the Cabinet documents of one Government are not considered by those who are the Ministers in another Government; they are left as their own internal affairs.
That practice has been reinforced many times.
For those who prefer constitutional historians to the vested interests of politicians, page 274 of the third edition of Jennings' "Cabinet Government" states:
The Ministers of one Government are not entitled to examine the Cabinet documents of their predecessors, though some of those documents (without the minutes) will be in the secret departmental files.
They are in the Department, but are not available to another Administration. I hope that the point has now been fully confirmed.
The Committee of Memoirs of ex-Ministers was chaired by Lord Radcliffe. Lord Franks was a member of the Committee and signed the report. On civil servants, the report states that the advice that they give should not be revealed during their service lifetime. That is the practice, but the report goes on:
Successive Governments have accepted a convention that neither the views of predecessors in office nor the advice tendered to them by their departmental officers should be made available to the successors.
In January 1976, the Committee, with Lord Franks assenting, accepted that position, and I have every confidence that Lord Franks will observe it in the Committee that he will chair.
I also agree strongly with the conditions that my right hon. Friend set out this afternoon, and which were set out in broadly similar terms in the letter that she sent to me and to the other former Prime Ministers. Hon. Members have mentioned the possibility of excisions from the report when it is presented. It is customary for excisions to be made with the agreement of the Leader of the Opposition and the leaders of other Opposition parties. I do not know whether that was omitted deliberately or accidentally, but if excisions are to be made the Leader of the Opposition and the leaders of other parties must know what has been kept out. The terms of reference and the acceptance of the responsibility of former Administrations for their documents are right.
I have great admiration for Lord Franks and the other members of the Committee. However, it is sad that the Committee does not contain a Conservative Member of Parliament. I should have thought that some Conservative Privy Councillors on the Back Benches would be suitable to serve on the Committee. As it is, the Committee consists of four members of the Upper House, one member of the Lower House and one former civil servant, for whom I join the right hon. Member for Hillhead in expressing admiration. When I was Prime Minister, he served with great distinction as head of the European part of the Cabinet Office.
I hope that the Committee will function satisfactorily and that it will pursue the main emphasis of the terms of reference that have now so obviously been shifted to this Administration, with authority to ask the Prime Minister of the day whether it may refer to earlier papers. I said last Thursday that I was willing to allow the papers affecting the Falkland Islands during my Administration to be seen by a committee of inquiry, but that the constitutional proprieties had to be maintained. That is now the position, and I am perfectly satisfied.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I believe that it was Mr. Costa Mendez who, soon after the invasion of the Falkland Islands, said that he did not believe that in the late part of the twentieth century Britain would wage a


colonial war in defence of the islands. That misconception may have encouraged the Argentine junta to invade the islands when it did.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) said that he has never had any such misconception and always believed that the Government would react by using force to repel the invasion. I was not so certain at the time—we had this disagreement in earlier debates—and it came as a surprise to me, not having attended the famous Saturday debate, that that was the uniform reaction throughout the House, with the notable exception of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Foulkes). I formed that judgment, as I said in an earlier debate, on the basis of my perception of the stance of successive Governments on the Falkland Islands. They were persuaded, because of the economic plight of the country and its present defence capability, that it would be impossible to maintain a force in the Falkland Islands that would be able to repel an invasion and to protect the rights of 1,800 people. Therefore, they came to the conclusion that the right thing was for sovereignty ultimately to go to Argentina and that the best they could do for the 1,800 Falkland Islanders was to negotiate on a basis of sincere conviction to achieve the best that they could for them.

Mr. James Callaghan: indicated dissent.

Mr. Lyon: My right hon. Friend shakes his head, but that was my perception. Some Back Benchers visited the Falklands and returned full of righteous indignation about the state of the morale of the islanders who were insisting that they could never negotiate sovereignty.
We criticise the Government for entering into negotiations, but, as I understand it, the Labour Government also entered into negotiations in the hope that sovereignty could be ceded in a way that would satisfy the Falkland Islanders. If that was not the case, and my misconception was a genuine misconception, then an effective signal was not made either to Argentina or to Britain in the run-up to the present dispute. If the Government always had it in mind that sovereignty would never be ceded and that if the Falkland Islands were invaded by Argentina there would be a military response on the scale that has taken place, that should have been made clear to all concerned. It is not my perception that that was the position.
I always take what my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East says as the unvarnished truth, but, with the history of the past few years, I find it difficult to believe that there has been any opposition. I wish to know from the Committee whether that was the position. Is it clear from all that was said and done by the Government in the lead-up to the invasion that they were always going to resist, even to the extent of killing people, any attempt by Argentina to take over the sovereignty of the Falklands? Was that their position? Did they take proper steps to ensure that that was made plain to the world—in particular, to Argentina?
In deciding whether the Committee will answer those questions, I have to consider personalties. There is no other way. These questions will not be answered by appointing any Committee; they will be answered only by the appointment of a Committee which will ask the right questions. Those who have said that they are satisfied with

the Committee believe that that will be achieved. How do we indicate the nature of our reservations in a debate such as this? We cannot go into the personal qualities of the members of the Committee or those whom we think should be on the Committee. However, having looked at the composition of the Committee, I cannot say that I am satisfied that the right questions will be asked.
I was once the parliamentary private secretary to my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Lever. I have the greatest affection for him and I rejoice in the relationship that we had when I was his PPS. I know that all hon. Members have the greatest affection for him. The House is used to making savage judgments about people, but I have never heard a savage judgment about Lord Lever because he is such an amiable man.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) described my right hon. and noble Friend as one of the "awkward squad". I agree that he has a perceptive mind but he believes and is anxious to believe the best of everyone. However, I am not sure that that is the best attitude in a committee of inquiry into the conduct of individuals.
As a barrister, I am used to trying to find out the truth about people. It was never the best tactic in cross-examination to begin by believing the best of the person being cross-examined. It was sometimes as well to take what they were saying with a pinch of salt. That is what I should like to see the Committee do.
I have referred to my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Lever, who I know will forgive me if I say anything personal about him. I do not propose to say anything personal about my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) or anyone else. The most I would say about the members of the Committee is that, with the apparent exception of Lord Watkinson, each has a close relationship not with the present Prime Minister but with a past Prime Minister. All past Prime Ministers can happily sit quietly in their seats because they have a friend at court. I believe that that represents a danger. I am not sure whether Lord Watkinson has been chosen as the Prime Minister's friend—I do not know what her relationship is with Lord Watkinson—but it may be so. Certainly, the civil servants to be questioned in the inquiry have a friend.
Those engaged on the inquiry might, through a sense of affection, friendship or links with the past want to do justice to—I would say protect—the interests of some of those whose reputations and records are at stake. That is not the right approach for an investigatory Committee.
What we need—my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) used the phrase "the awkward squad"; I would not put it as baldly as that—are people who are prepared to ask the difficult questions and to persist with them in order to ensure that they get the right answers.

Mr. Donald Stewart: I suggest that, because of friendship, members of the Committee would be so keen to prove their impartiality that they might be less than fair to those involved.

Mr. Lyon: In a wicked moment before I rose to speak, while I was thinking about what to say and how difficult it would be to say it in the presence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East, I thought it might be


useful if the Government heard a cynical contribution at the beginning of the debate in order that they might overreact. Even in that situation they would not do so.
The truth is that we have a selection of people who will ensure that some of the questions are at least muffled. I say that openly not because I am in any way hostile to the membership of the Committee. If I were to choose the Committee, I would not necessarily choose those mentioned in my amendment, which has not been selected for discussion. I chose those mentioned in the amendment because they fit the criteria laid down by the respective Front Benches. They are all Privy Councillors. Lord Franks is to be the Chairman. There is one civil servant and two Labour and two Conservative Members. However, if I were to choose the members of the Committee, they would not necessarily be Privy Councillors.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said that this was a parliamentary inquiry. It is not. It has been agreed by the two Front Benches. I am not criticising you, Mr. Speaker, for not selecting the amendment, but the fact that you have not means that the House has only one choice at the end of the day. We can either accept what the Front Benches have agreed or throw it out altogether. If we throw it out, there will be no inquiry. I want an inquiry, but I should have liked the House to participate in setting up the inquiry and appointing its membership. That is the most important factor in the whole issue. The House cannot find a way of selecting people for such committees. We are resistant to a system of selection that means putting forward candidates and having people canvassing for them.
You, Mr. Speaker, and I are privileged to know a method that would overcome this difficulty. You were once selected as the vice-president of the Methodist conference. I was selected too, but I turned down the invitation. We were selected on the basis that, on the first day, each person in the conference puts forward the name of a person he would like to be vice-president. Of the people nominated, the first two or three who receive most nominations are voted upon by the conference. Therefore, there is a nomination system that comes out of the grass roots. No one can canvass. That is what we want in the House. We want a system whereby the whole House can put down names. Those who are highest in the list should be selected. If there has to be a vote, there is an immediate vote to identify who should fill the position. Some such system must emerge. I am treading on delicate ground by saying that such a system would be useful in the selection of Mr. Speaker.
We in the House have no means of identifying our wishes. In the end it is the wishes of the Front Bench that count. We are not consulted. We are not privy to the decision. For that reason, I have my reservations. I hope that the Committee will be successful. I hope that it will bring out the truth, but I have my doubts.

Sir Bernard Braine: It is right to hold an inquiry into the events leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April. The nation and Parliament are entitled to know not only what went wrong but whether what happened could have been avoided. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) was right. That is the key question. However, with respect, that is a reason why the inquiry cannot be

concerned solely with what happened just prior to the invasion, important and relevant though that may be. The Falklands tragedy did not start then. I fear that the signals that had been flashing from Britain to Buenos Aires over the past 17 years had been conveying at best a confusing message and at worst the idea that in the end the British would yield.
True, there was a dispute over sovereignty, but Britain had always made it clear that she was ready to submit it to the International Court of Justice. It was Argentina that refused. There the matter should have been left. In 1965, the twentieth general assembly of the United Nations passed resolution 2065 inviting Britain and Argentina to enter into discussions to find a peaceful way of resolving their differences. However, as our spokesman at the United Nations, Lord Caradon, told the assembly, referring to the Falkland Islands,
the people of this territory are not to be betrayed or bartered. Their wishes and interests are paramount and we shall do our duty in protecting them.
That was the last robust statement for some years.
Since the Falkland Islanders themselves told the United Nations that they wished to remain British, the matter should have been left there. Instead, talks went ahead. The storm burst when four unofficial members of the Governor's executive council wrote on 27 February 1968 to each hon. Member of this House asking;
Are you aware that negotiations are now proceding between the British and Argentine Governments which may result at any moment in the handing over of the Falkland Islands to the Argentines? Take note that the inhabitants of the islands have never yet been consulted regarding their future. They do not want to become Argentines. They are as British as you are. Are you aware that the people of these islands do not wish to submit to a foreign language, law, customs and culture because for 135 years they have happily pursued their own peaceful way of life, a very British way of life? Do you not feel ashamed that this wicked thing may suddenly be foisted upon us?
Not only had there been negotiations behind the backs of the islanders but the Argentines were beginning to think that they might prevail. The distinguished naturalist, Peter Scott, who had just returned from a visit at that time wrote to The Times saying that in Buenos Aires he had found
a general impression that any minute now, the Islas Malvinas, as they call them, will be part of Argentina.
Who had given the Argentines that impression? The crisis was debated in the House on 26 March 1968 under pressure from both sides of the House. The then Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, speaking firmly, made it clear that there should be no doubt about our sovereignty, but that, in order to secure a lasting modus vivendi with the Argentines, it was thought right to discuss sovereignty.
Later in the same year came the bombshell of the Chalfont mission. It seemed clear to us—to the islanders it seemed certain—that an attempt was being made to change their minds by telling them, without real foundation, that if they did not do so their economic prospects were gloomy. The exercise was described by The Economist on 7 December 1968 as a sign of "sheer governmental incompetence."
The most crushing comment came from my right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath), who was then the Leader of the Opposition and in whose team I had the honour to serve as a Commonwealth affairs spokesman. At a meeting of the Royal Commonwealth Society, reported in The Times on 6 December 1968, he said:
It was wrong and foolish to try to scare the islanders out of their loyalty to the Crown by partial and pessimistic accounts of their long-term future. It is wrong and foolish to go on discussing


the sovereignty of the islands with Argentina. This alarms the islanders and at the same time arouses expectations with Argentina and at the United Nations which we cannot fulfil.
The Government gives the impression to the world that it is sorry that the islanders wish to remain British. But this is a matter for pride, not for shame.
My right hon. Friend went on to say that Britain should applaud the islanders' loyalty, promise them its firm support and encourage development through private enterprise projects. Those were plain and honest words. I hope that my right hon. Friend will not mind if I say that they expressed my view, and it has never changed.
At a stroke my right hon. Friend had revealed the weakness and confusion that were passing for policy on the Falklands issue. My right hon. Friend no doubt will defend the communications agreements into which he entered when he became Prime Minister. I am not criticising this. I am merely saying that that was part of the exercise of pushing the Falkland Islanders into sole dependence on Argentina for their external air communications.
The only ray of light that emerged after those events was the Shackleton report. It was an admirable document, but it was confined to economic matters. There were no political overtones in it. It appeared in 1976 and showed for the first time that there were resources which could be developed, and that there could be a viable future for the Falkland Islanders. But it also said that it was crucial to lengthen the runway at Port Stanley
without which any substantial new development would, in our judgment, be greatly handicapped".
Needless to say, the runway was never extended. Nor was there any hurry to implement the 90-odd recommendations of the report. It was as though such a positive report was an embarrassment, even an obstacle, to getting rid of the Falklands. When the inquiry gets to grips with its task, I hope that it will establish the true facts about that.

Mr. Heath: The treaties that were negotiated during the Government of 1970–74 when Sir Alec Douglas-Home was Foreign Secretary were negotiated in the interests of the islanders and the development of private enterprise. There could not have been any private enterprise until air and sea communications were established. The islanders then managed to get social services that they desperately needed—education and health—in Buenos Aires. Moreover, that was agreed by the great majority of the islanders.

Sir Bernard Braine: It was indeed. I was careful to say that I was not criticising the agreements. I would point out, however, that the airfield was capable of taking only relatively small aircraft from Argentina. It was unable to take larger aircraft from other parts of South America and Europe. Perhaps they were the best arrangements that could have been made at the time, but undoubtedly they increased the dependence of the islanders on Argentina.
I now turn to a serious development that made the arguments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup against negotiating with Argentina all the stronger, and here I hope that the inquiry will ask the most searching questions. From 1975, Argentina's armed forces were engaged in war against their own people. Since then, at least 15,000 persons—it may be many more—including children, drawn from 30 nationalities, have disappeared into the prisons and torture chambers of the junta. A few of these unfortunates have reappeared and testified to the

horrors that they endured. The rest must be presumed dead. The disappeared have not been brought to trial or charged with any offence. Their families can obtain no information about them. There is evidence of mutilated bodies being washed up on the shores of Uruguay.
In 1980, the inter-American commission on human rights reported to the OAS, of which the United States is a member, after a visit to Argentina that serious violations had taken place affecting the right to life and personal freedom. Thousands had disappeared. Many had been killed in prison or had died from torture and other inhumane and degrading treatments. The methods of torture used were unbelievably cruel.
All that was known to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; it was known also to Western Governments. The total unfitness of Argentina to have any hand in administering a territory inhabited by people of British stock, nurtured in our tradition of parliamentary democracy, should have been apparent to all. But it was not, save to those hon. Members on both sides of the House who had known it for years. Alas, we did not know all.
From 1976, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had known what was going on. I have also established in the past few days that the truth had been concealed from Parliament that among the disappeared were United Kingdom citizens. How is it that the British Government were prepared to enter diplomatic talks with representatives of the military junta knowing that British subjects were being held illegally, perhaps tortured, and are probably now dead?
I hope that the inquiry will ask whether when Ministers were advised to enter negotiations they were told that on 9 August 1976 Walter Kenneth Nelson Fleury, a British citizen, had been apprehended by Argentine security forces and had not been heard of since. Were Ministers told that in September 1977 Dr. Douglas Gillie Whitehead, a British citizen, born in Berwick-upon-Tweed, and his brother Deryck, born in Argentina, were seized in their own homes and have not been heard of since? I have spoken to women who were similarly kidnapped who owed their survival to the King of Spain. In 1978 he had successfully demanded the release of a Spanish woman who had been swept into the same net. She was released quickly enough and gave the names of others, who were also released and allowed to go into exile.
Why did the Government of the day not demand the release of our people as a precondition for talks? Better still, why did they not see, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup so clearly saw in 1968, that there was no case for entering into talks? At the very least, Ministers could have said that sovereignty was non-negotiable, save with a democratic Argentine Government that respected human rights. Why was that not done?
When the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands) went out to Buenos Aires and the Falklands, an Argentine human rights organisation was giving evidence to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva about the appalling treatment, the torture and killing going on in Argentine prisons and military camps. Was the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ignorant of that, or was it just deaf?
One can see how, step by step, despite protests made in this House, the ambivalence in the conduct of foreign policy had disheartened the Falkland Islanders and


encouraged the Argentines. Is it really so surprising that the junta was prepared to take chances? Did the junta escalate its harassment because it believed that there would be no more than a token response? If so, it would not have been the first to misjudge us. The tragedy is that we did not learn the lessons of our own history in time. We should have known that it is always fatal to appease the bully and shameful to let our own people down.
I have only posed the questions. The inquiry is composed of people who are admirably placed to discover the answers. I have every confidence that they will.

Mr. Dalyell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Could you, at your own convenience, clarify your own position? Will the Franks Committee be empowered to call you in your previous incarnation as Minister of State at the Foreign Office? Whether the Speaker of the House of Commons should be subject to a Committee is a serious matter.

Mr. Speaker: I should be very surprised if it could. I am a servant of the House. No one in the land can order me around.

Mr. Denis Healey: That was the final assurance that we needed to terminate the debate.
Some hon. Members seem to imagine that the Prime Minister dictated the terms of reference of the review. That is not so. I must pay tribute on behalf of the other parties in the House to the fact that she consulted all of us about the procedures, the terms and the composition of the inquiry. She made substantial changes to her original intentions.
I warmly welcome the flexibility that the Prime Minister showed in her consultations about the nature of the inquiry, and her readiness to change in a search for consensus. I hope that the widespread support that the final proposals have received will encourage her to be similarly flexible in the pursuit of consensus in other matters.
The debate has been concerned primarily with the nature and composition of the inquiry. For that reason it has been obliged to stray into the substance of matters that the inquiry must consider.
Is an inquiry necessary and should it concentrate on the responsibility of the Government in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion? There can be no doubt but that it is necessary. That must be the focus of its work.
The fact that the Argentines were able to invade the Falkland Islands without significant resistance was rightly described by the Foreign Secretary himself at the time as a national humiliation, and it led him and two of his ministerial colleagues at the Foreign Office to resign and the Secretary of State for Defence to offer his resignation. We should all pay tribute to Lord Carrington for allowing his sense of honour to dictate his resignation. He served the country with great distinction in that high office, but he was right to resign after the events which led up to the Argentine invasion. I do not believe, however, that he was solely responsible for the national humiliation that we suffered. I suspect that there were other weaknesses in the way in which the Government discharged their responsibilities. If so, they must be identified and corrected so that similar errors are not made again. That is the case for the inquiry and for its terms of reference as they finally emerged.
There have been questions about the people chosen to serve on the inquiry and about its procedures. It seems to me that the composition of the Committee of inquiry is dictated by the nature of the events and the errors of judgment which led to our national humiliation and the subsequent ministerial resignations.
The inquiry is bound to spend some time considering problems of intelligence. Was the information required for the proper judgment of Argentine intentions available to Ministers? I do not mean just secret intelligence through communications from satellites and agents on the ground but also information publicly available from the British community in Buenos Aires, articles in the Argentine press, statements by Argentine representatives and, indeed, the actions of the Argentine forces themselves, from the warlike preparations seen by the captain of HMS "Endurance" in Ushuaia at the end of January to the landings on South Georgia.
I find it difficult to believe that adequate information was not available to the Government. The real question is whether the information was rightly interpreted. The answer to that can only be a clear "No". The Government misjudged the intentions of the Argentines and thus reacted improperly to the way in which the Argentines behaved.
The central question that the inquiry must consider in this context is one that, I confess, perplexed me when I was Secretary of State for Defence 20 years ago. Is it right that representatives of Departments responsible for policy in the Government should have responsibility for assessing intelligence information? It is inevitable that, in assessing intelligence, highly placed members of the Foreign Office are bound to be influenced by the policy positions that they have honestly and sincerely taken in their Departments on a particular issue. I know well, as I believe that the Secretary of State for Defence knows, that it is dangerous to make an individual defence service responsible for evaluating intelligence about the opposite enemy service which may influence its position in Whitehall.
I believe that there is a strong case for separating the assessment of intelligence as well as its collection from policy Departments in the Government, as the Americans decided when they set up the CIA. Whatever its defects, it is worth recalling that the CIA was the only American agency which gave accurate information to the American Government throughout the war in Vietnam. I hope that the inquiry will look into that aspect of the matter, as I suspect that the failure to interpret intelligence correctly and to purvey the right interpretation to Ministers may derive from the way in which responsibility for its assessment is currently structured in Whitehall.
The central importance of intelligence makes it inevitable that members of the Committee of inquiry should be persons with some knowledge of how the intelligence community operates. I do not believe that it was essential that they should be Privy Councillors—as I shall explain, I think that other considerations led to that conclusion. The presence of Lord Watkinson, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) and Sir Patrick Nairne—to whom I also pay tribute, as I think that he served as private secretary to about half the Ministers and ex-Ministers now in the House—was necessary for that reason.
The inquiry is also concerned with wider issues which go to the root of how foreign and defence policy should be handled. For that reason, it is essential that it should


include senior politicians with Cabinet experience at a high level, as will indeed be the case. In this respect, I am glad that the Prime Minister has not chosen Cabinet Ministers with recent experience in the Departments that are the subject of the inquiry. She was right to steer clear of that.
The central charge against the Government by both sides of the House has been that of unpardonable fecklessness in dealing with the Argentine threat to the Falklands in the months preceding the invasion. General Galtieri made it clear when he took office that he would use force to recover the Falkland Islands if he could not obtain them quickly through negotiation and if force could be used without serious resistance. There is a great deal of evidence for that. Lord Carrington, on the day on which he resigned as Foreign Secretary, admitted on television that the Argentines were likely to use force but that he had thought that it would come later in the year. The implications of that surprising statement will need to be explored by the inquiry.
The central question is this: given the mass of evidence that an invasion might be being contemplated, why did the Government send the wrong signals to Buenos Aires on every occasion? That cannot be denied. It was made clear by many Members on both sides of the House in raising questions about, for example, the announcement that HMS "Endurance" was to be withdrawn, the failure to respond to the extremely offensive renunciation by the Buenos Aires Foreign Ministry of the agreement on pursuing negotiations made by the hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce) a few days earlier, as well as in our handling of questions about the landings on South Georgia.
Another matter that must be considered is the fact that General Galtieri and Mr. Costa Mendez said on many occasions after we had reacted that they were absolutely staggered that we had reacted in that way, as they had had no reason to believe that we would. Every signal that we sent them was to the effect that we did not take the possibility of an invasion very seriously. We sent no messages of warning. Instead, we sent them armaments right up to two or three days before the invasion took place.
One reason for the difficulties into which we fell may be suggested by the fact that the Foreign Secretary, as Lord Carrington said in his television interview, was staggered by the reaction of the House of Commons in the debate on 3 April. I suspect that that is a very strong argument against the appointment of a peer to an office of such political importance—particularly a peer who has never served in the House of Commons and has never been elected to public office.
The analogies for the failure to send the right signals at the right time have been legion in recent years and all have had tragic consequences, from the failure to stand up properly to Hitler from the Rhineland to Munich to the failure of the Americans to warn the North Koreans when they withdrew their troops from South Korea without replacing them with any kind of defence commitment.
The one lesson to be learnt from recent history is that in dealing with dictators, military or civilian, one cannot afford to take chances. On the intelligence side, one cannot afford to take the easier interpretation rather than the more difficult one, and, on the military side, an ounce of deterrence can save tons of military action to restore the consequences of one's failure to react. The principles that

I have announced are fundamental to the conduct of any Government's responsibility for foreign affairs. The House must know why they were neglected in the months preceding the invasion of the Falklands. Nothing can reduce General Galtieri's prime responsibility for the thousand families who are now mourning their dead because of his action.
If it is shown that the United Kingdom Government failed in their responsibility to take timely action that could have led General Galtieri to abandon his plans, the Government will bear a heavy responsibility. Should that be the inquiry's finding, I hope that the Prime Minister will show the same courage in accepting its implications as Lord Carrington showed three months ago.

The Prime Minister: I shall reply in the few minutes available that I believe are sufficient because of the way in which the debate has gone. The House has generally supported the proposals that the Government have placed before the House.
I thank the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) for the tribute he paid to Lord Carrington for the excellent way in which he carried out his duties as Foreign Secretary and for his supreme integrity. I listened extremely carefully to what the right hon. Member for Leeds, East said about intelligence assessment. I shall follow that up from the viewpoint of a Minister and Prime Minister. I thank him for making it clear that the consultations between the Front Benches and the leaders of other parties had been fruitful and were largely responsible for coming to the agreement that we have broadly reached.
The right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) rather took me to task for referring initially to Government Departments in my reply to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond). The right hon. Gentleman will remember that he first asked me if I
will order an inquiry into the conduct of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in recent years and the sufficiency of the advice and information supplied to Ministers."—[Official Report, 8 April 1982, Vol. 21, c. 416.]
It was in reply to that question that I said that we would have to go wider into other Government Departments. A good deal of what was in that reply is in the terms of reference. When the answer was drafted, to me "Government Departments" obviously included "Ministers". I saw afterwards that it might be taken to be an inquiry only into officials. That is why we changed it in the final terms of reference to the responsibilities of Government.
There have been some comments about the fetish of having inquiries by Privy Councillors. I have to consider not only the integrity of Privy Councillors and others, but the attitudes of the intelligence community and maintain its confidence that it is yielding its information to people of supreme integrity. Officials are governed by the Official Secrets Act. Ministers would be, but not necessarily those people who would be on an inquiry.
If we are to continue to obtain intelligence and protect its sources—to continue sometimes to obtain it from other countries—we must be certain that we do everything possible to protect it. It was for that reason that we were naturally led to a Committee of Privy Councillors. It makes it easier to secure the consent of those who have to


give such consent if Cabinet minutes and documents are to be revealed to the members of the inquiry. There was never any suggestion that Cabinet minutes and documents of one Administration should be revealed to another of a different political party, or even to another Administration whose members were not entitled to see them. The question arises as to what can be revealed to those who are on the inquiry. I was naturally anxious that we should reveal as much as possible, because if the inquiry is to be charged with the duty of finding the facts it must see as much of the evidence as possible. That is why we were led naturally to a Committee of Privy Councillors
The 30-year rule has been criticised in some quarters of the House. I believe in that rule. It is a reasonable period, and if it were made much shorter we should soon find that Cabinet minutes and Cabinet Committee minutes would be drafted differently and would yield up far less information to future generations and fewer of the reasons that led us to take certain decisions.
I shall make one point about previous relevant information, although I thought that my right hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Atkins) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. Whitney) put it extremely well. Other right hon. and hon. Members pointed out that a great deal of such information was already in the public domain but it is not possible to appreciate some of the decisions that were taken except by seeing them against a longer background.
With regard to a pledge of action that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East mentioned, it is a little early to talk about that before the review has even started. We shall have to see what it reports. It will have to come to the House for debate and perhaps we can take it from there.

Mr. David Winnick: rose—

The Prime Minister: I must finish in three minutes.
With regard to the members of the inquiry, I have, as the right hon. Member for Leeds, East pointed out, been careful to choose those who have not had recent experience in the principal Departments concerned. I take issue with the right hon. Member for Leeds, East on what he said about natural justice. I have gone to great lengths to consult with many other right hon. and hon. Members on the terms of reference and on the composition of the inquiry and its general scope. I have made it perfectly clear that I shall very rarely make deletions.

Mr. Foulkes: rose—

The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath) made a point about intelligence. I have made it my business to ensure that the intelligence and security services have had sufficient resources to fulfil the requirements placed upon them.
As has been said, there are some drawbacks to every inquiry. I am anxious that we should reveal as much as possible and I believe that this is the right inquiry to choose and that that has been endorsed by the Leader of the Opposition and the leaders of the other political parties. I believe that it has had the general support of the House, and I ask the House to support it.

It being three hours after the commencement of proceedings on the motion, MR. SPEAKER put the Question pursuant to the Order this day.

Question agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House approves the decision of Her Majesty's Government to set up a Falkland Islands review as announced by the Prime Minister in her reply to a Question by the right hon. Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, on 6 July 1982.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[23RD ALLOTTED DAY]—considered.

The Army

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. — [Mr. Goodlad.]

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Peter Blaker): The Army has made great progress in the last three years. At the beginning of 1979, just before we came into office, the Army was not in the best of health. Pay was between 16 and 26 per cent. behind comparable jobs in civilian life. The Regular Army was nearly 10 per cent. short of its requirement for trained men, with a voluntary discharge rate running at about 5 per cent. Recruiting and discharge rates were getting worse. In Northern Ireland we had seven roulement major units, four of them from BAOR. Only two of the 14 infantry battalions in BAOR were able to man their establishment of four rifle companies. The Territorial Army was 19 per cent. under establishment. On the equipment side the 1st British Corps compared very badly with other corps in Germany, and no new tank was due until the end of the 1980s, if then. We were short of medium artillery. The Army was overstretched, undermanned, underpaid and badly equipped.
I am glad to report that the patient is now making good progress. Today the Army is fully manned and the TA is less than 2 per cent. below its establishment. Pay is fully comparable. The number of men leaving voluntarily is insignificant. In Northern Ireland we have only three roulement battalions.
In Germany we are now manning a full front-line tank strength; and the number of manned tanks has now increased by over 120, or more than 25 per cent., compared with three years ago; we have formed a ninth armoured regiment. We have trebled the number of medium guns in BAOR, and we already have the FH70 towed medium gun in service. We have increased the number of Rapier air defence equipments in Germany and the capability of our armed helicopter fleet has been improved by the introduction of Lynx with its full quota of Tow missiles.
The outlook is that the Army will continue to gain strength. However, before I go into the ways that that will be achieved, I should like to deal with the case for our retaining a substantial Army in Germany. That case was called in question during the past week's defence debates. In doing so I am not taking sides or joining any lobby; I am simply stating the facts of life that confront any Government who address the subject.
I want to make five brief points. First, the central front, where BAOR is situated, is the heartland of Western Europe. BAOR occupies a key sector of that front. If that front collapsed in a war the Russians could be at the Channel. It would be a very different matter having the Russians there, with all their numbers and all their armaments, even from having Hitler at the Channel ports

in 1940, and that took long enough to put right. In saying that, I do not intend to belittle the importance of other parts of the NATO front. I simply state a fact of geography.
Secondly, there is no substitute for in-place forces. My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Critchley) made that point very effectively in his speech on the Defence Estimates. We cannot be sure how much warning we would get. The Territorial Army has a vital role to play in the defence of the Continent, and it would do it well, but my hon. Friend drew attention to examples of surprise attack, and even if the British Government of the day acted with the utmost resolution and dispatch at the first sign of danger it would take a while to get the reinforcements to Germany.
Thirdly, I ask the House to consider the possible effect if we were to reduce BAOR below the figure of 55,000 which our treaty commitment requires. It would be bound to affect the lessons which the Soviet Union would draw about our political will, despite events in Afghanistan and Poland, and in advance of any MBFR agreement. Even more serious could be the effect on our Allies.
My hon. Friend the Member for East Grinstead (Sir G. Johnson Smith), whose comments are all the more valuable, given the benefit of his experience and contacts through the NATO Assembly, is absolutely right to say that it would have a catastrophic effect on our Allies if we were seriously to entertain withdrawing BAOR. He got to the heart of the matter when he said that it would not add up in political, let alone defence, terms for us to argue that it is vital for the defence of the United States to station about 300,000 of its men in Europe but that it was not vital to station 55,000 of our Army on the Continent.

Mr. Keith Best: On the second day of the defence debate the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), and perhaps one or two others, postulated the idea that our treaty commitment to station troops in BAOR could be satisfied with reservists rather than with the Regular Army.

Mr. Blaker: If that is what the right hon. Gentleman said, I do not agree.
The Belgians, Canadians and Dutch between them contribute 80,000 Army personnel to the central front. The French also maintain about 46,000 men in West Germany under bilateral agreements with the West Germans. What would be the effect of our example on them? In that context, one of my hon. Friends has said that a gap is always filled. That is not so. History is full of examples of peaceful States neglecting their defences through loss of will or wishful thinking and tempting acquisitive powers into attack. Any serious step by us to reduce BAOR could be the start of a process of unravelling NATO's main land defences.
Fourthly, we must consider the financial factors. It would cost us far more to bring back our forces than to keep them in West Germany. We simply could not house or train them without a massive new infrastructure programme. We are talking about a possible bill for total withdrawal of about £1,000 million for barrack accommodation alone. On top there would be many other costs. Just how that proposal is supposed to produce resources for allocation elsewhere escapes me.
This year British Forces Germany will cost under 9 per cent. of the defence budget compared with over 11 per cent. in 1979. Bearing in mind that British Forces


Germany accounts for about 30 per cent. of the total Army and RAF strengths, that underlines the real value for money of its contribution to forward defence and to our overall defence effort and collective security.
Fifthly, it has been argued by some hon. Members that the very stability of the central front, and the fact that it has lasted for 30 years, means that we can safely make big reductions there. That is to stand common sense on its head. The stability results from the joint resolve of the NATO countries to keep a strong military presence on the ground on the central front. The success of a policy is not a reason for abandoning it.
I turn to our plans for the Army. By the middle of next year the reorganisation of 1(BR)Corps into three larger and more powerful in-place divisions than the previous four will have been completed. That will allow the corps commander to maintain two strong forward divisions and a division to give the corps more depth. It will provide him with the flexibility and balance necessary to fight the immediate tactical battle, if necessary on short warning, and to provide a credible corps reserve.
Grouping in peacetime will reflect grouping for war more closely than at present, and much of the confusion that could arise under our present reinforcement plans will be eliminated, particularly in the forward area, where the most critical battle is likely to occur. A fourth infantry division, consisting largely of existing TA units, will be located in the United Kingdom in peacetime with its headquarters at York, and will move to BAOR on mobilisation with responsibility for securing the corps rear area.
The new structure will also help us to maintain the size of BAOR, after some reduction, at 55,000 men, the Brussels Treaty level. I make it clear to my hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) that the treaty is talking about men present on the Continent and not about reserves. We shall do that by making savings in infrastructure and support, but in areas that should not affect front line operational capability. The command structure in BAOR is being streamlined and administrative staff cut. All Headquarters are being reduced in size and unit establishments pruned.
We shall be creating headroom within the 55,000 level for key improvements. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State mentioned that the planned buy of sufficient Challenger tanks to equip four armoured regiments will enable us to form two additional armoured regiments in Germany in the mid-1980s, the 10th and 11th, and to provide a full war maintenance reserve of Chieftains. Together with other planned enhancements in the logistic, engineer and communications areas, and the continuing major re-equipment programme announced last year, the net result will be a major improvement in 1 (BR) Corps' fighting capability and staying power.
Let me now turn to the details of the major re-equipment programme over the rest of the decade, a programme that is already well under way. We are placing high priority on improving our armour and anti-armour capability. In addition to the purchase of Challenger, we plan to introduce thermal imaging sights, for both new and existing tanks, and new 120 mm high pressure gun; and a new generation of anti-tank ammunition. There will be further improvements to fire control systems and to automotive components.
We plan to double the number of Milan firing posts and to triple our missile holdings by the late 1980s. Over the

next few years we shall be introducing a new night sight for both Milan and Swingfire—our longer range anti-tank system—which will enable our troops to detect and engage enemy armour in darkness and in poor visibility. Improved warheads will also be introduced for both missiles. By the middle of the decade LAW 80, the new light anti-armour weapon, will have entered service. It will be issued in large numbers throughout the Army.
When the deployment of Lynx helicopters armed with the TOW anti-tank system is complete we will have doubled the number of helicopter-borne systems in service and increased our helicopter-launched missile holdings sixfold. Improved warheads should also be fitted to our TOW missiles, enabling them to engage the latest Warsaw Pact armour. The introduction of a series of improved fuses will enable Barmine, our current anti-tank mine, to increase its effectiveness against enemy armour.
Another key area is air defence. We announced last June that we had placed an order for the self-propelled variant of the Rapier, the air defence missile system. By the mid-1980s tracked Rapier will equip three air defence batteries in BAOR, and will bring greater speed, mobility and flexibility to air defence in forward areas.
The artillery will receive the self-propelled—SP70—field howitzer in the later part of the decade. This is the self-propelled version of the in-service FH70. Another major improvement in firepower will be the introduction of the multiple launch rocket system planned for the middle of the 1980s. The delivery of the 69 extra M109 announced in last year's White Paper is now complete. In addition, the battlefield artillery target engagement system—BATES—has entered full development.
BATES is a "force multiplier" designed to enable us to make more effective use of current and future guns. We plan to introduce BATES in the latter part of the decade along with other equipment designed to enhance our command and control. This includes the Wavell automated system for the rapid handling of tactical data, which is currently being evaluated in 1(BR)Corps, and the Ptarmigan trunk communications network is also being developed for introduction in the same timescale.
We have another major programme under way to modernise the equipment and capability of our infantry. We plan to improve its mobility by providing more vehicles for both mechanised and non-mechanised units, with consequent benefits in flexibility and protection. We have let the development contract for a new mechanised combat vehicle MCV 80, and we are now developing plans for the best mix of vehicles required for infantry mobility in the 1990s.
Soldiers will start to receive the new small arms in the NATO standard calibre of 5·56 mm from the middle of the decade. Two weapons will be entering service, the individual weapon and the light support weapon, which will simplify the logistic and support problems associated with the larger number of types of weapon that they will replace. Nuclear, biological and chemical defence will be further enhanced by the introduction of the NAIAD chemical attack detector, production of which has already started.
Finally, I have already alluded to the emphasis that we place on raising the level of our war stocks. Plans are in hand to give effect to this. In addition, we will establish a special stockpile of items to support operations outside the NATO area.
In general, although the Army will lose about 7,000 personnel, it will be better able to fight and therefore to deter aggression.
Still in the front of our minds is the magnificent role played by the Army in the Falklands. But, as the House knows, other men and women in the Army are making a valuable contribution to our defence in several other parts of the world, including the United Kingdom. Not least, our men and women are still fulfilling a task in Northern Ireland which is as vital as ever, and the House, I know, would want to pay them a special tribute. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, if he catches your eye later in the debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, will expand on the role of these forces.

Mr. Bob Cryer: The Government have set up a fund for the relatives of the Service men killed in the Falklands. Does the Minister feel that many of the relatives of soldiers killed in Northern Ireland may feel badly dealt with in comparison?

Mr. Blaker: Existing funds care for the relatives of those killed in Northern Ireland. The Army benevolent fund, for example, has funds for that purpose. The fact that the South Atlantic fund will be available specifically for the relatives of those who suffered in the South Atlantic will release the other funds of the Army benevolent fund for other purposes including Northern Ireland.
Returning to the Army's role in the Falklands, I focus attention on one or two specific aspects of the land campaign and pay tribute to the professionalism and courage of the corps and units represented in the military forces under the command of Admiral Fieldhouse.
Before I start I should like to express my deepest sympathy to the next of kin of those, especially in the Army, who gave their lives in the campaign. I also extend my sympathy to those who have been wounded or injured. The House knows that the Army's casualties were higher than those of any other Service.
The breakout from San Carlos beachhead, to which I referred on Tuesday, began on 26 May. 45 Commando, Royal Marines moved on the northern route to Salvador settlement while the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment advanced on a central axis towards Teal Inlet. The 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment was given the task of securing the heavily defended area of Darwin and Goose Green. I want to say a little more about their achievements.
The House will, I know, appreciate that full details of this epic battle have still to emerge. However, we do know that all members of that gallant battalion, reinforced by a company of 42 Commando, conducted themselves with superb courage and resolution. The narrowness of the isthmus separating Goose Green from Darwin denied them room to manoeuvre and obliged them to advance directly on the enemy across open ground. Bad weather deprived them of close air support, although they were able to rely upon the magnificent assistance of the gunners, one of whose batteries fired more than 1,000 rounds during the battle. Even so the battalion had to fight its way through about three miles of well dug-in enemy positions amply provided with mortars, 105 mm pack howitzers and anti-aircraft guns. As we know, it lost its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, early in the action, while he was, with great courage, leading an assault party against two heavy machine gun posts.
When the guns finally fell silent, a single battalion group had overcome an enemy force nearly three times its size. One thousand four hundred prisoners had been taken for the loss of 16 dead and 34 wounded. I believe that military historians will look back on the seizure of the Argentine positions at Darwin and Goose Green as a battalion action as brilliant as any in our military history.
The 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment scarcely had time to draw breath before its leading elements were rushed forward to secure Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove, both of which had been left unoccupied by the Argentines. It then became a race to reinforce the position before the enemy could counterattack to prevent the complete encirclement of Port Stanley. Fortunately, by this time 5 Infantry Brigade, with the Scots and Welsh Guards and 1st/7th Gurkha Rifles, had been safely put ashore at San Carlos. As all available helicopters were needed for other vital tasks, these units had to deploy by sea. Regrettably, on the last day the cloud lifted and the final elements, about to disembark from two landing ships logistic, were hit by an air strike which inflicted heavy casualties and caused both ships to be abandoned.
Nevertheless, the position was secured and the way was open for the final attack on Port Stanley. After overcoming stiff opposition 3 Commando Brigade secured positions on three key mountains. Two nights later it was 5 Brigade's turn. While the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment took Wireless Ridge, the Scots Guards attacked and overran the Argentine positions on Tumbledown Mountain. The Gurkhas then pushed on and took Mount William and the Welsh Guards moved on Sapper Hill as all units prepared to exploit the situation and advance on the town itself. However, by then it was obvious that the Argentines had little stomach left for a fight and the white flags began to appear over their positions. Just after midnight, London time, on the night of 14–15 June, General Menendez formally surrendered all Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands to General Moore.

Mr. Jim Spicer: The Parachute Regiment will be grateful for the kind words that my hon. Friend has used about a regiment that was merely doing its duty. It would be unfair if at the same time he did not make special mention of the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment and its assault on Mount Longdon, where its casualties were more severe than those sustained by the 2nd Battalion. That was the most outstanding feat of the campaign, although it was overshadowed by the fall of Port Stanley. Perhaps my hon. Friend will confirm that the 3rd Battalion suffered heavier casualties.

Mr. Blaker: I agree with my hon. Friend about the remarkable achievement of the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment on Mount Longdon. I was unable to mention that in my remarks, because I had to be selective. In fact, every battalion that took part in the ground action distinguished itself. However, I am conscious that many other hon. Members wish to participate in the debate.
On Tuesday I referred to the role of the Special Forces in the campaign, which was carried out with all their customary skill and daring. During the years since Korea we have had little need to call upon the Royal Regiment of Artillery to fulfil the roles for which it is trained and equipped, yet its air defence batteries were given plenty of opportunity by the Argentine air force to prove that all those years of training had been put to good use. As I have said, Rapier and Blowpipe achieved significant successes.
The men who manned the Rapier system deserve the fullest praise. Throughout the daylight hours they could never relax and never take their eyes off their radar screens, yet despite the appalling weather conditions they maintained the highest possible state of vigilance. Equipped with the British-designed and manufactured light gun, which more than proved its worth during the campaign, the men of the five field batteries responded magnificently to all that was asked of them. Keeping them supplied with ammunition presented a major logistic challenge, which, I need hardly add, was successfully mastered.
Indeed, the mounting and maintenance of "Operation Corporate" produced the most intense activity in logistics for decades. The lines of communication stretched back more than 8,000 miles, with the only possible forward base—Ascension Island—about 4,000 miles from the United Kingdom.
In addition to the routine support of the Field Army, Army logistic units provide a considerable measure of direct support to the other Services and to the Royal Marines in particular. For example, the bulk of the Royal Marines assault packs of ammunition and general stores are held and accounted for in Royal Army Ordnance Corps depots.
The stores outloaded during the operation amounted to many thousands of tons, the majority of which were moved to the ports within 48 hours of the issue of the task force's sailing orders. Of course, the flow of stores to the South Atlantic still continues.
Very detailed logistic staff-work has been necessary to ensure the continued maintenance of the force. I congratulate all those staff officers in the Ministry of Defence, at Northwood and at headquarters United Kingdom land forces, whose many hours of detailed planning on both a single and tri-service basis ensured the smooth running of the operations. I also pay tribute to the work of all members of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, who worked so hard to issue and to account for stores, both at home and in the field, and to their civilian colleagues in the depots.
The movement of stores on land is, of course, the responsibility of the Royal Corps of Transport, whose members played a major part in the organisation and supervision of ship loading programmes. Many of them also accompanied the stores into the operational area to arrange their offloading. The military-manned port at Marchwood has been in almost constant use, and, in addition to Regular Army involvement, about 2,000 task vehicles were provided by the Territorial Army units of the RCT during the initial stages of outloading.
Not all stores travelled by sea. Men of 47 Air Dispatch Squadron RCT spent many hours in the back of Hercules aircraft delivering urgently needed items and mail to ships of the task force. That even more stores and equipment were not needed is a tribute to the skill of the craftsmen of the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, who worked so hard in the miserable conditions to maintain vehicles, helicopters, weapon systems and radios. I salute them all and gratefully acknowledge the full co-operation of industry in fulfilling many of our urgent and outstanding orders and in speeding up some of the contract repair and construction work.
The care of human beings is, of course, of greater importance than even the care of material and no Service in the Army can have enhanced its reputation more during

the Falklands campaign than the Royal Army Medical Corps. The field dressing station of the Commando Logistic Regiment, which was manned by both naval and military surgeons, tended more than 500 wounded, many of whom were Argentine, and performed more than 150 major operations in far-from-ideal conditions in makeshift accommodation. They cart justifiably take great pride in the fact that every man who entered that operating theatre alive left it alive.
None of this would have been possible without the courage and skill of the medical orderlies from the RAMC and the individual units who rescued the casualties and rendered immediate first-aid without regard to the dangers to themselves.
Tragically, the danger to life and limb is by no means over, because of the Argentines' practice of sowing mines over large areas of the Falkland Islands in an indiscriminate way, without keeping the appropriate records. This is a clear breach of the generally accepted principles of mine warfare. Clearing these mines is a dangerous task, made more difficult by the fact that the majority of the mines sown are in plastic cases. Unfortunately, the science of mine detection has failed to keep up with the development of new mines and it is likely that it will be many months before this task is complete.

Mr. Julian Critchley: Why did we seem to be surprised by the fact that Argentine mines were made of plastic? Does not the Soviet Union have similar mines?

Mr. Blaker: Many countries produce plastic-covered mines. This is both a problem of terrain and the indiscriminate way in which the Argentines distributed the mines. The conventions of war require that minefields should be recorded.

Mr. John Browne: A particular question has cropped up many times in my constituency mail. Given that the Argentines broke the conventions of war on three counts—first, indiscriminate laying; secondly, the fact that they did not label the minefields; and, thirdly, that the mines were covered in plastic—why should British soldiers risk their lives picking up the mines? Why do we not use the Argentine prisoners, just as we used German prisoners in the Second World War, to lift their own minefields?

Mr. Blaker: To oblige the Argentine prisoners to do so would be contrary to the Geneva convention.

Mr. Browne: We did it in the Second World War.

Mr. Blaker: I believe that the Geneva convention to which I am referring was not then in force. Thirty-five Argentine soldiers have volunteered to help us remove the mines, and I am sorry to say that one has been severely injured.
We are sparing no effort in our attempts to find new solutions to the problem of mine clearance in the extremely difficult terrain and conditions of the Falkland Islands. I know that all hon. Members will share my admiration for the skill and dedication of the Royal Engineers who are now carrying out this work.
Many of them have already made a major contribution to the successful campaign by removing obstacles from the path of our advancing troops and by constructing a host of installations, ranging from a Harrier operating base to emergency refueling points. Of course, their skills are


now in greater demand than ever before as they work in Port Stanley and the outlying settlements to repair the damage inflicted on private homes and public utilities.
Sadly, I must record that three Royal Engineers have been seriously injured while trying to make the Falkland Islands a safe place in which to live again. In addition, tragically, a Gurkha has been killed while clearing ammunition.
Apart from the problem of mines, in Stanley itself the town water and electrical supplies were badly damaged during the fighting. The Royal Engineers have restored the water supply. In the power station, two of the three generators have been repaired by the Royal Engineers and the public works department working together. The Royal Engineers are engaged in many other tasks to restore Port Stanley to normal. The House may like to know that the Armed Forces are co-operating with the civilians in Port Stanley and elsewhere in a number of ways. They have provided an officer to teach in the Port Stanley school while a teacher is absent on leave. Another Army officer is assistant organist at the Port Stanley cathedral. The Army is helping to produce the local newspaper and to run the radio station for the time being.
I find it difficult to overstate the achievements of the British Army during the past three months. I have tried to draw the House's attention to the more notable aspects, but I am fully conscious that I have been unable to do full justice to them. I have not mentioned the contribution of the men of the Household Cavalry, who took maximum advantage of the mobility of their Scorpions and Scimitars to fulfil their roles of reconnaissance and flank protection. Time prevents me from doing more than mention the other corps and services that took part in the campaign.

Dr. Alan Glyn: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for mentioning the Household Cavalry. Does he agree that the role that it performed was unusual and unprecedented?

Mr. Blaker: My hon. Friend is correct. Among other things, the terrain was extremely difficult for it.
The other corps involved in the Falklands campaign were the Royal Signals, the Army Air Corps, the Royal Army Chaplains' Department, the Corps of Military Police, the Royal Army Pay Corps, the Intelligence Corps, the Army Physical Training Corps and the Army Catering Corps. They, too, can take pride in the way in which their members discharged their duties.
Many of the Army Department civilians willingly worked long hours to ensure that the supplies needed by the task force were available. Others had vital roles in the casualty reporting and welfare systems. Theirs is not a glamorous task and it is right that I record here their devotion to duty and their important contribution to the success of the whole enterprise.
In short, the recovery of the Falkland Islands showed that the British Army is, as we all believed it to be, well trained, well led and equipped with some of the finest weapon systems available. Above all, it is manned by what I believe to be the finest professional soldiers in the world, resourceful and resilient people who will endure any hardship and overcome any discomfort to perform their duty regardless of the odds against them. It is an honour to be associated with them.

Dr. Oonagh McDonald: I hope that the House will give me leave, should I catch Mr. Speaker's eye, to speak again later.
Before I turn to what I should like to say, I extend the apologies of my right hon. Friend the Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) for his absence. He expected the debate to take place earlier and, regrettably, made other arrangements.

Mr. Best: Has he taken the whole of the Opposition with him?

Dr. McDonald: The hon. Gentleman seems a little surprised that one Labour Member can take on the whole of the Government single handed, but I am sure that I shall find that possible.
I thank the Minister for the detailed picture that he has given us of the role of every aspect of the Army in the Falklands campaign. The Opposition appreciate that picture, and we were impressed with the skill with which the Army carried out a difficult job in the Falklands and the success of the operation. The Opposition express their sympathy to the relatives of those in the Army who were killed and to those who were injured during the course of the campaign and those who have sadly been injured during the mine-clearing operation. I thank the Minister for referring to the mine-clearing operation, as I had intended to ask him a question about that.
As the Minister rightly pointed out, the Army was not only engaged in the recent Falklands campaign, but for too long now has been engaged in difficult and dangerous operations in Northern Ireland. The Opposition pay tribute to the work that the Army does there.
The Minister spent much of his time commenting on the White Paper and, in particular, on defending the role that is still given in the Government's planning to the defence of the central front, the stationing there of 55,000 troops, and to the operations of the British Army of the Rhine. I wish to deal with some of the points that the Minister made.
In the White Paper of 1981—and the White Paper of 1982 is simply a continuation of that—we were promised a radical review of our defence expenditure and planning. However, there has been little change. A substantial part of the defence budget—both this year and last year—is spent on the central front. The Minister said that the BAOR takes up 9 per cent. of the defence budget.
If we examine the subject in another way and attribute planned expenditure to the principal roles, we find that total defence spending, directly or indirectly attributed to Britain's contribution to the NATO forces for land and air warfare in the European theatre, constitutes just over 40 per cent. of the defence budget. That is the estimate provided, although the Minister may wish to give a different version later.
If we examine the subject in that way, we find that there is still a substantial amount of money going to the BAOR, but, as we know from the many voices raised in protest in last year's and this year's defence debate, that has been at the expense of the nation. The Government felt that they could not cut this part of the budget because there were political and military obstacles in the way of doing so.
The military obstacle lies in the NATO belief that the major threat comes on the central front. The NATO forces are organised to fight in layer cake distributions on the


central front, and as long as NATO takes that view and the Government do not question that view there are military objections to any reduction of the BAOR and its supporting units.
The political objections were mentioned by the Minister, and I shall return to them later. However, if we examine the whole thrust of our defence policy and are prepared to question some of the shibboleths that underlie NATO's thinking on the third world war and the Soviet threat, we reach rather different conclusions. Perhaps the burden of the adjustment has fallen on the British forces in Germany—the Rhine Army and RAF Germany. For this reason, what Britain does in the Eastern Atlantic is unique.
It is inconceivable that any other European member of NATO would or could make good the deficiencies that the Government would bring about if Britain's contribution to NATO's defence of the Eastern Atlantic and to her sea lanes and interests in other parts of the world were changed. The Government's problem with planning is that the plan may work for a few years but in the years to come we may regret the decisions taken in 1981, which are merely being followed through in 1982. We have not yet heard of any new thinking that might be done after the review of the Falklands campaign has been completed.
We may regret the decisions in future years because the maritime capacities that are being cut away cannot be rapidly restored. A commitment to a labour-intensive standing Army means that it will continue to be expensive in future and will make us vulnerable to foreign exchange changes, as it has done in the past. It is unlikely to change in the future. The new model force structure that the Secretary of State introduced last year may be difficult to support in German marks in the future and at that time, when the unemployment position may ultimately have changed and recruitment to the Army may not be as easy as it has been over the past year or so.
There is no radical change in the Secretary of State's thinking. He merely accepts NATO's assessment of the threat. He merely continues the whole commitment. There is a small reduction in the Army, but in general the principle remains the same. We maintain the largest standing Army in Europe, as the Minister made plain, apart from America.

Mr. Blaker: Will the hon. Lady repeat what she said? Did she say that we maintain the largest standing Army in Europe?

Dr. McDonald: Yes—in the West, apart from America's standing Army, because our contribution is higher than that of others. If I am wrong about that, I apologise. At any rate, we maintain a large standing Army in Europe.
We also pay the largest proportion of our defence budget to NATO. We pay NATO more than 90 per cent. of our defence budget, which is a higher proportion of defence budget than America or any other NATO ally pays. We are the paymasters of Europe in terms of the percentage of our defence budget that goes to NATO defences, in spite of the fact that, measured in terms of average income per head, we are one of the poorest countries in NATO. Only Turkey, Italy and Portugal are poorer than the United Kingdom, and yet we pay one of the highest proportions of our GNP in terms of defence budget, and of that we pay the largest proportion of our defence budget to NATO.
We should therefore bargain from a position of strength. We should say to our NATO partners "It is time that you shared some of the costs. It is time that we had a fairer distribution of the burden of NATO defence and, in particular, a fairer distribution of the burden of maintaining forces in Europe."
The political obstacles that the Minister sees can be overcome. I accept that they are serious difficulties, but negotiations could take place about the costs of maintaining BAOR and RAF Germany over a period so as to phase down our contribution and allow others to take greater resposibility for maintaining their standing armies. That is perhaps cheaper for them, as they have conscript armies, not a professional Army like ours, which inevitably is more expensive. The political obstacles are not insuperable. The Minister and the Government use them as excuses for refusing to reconsider the costs of BAOR and how they might better be shared among other NATO countries.
The Minister told us about the costs of bringing the Army back home. He said that the Army would have to be rehoused, that, inevitably, that would be expensive, and that there would be no saving in public spending. I was impressed by that argument, until I looked at the report of the Defence Select Committee for 1981–82 on the allied forces in Germany. It showed that the British section of the allied forces in Germany has undertaken a barracks improvement programme. It began in 1974, and it is expected to continue until 1990. The cost of the improvement and maintenance programme is undertaken by us. The construction of any new barracks is done by the Germans.
I should like to know how much the programme will cost. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) said in his evidence that the Committee was concerned with the social welfare of soldiers. He said that they looked at a number of barracks of the 32nd Armed Infantry Brigade and at the American accommodation. The American accommodation looked like four-star hotels. He said that ours was not as bad as the Salvation Army, but that he had seen better Salvation Array accommodation.
I am sorry that the British Army apparently has such poor accommodation, and I do not suggest that the accommodation should not be improved, but I wonder how much that improvement will cost. The programme is only 48 per cent. complete—at least, that was true in autumn 1981. Clearly that will be an expensive programme. What will the cost be? Who is carrying out the work? I assume bat German construction workers are doing that improvement work.
There is empty Ministry of Defence accommodation in this country, and I am sure that some of it needs improvement. Could not that impovement work be undertaken? Could not the soldiers be housed there? Would that not be a sensible use of resources? I do not say that it would save resources, but if the troops were brought back and if barracks had to be provided and modernised for them, at least public money would be spent in this country, and we should be providing jobs. After all, about half a million construction workers are out of work in this country. Surely the money would be better spent here.
Some of the acommodation appears to require the purchase of land, and that is a time-consuming procedure in Germany. Clearly takes time, money and effort. We should consider not only the costs of providing housing


here, but the economic impact of doing that. If troops were brought home, the local economy and community in parts of the country would benefit. All these factors should be taken into account in assessing the costs of bringing the troops home. So the Minister's claim that it would simply be more expensive to do so needs close examination.
Other aspects of the support that is required for the British Army of the Rhine need to be considered. It is not just a matter of providing accommodation. We must also provide airfields, ammunition storage and so on. That process is continuing until 1990. The Minister mentioned it this evening, and spoke of the need to speed up the programme and the Government's plans in that regard. What progress has been made in obtaining new grants from NATO's infrastructure fund for the new storage that has to be provided? How soon will it be before we have all the storage that is necessary to provide sufficient conventional ammunition should there be a third world war, and should Europe be the theatre that is immediately involved?
That is an extremely important question in view of the recommendation that was made in the first report from the Defence Committee in 1979–80. It points out that if there were insufficient ammunition, storage, and means of distributing ammunition efficiently, the commander would have to plan for a period of conventional warfare no longer than that able to be sustained by the corps with the lowest level of supplies. He might therefore be forced to recommend the premature introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the battle.
That is an alarming prospect. Although tactical nuclear weapons sound innocent enough, as though they might be merely restricted to the clash between armed forces, they are far more dangerous than that. The average size of such a weapon is four kilotons. That is greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
If the worst happens and conventional ammunition runs out forcing the Army to use the so-called tactical nuclear weapons, we should be rushing headlong into a nuclear exchange. Many commentators agree that it would be far too difficult to confine that simply to a clash between armed forces. Nearby cities would soon be involved and the war would rapidly escalate.
The Minister should provide further information about the progress of ammunition supply and storage space. He must assure us that sufficient quantities of conventional ammunition will quickly be available so that such a risk will be eliminated. It is a risk which must alarm him as much as it alarms the rest of us.
Those are the kinds of question upon which I wish to press the Minister. He should consider the costs of the whole programme and the speed at which aspects of it are taking place. He should also reconsider his claim that the costs of bringing the Army home would far outweigh the costs of maintaining it there.
We are told that the Secretary of State cast his merchant banker's eye over defence spending last year when he took up his post in January 1981. We were told that he was considering in great detail every aspect of the defence budget and looking sensibly for proper savings. His eye seems to have failed to fall on one aspect that is mentioned in the first report from the Defence Committee on the allied forces in Germany. It talks about the estimate of costs being complicated by variations in the exchange rate between the deutschemark and the pound. It says:

A variation of a single pfennig could represent more than £1 million in the cost of pay and allowance".
That is a high cost indeed.
That is not an unfamiliar problem, but it is one that the Secretary of State appears to have overlooked. If one looks back over the history of the Government, it appears that that issue was raised in 1979, shortly after the Government took office. We were told in The Times on 27 November that London was preparing for a battle with Bonn over the cost of BAOR. We have heard little about that battle since.
Have the Government given any further consideration to the foreign exchange costs of maintaining BAOR? Will they do battle with Bonn over those costs? Will they obtain an improvement on the agreement that was signed in 1977—regrettably—by the Labour Government which involved the Germans finally agreeing to pay £125 million over three years? I say "regrettably", because the Bonn Government insisted on £125 million worth of building for British troops, whose barracks have long been in need of modernisation, which not only benefited the German economy but added to its real estate since the barracks remain in its possession. Has any more thought been given to that? We cannot sustain such heavy foreign exchange losses. I am not suggesting that there should necessarily be an alteration to the defence budget, but it does require urgent investigation. What plans do the Government have to cope with that?
In his opening remarks the Minister spoke about weapons and armaments. Has he given any more thought to the Government's decision to note the Select Committee's report in which the lack of anti-helicopter weapons was pointed out? I noted the cost of the improvement programme for the main battle tanks, which now includes thermal imaging, at a cost of £450 million. That involves partly modernising the Chieftain tanks and partly producing the Challenger tank, at a cost of about £1·5 million.
I cannot help but ask whether this is the best expenditure. I know that NATO claims that there cannot be tank parity between Warsaw Pact countries and NATO forces. I merely ask whether that is something that we should try to do. Perhaps we should concentrate our expenditure and effort on anti-tank weapons, bearing in mind that the tanks that are produced by the Russians tend to become obsolete more quickly because the Russians and Eastern European countries generally tend to go in for longer runs of the production of a particular tank than does the West. No doubt they have their own reasons for doing that. However, is this the best use of resources? Should we turn away from equipping the Army to such a large extent with tanks? Should we spend £440 million, perhaps partly on anti-tank weapons and partly on some other weapons systems? Roughly three to four tanks would cover the cost of a Harrier.
I know that this is a matter of dispute and that there is a pro-tank and anti-tank lobby. However, if one looks at more recent wars, such as the Egypt-Israeli war, one wonders about the usefulness of such heavy equipment.
I have listened carefully to the debates and discussions on the Falklands and about all that has been provided by the Army, Navy, Air Force and by back-up organisations of various kinds. There has been one startling omission. There has been no mention of the Royal ordnance factories where many workers work overtime during their Easter holiday to provide much-needed ammunition for the Falklands conflict. In general, the Royal ordnance


factories have provided a stable capability for the Army, providing about one-sixth of the arms equipment and in some case constituting the only British source of supply. I am surprised that the Royal ordnance factories and their workers have not been mentioned. Some of them were badly treated—

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. Geoffrey Pattie): I am grateful for the opportunity to remind the hon. Lady that I mentioned them fulsomely in my speech the other evening.

Dr. McDonald: I do not recall a detailed and lengthy reference to them. I note, however, and I stress, that workers in the Royal ordnance factories in Chester-le-Street and Blackburn, for example, were badly treated during the campaign. Numbers of them received redundancy notices having worked overtime presumably to provide ammunition for the Falklands campaign. The Royal ordnance factories provided stable employment under the Labour Government. Under the present Government, in spite of alleged increases in Government spending on defence, the factories have faced redundancies together with a long period of uncertainty while the Government decided on their privatisation plans.
The general response of the Government to the study undertaken at the end of 1980 has now been announced. The Government are waiting to bring forward legislation to privatise the Royal ordnance factories. These plans, which bring fear and anxiety to the workers in the factories, should be abandoned. The factories should continue to fulfil the same role that they have always occupied. The Government should recognise the stability of provision for the Army by dropping the plans once and for all.
I turn now to the question of personnel. The White Paper describes the Army as now being fully manned and says that fewer trained personnel are leaving the Army than at any time since the ending of conscription. However, the target for the Army is a reduction of 7,000 by 1986. I should like to know what progress has been achieved in reducing the size of the Army through natural wastage. If the Army is at present fully manned and if fewer people, at a time of high unemployment, are inclined to leave, how confident are the Government that they can bring about a reduction in that way? Does the Minister expect redundancies? If so, what arrangements have been made for such redundancies? I should be grateful for answers. I hope, however, that any reductions planned by the Government will be brought about by natural wastage and that redundancies, with the consequent problems that they cause for the individuals concerned, will not be necessary.
I still do not believe that the Government have presented an adequate case for their refusal to alter the size of BAOR. They have failed to provide strong arguments for suggesting that the Army should not, at least in part, return home. I look forward to the Minister's response to some of the questions that I have asked.

Mr. Jim Spicer: If falls to me to follow the hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald), who spoke for the Opposition. I sympathise with her. For a large part of her speech, she has been the only Labour Member present. That must be a difficult burden to bear

when she has to deal with a subject of such complexity. The hon. Lady talked about the strength of our forces in the Rhine Army. I would advise her, at some point, to talk to Army commanders in the field, who have to face the problems caused by armies around them that are continually looking for reasons for reducing their strength on the ground.
The Danes and the Dutch are longing for the moment when we reduce oar forces in the field. They will see it as an excuse to do likewise. Many people in Europe and within European armies still look to us, not to the Americans. They take a line from what we do. That is a factor that the hon. Lady and the Labour Party should remember.
This is a timely debate. This week sees the arrival home of key elements of our task force. No one will mind if I mention the fact that the Royal Marines arrive back on Sunday morning in the "Canberra". It is hoped that they will pass through the towns of Dorchester and Bridport where people are making great efforts to get the pubs open early in the morning and the flags out to receive them. I should also like to mention my own regiment, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions the Parachute Regiment, which has already arrived home and whose members are enjoying a well-deserved short leave.
My hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, who opened the debate, covered a tremendous amount of ground in talking about the re-equipment programme. I hope that he will not mind if I concentrate on the Falklands campaign. It is vividly in our minds. There is much to be learnt from the campaign. Soon after the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment, with its supporting arms and services, occupied Goose Green and Darwin, an early-day motion, supported by hon. Members from every party in the House, was tabled. It stated:
That this House congratulates the 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment on its magnificent achievements at Goose Green and Darwin which were in accord with the traditional standards of the regiment, whilst at the same time mourning with them the loss of their commanding officer and others serving with, or in support of, the battalion on this occasion.
There was a remarkable degree of support for the motion. That first major ground engagement set the pattern for what followed. I am certain that it undermined the ability and the will of the Argentine forces to resist in any great strength. At that time the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment was very much in the public eye. On other occasions, both before and after, many acts of heroism showed the calibre of all members of our Armed Forces engaged in the Falklands campaign.
I have already intervened to mention the fierce and bloody battle fought by the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment for Mount Longden two days before the final capitulation of the Argentine forces. That was a magnificent feat of arms and deserves special mention. The 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment was up against the crack forces of the Argentines on the island. It suffered heavy casualties in a bloody engagement.
I have spoken of the two battalions of my own regiment. However, as hon. Members know, honour and casualties were shared equally among the Armed Services in that short and memorable campaign. While paying tribute to those involved in the campaign in the Falklands, it is also necessary to recall that our forces have spent long, dreary and bloody years in Northern Ireland. One recalls the full horror of Warrenpoint and other places, but much more the events that have occurred in the back streets of


Belfast and Londonderry. The calibre of Armed Forces, especially the Army, has been demonstrated in a way that no other Army ever could demonstrate. Above all, the self-restraint of our troops in Northern Ireland was the marker that showed exactly what they would do when they embarked on the Falklands campaign.
I return to the Falklands campaign. Earlier this week, Sir Edwin Bramall, the chief of the General Staff, talked to men of the Parachute Regiment on board the ferry "Norland" near Ascension Island. In his address he said:
You will be able to say, as they said after Agincourt, after Alamein and Arnhem, 'I marched, and fought, and won in the Falklands and showed the world the incomparable quality of the British Army'.
Sir Edwin Bramall spoke for almost every British citizen.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was right to say that the lessons of the Falklands campaign had yet to be digested. Chief among the lessons that we have already learnt is the incredible ability of all our Armed Forces to improvise when the need arises. Improvisation is a wonderful thing. We all use it in our lives from time to time, but one would not wish to rely totally upon improvisation and say that things will always come out right in the end. They do not. We should avoid improvisation, if possible, and instead have what is needed on the ground at the right time.
I turn to two matters about the Parachute Regiment, to which I hope my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will address himself. Not too many years ago we disbanded the Parachute Regiment's field force formation headquarters. Our experience in the Falklands has shown that it might have been much better to keep that small headquarters, at what would have been a very small cost. I ask my right hon. Friend, when examining the lessons of the campaign during the next few months, to pay special attention to that small, but vital, element.
With the vast increase in range afforded to our C130s by in-flight refueling—we have seen only the tip of the iceberg on this development—is there not a strong argument for developing more positively the parachuting capability of a reformed Parachute Brigade? Who knows when we may yet again wish to move forces over a long range with their parachuting capability ready for use?
I have been unashamedly banging a drum for my own regiment today, but it is a proud week for all those who have served at any time in the Parachute Regiment.

Mr. Best: I hope my hon. Friend realises that many hon. Members in the House endorse his remarks.

Mr. Spicer: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comment.
I turn to the back-up stocks about which the Minister of State spoke. Earlier one heard some rumours about the panic stations caused by the need to raid our first line stocks at short notice. It is clear from the Falklands campaign that we cannot fight a modern war without sufficient supplies and back-up stores ready on the ground. If I agreed with anything that the hon. Member for Thurrock said, it was her brief mention of the need to have stocks ready to hand. I hope that during the next few years we shall learn the lesson of the Falklands. Those lessons have been hard-learned, but if they are taken to heart they will not only serve to make our forces more efficient, especially the Army, but save many lives in future incidents that will inevitably face our Armed Forces.

Mr. Clement Freud: I listened with care to the Minister's speech. The whole House was proud of the courage, skill and bravery of our soldiers in the South Atlantic and we extend our sympathy to those who could not go there. Their bravery and skill is no less for being in Northern Ireland or at some other base. The protection of what we have is more satisfactory and cost-effective than the recapture of what we have lost. The fact that we recaptured what we lost with some brilliance does not exonerate the Government. War is brought about by the failure of politics.
The defence correspondent of The Economist some years ago wrote:
Navies and airforces are machines manned by men and armies are men with guns.
During this debate we can pay tribute to our soldiers and perhaps examine their role a little more carefully. The defence correspondent also said that our Army is the worst equipped Army on the Rhine. He called our soldiers
first-class men using second-class equipment".
I am pleased that steps are being taken to ensure that first-class men will soon have the equipment that they deserve.
I wish to talk not about the military role of the Army, but about its social side. I accept that the Army's role is to prepare soldiers to fight, not to ensure their comfort or that of their families. Housing is one of the most important and most ignored aspects. A soldier who joins at 18 and leaves the Army 22 years later invariably does not have a home to go to. The Army does nothing to facilitate the purchase of houses for men who have given the 22 best years of their lives to their country. I know of soldiers who cannot put down deposits on homes when they leave the Army. I know that housing lists are often long, but, even if proper notice is given to a local authority, it is difficult to find a house for someone who has been demobilised after serving his full term. Some local authorities do not accept them because they live outside the area. Some military families have no right to council housing in any area because of the peripatetic nature of their lives.
The remit of Sir Derek Rayner was to look for financial savings, but I wonder whether the social cost has ever been studied. In the city of Ely, which I have the honour to represent, we have an Air Force hospital. After the Rayner report, the cleaners from the city of Ely who took pride in working in the RAF hospital were made redundant. The cleaning is now carried out by contractors. There is no longer a genuine connection between the Air Force and those who work in the hospital.

Mr. Best: I have the same problem in my constituency with RAF Valley. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be pleased to hear about the great efforts made by the Ministry of Defence to ensure that the contractors reengage those who were made redundant. The system has worked well in my constituency.

Mr. Freud: In my constituency the contractors have re-engaged many workers, but they are no longer under the auspices of the RAF and do not have a gentleman officer to whom they may bring their grievances. They now have the telephone number of the head office, which is about 50 miles away. I deplore the lack of connection.
In my opinion it is better to pay more to local people for the sake of good will. The hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) will accept that if the contractors employ the same people, and since the whole point of the exercise is


to save money, it is unlikely that they will be paid as much. They will in fact be paid less, work harder and have fewer nice people with whom to deal. That has been the substance of the complaint that I have received.
I am a great believer in military establishments playing their part in the community and I wonder whether enough thought has been given to that. I should like to see adjutants sitting on parish councils of the villages in which their barracks are situated. I should like members of regiments to become governors of colleges of further education and polytechnics. I know that they are sent away, but they are replaced by others. It is essential that the Army, which provides full and now well-paid employment, should play its part in the community by providing the occasional service—allowing, if security will permit, its sports grounds to be used by local citizens who have no football field and behaving like the good and rich neighbour.
In a previous debate the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) pleaded that, when widows were told of the deaths of their husbands, the sad information should be brought to the house by an officer. I know that the Secretary of State gave an assurance that that would happen and it is enormously to be welcomed.
There are Service families overseas who have much to complain about and no one to hear their complaints. There are those who are not covered by the DHSS in the same way as those serving in Britain, despite the fact that they pay taxes to the United Kingdom. Non-contributory invalidity pensions are not available to Service wives who return from living abroad until they have established residence here. Child benefit is paid to a husband in Germany, and when he is sent to Northern Ireland he still receives the child benefit while his wife is in Germany looking after the children. Many of us have had to deal with such cases. A little more concern for the Army would eliminate such complaints.
The Royal Medical Corps prepared soldiers to fight, so it cannot spend as much time as perhaps it should on women's and children's health. In Germany there are no smear clinics and few facilities for public health. There are lower standards of health care and higher infant mortality in German bases than anywhere else. I should like the Minister to look into that matter.
Great Britain already has the highest infant mortality in Europe. In Germany, in the Army of the Rhine, it is even higher, and this is largely due to stress during pregnancy. The other problems in the Army of the Rhine include a substantial divorce rate, a high rate of non-accidental injuries and a very high rate of delinquency. There is now a new standing civilian court with a United Kingdom magistrate and a probation officer.
Women's rights in the Army are virtually ignored. A woman cannot choose where she wants to live; she is given a house. An Army wife cannot choose the decor; it is chosen for her. She has no say in running the community because, despite the loud words of feminism in the civilian sector, in the Army a woman is still "an Army wife" with no rights. Such wives follow the flag loyally. It seems a mindless waste of resources, especially given the cost of and limits on staff officer provision, not to cater for such women properly, caringly, and compassionately.
One currently remembers Kipling, now that the nation welcomes home the Army and speaks so highly of soldiers. Kipling wrote:

Oh, it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Tommy, go away';
But it's 'Thank you, Mister Atkins', when the band begins to play.
We forgot about the Army until we welcomed our Service men back to this country as heroes. It would not be a bad idea for the Minister to look into the provision of No. 2 dress uniform. I do not know of soldiers who have complained about their battle dress and I know that SCREDE has looked into hats and boots, but the No. 2 dress uniform, which the soldiers wear with pride when they go out into the community, is a uniform on which little work has been done. There is not as much pride as there was when I was in the Army and I had my smart uniform apart from my ordinary uniform.

Mr. John Browne: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is ridiculous that the No. 2 uniform is still khaki, which is made for camouflage in the field? Does he agree that there is a great opportunity for the Army to design a new No. 2 uniform in a more attractive colour than khaki? The combat kit is camouflaged, but the No. 2 uniform should be for parades and home service.

Mr. Freud: I thought that I had said that. I was unhappy about the humdrum nature of the No. 2 uniform. I should explain that the No. 2 uniform is what used to be the No. 1 uniform, which has gone. It would be nice if there were something a little more charismatic. Perhaps that could be looked into.
We have opinion polls on so many pointless subjects. We now find out how popular the Prime Minister is or who is the best dressed leader of which party. It is high time that the Army found out how unhappy are the Army wives and families. To have a competent and contented soldier, one needs some assurance that he will have an infrastructure in which his family can be reasonably happy and his children receive a decent education;
I have looked at the Defence Estimates carefully. The Government do not publish anything remotely satisfactory about the health and welfare of dependants, of whom there are 100,000 in Germany. The House would like to know why people leave the Army. They no longer leave the Army because they are ill-paid. That has been seen to. However, too many highly trained people are still leaving the Army—men who have cost the country a great deal of money in training. We can read how many there are, but we do not learn the reasons why.
Finally, it would be a good idea to give military dependants some rights, rights that they do not now have. There should be someone to whom they can appeal for redress without it harming their husbands or whoever is their relation in the Army. The Government tend to concentrate on what soldiers do for us. It is time that we concentrated on what we can do for them—and their families.

Mr. Keith Best: I agree with the hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud), who is concerned about the ability of soldiers, particularly Army officers, to purchase property. My hon. Friend the Minister has been considering that matter for some time. It is an area of concern that cannot be satisfied by the gratuity as presently constituted. That is why so many soldiers and Army officers who purchase property during their Service lives have the difficulty of maintaining it while they are many thousands of miles away serving overseas.
The hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not follow him down the road of the argument about No. 1 or No. 2 dress. My No. 1 dress has been hanging in my cupboard for many years. It has not been used. Therefore, perhaps I can give it to the hon. Gentleman and he can decide what best to do with it.
As a Territorial gunner having served with both airborne forces and Commando forces, I was pleased when my hon. Friend the Minister spoke so highly of the role of those forces in the Falklands campaign. Hardly any hon. Member has not referred and will not refer to the Falklands campaign. It is absolutely right that it should be mentioned time and again.
I also pay tribute to the Service men who went there. I am sure that the House will understand if I mention two of my constituents. The late Welsh Guardsman, David Williams, from Holyhead, was killed on an assault landing ship at Bluff Cove. Another Welsh Guardsman, David Grimshaw, from Valley, has had a leg amputated and suffered severe burns. He was married only in January this year. When hon. Members learn about constituents who were killed or severely injured, it brings home the tragedy of war and the need for the House to avert it in so far as we can. I hope that that thought is never far from hon. Members' minds.
Although we may have been fortunate not to lose more Service men and ships—luck plays its part in any military venture—because the campaign was successful it seems rather strange that some hon. Members now want completely to disorientate our defence strategy and the way in which our forces had been deployed in the past, just because of that one campaign.
Surely the very success of the campaign demonstrates our forces' ability to meet such a challenge when it presents itself while they continue to be prepared to meet the underlying threat that undoubtedly comes in central Europe from the forces that are ranged against us in the Warsaw Pact. I do not wish to dwell on the matter. The Government will draw conclusions later this year as a result of the analysis of the Falklands campaign. That will be the time to make speeches on the matter.
The present debate, just like the debates on the Defence Estimates, is essentially about financial resources. In his statement that accompanied the publication of the White Paper my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said:
We can only enhance one capability at the expense of another—unless, of course, the nation decides to devote more than the 3 per cent. rate of growth to defence.
He reiterated that view at the beginning of the debate on the Defence Estimates.
I listened with great care to the speech of the hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald). She did it with great charm. She was on a lonely promontory for much of her speech. It must have been a formidable task when she saw ranged on the Government Front Bench not only my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, but the rest of the Defence team—my hon. Friends the Members for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker), Chertsey and Walton (Mr. Pattie) and Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin).

Mr. Freud: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that she received 100 per cent. reinforcements halfway through her speech?

Mr. Best: The hon. Gentleman may not be too sure of that. No doubt he knows the story of the Trojan horse. The hon. Member for Thurrock may discover that one has marched into her own camp. We must wait to hear what the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) says before we know.
As I understand it, it has always been the view of the Opposition in these debates that savings must be made in defence. That seems to be their central theme. In a way, it coincides with what my right hon. Friend has said—that if we are to seek to expand any element of our defence forces, savings will have to be made in some other element.
If that is so, wherein are the savings to be made? I do not think that anybody would argue that savings should be made in the Royal Navy. Certainly that is not the view of the Opposition. They take the view that the Navy is essential to preserve our independence, our lines of communication and, most importantly, our lines of supply. Nor are savings to be found in the defence of the home base by the RAF. I remember hearing, and I believe that it is still true, that the RAF intercepts more Soviet reconnaissance aircraft in a year than all the other NATO air forces put together. Clearly, savings cannot be made there.
That leaves only two areas in which savings could be made—the nuclear deterrent, that is to say, Trident, and the Army. I shall not dwell at length on whether savings could be made on the nuclear deterrent, although it is right that I should deal with it now that I have mentioned it. The Opposition accept the concept of deterrence, as is clear from the speeches of their Front Bench spokesmen. It seems strange, if not disingenuous, to argue that one believes in the concept of deterrence and then to say that one does not believe in the concept of nuclear deterrence. The whole point about deterrence is to meet strength with strength and to make the military adventure of the potential aggressor such a costly exercise to contemplate that he will desist from ever embarking upon it. That is just as true of the nuclear deterrent as it is of conventional weapons.
In this context, I refer to a paper published in May 1981 by the Fabian Society, to which I am sure the hon. Lady will pay particular heed, entitled "A British Approach to Peace" and written by Professor Neville Brown. It states:
A unilateral departure by Britain would heighten by perhaps a factor of ten the near-term danger of nuclear war, especially if she renounced the Rome Treaty at about the same time.
Yet that is precisely the policy of the Opposition—unilateral disarmament and withdrawal from the Treaty of Rome. I hope that Labour Members will weigh carefully the words of Professor Brown and consider carefully whether their policies might not bring this country much closer to the brink of war than those currently being followed by the Government.
In a recent analytical article, two Soviet policy-makers wrote that the Soviet Union
cannot undertake the unilateral destruction of its nuclear weapons (and indeed has no right to do so, as it is responsible to the peoples of the whole world for peace and progress). To do so would mean disarming in the face of the forces of war and reaction.
What, then, is the benefit of unilateral disarmament? Clearly it will not encourage the Soviet Union to follow suit, let alone ensure that it will do so. In my judgment, therefore, it is not a valid option to save money. It does not follow, as some Opposition Members suggest, that


because other NATO countries do not have the nuclear deterrent they are defective or that we are in some way immoral to retain it.
That flies in the face of logic. We have a nuclear deterrent. If we were to dispossess ourselves of it, that would dramatically alter the concept of deterrence. It cannot be put forward as a serious proposition that, because other NATO countries do not have a nuclear deterrent, we can dispossess ourselves of it.
One is left to consider whether savings can be made in the Army. It appears that they can be made in no other area of our defence commitment. The argument about the nuclear deterrent cannot be whether we have one; it can only be whether we have Trident. If the Minister is correct when he says that Trident is still the cheapest and most effective nuclear deterrent, we should maintain that rather than anything else.
Savings in the Army appear to be the only option. Surely those savings cannot be made in equipment. The tenor of the remarks of the hon. Member for Thurrock, in which she was joined by the spokesman for the Liberal Party, the hon. Member for Isle of Ely, seemed to be that our equipment is not good enough. One cannot make savings there.
I welcome the announcement of the advent of the multiple launched rocket system. One has become increasingly worried about the effectiveness of the Soviet BM21 and the damage that it can wreak, as shown on training films and during exercises. It would be a lacuna for us not to have a multi-barrelled rocket launcher system. I am glad that that will now be remedied and that we shall have new small arms by the mid-1980s. It will undoubtedly simplify logistics not to have 7·62 mm ball and 9 mm ball within the same small unit.
I am pleased that the Territorial Army is being expanded and that more man-training days will be made available. Those of us still in the Territorial Army realise how valuable man-training days are and have fought hard to have them increased. It cannot be suggested that we can turn completely from a professional to a citizen army. I welcome the expansion of the Territorial Army. It is a cost-effective complement to, but it cannot be a substitute for, the Regular Army.
The Territorial Army is only one aspect of the reserve. There are the Regular Army reserves. When I was on Exercise Crusader in BAOR, I talked to men in the units who told me that they had never seen the Regular Army reservists who would come to them at basic section level as top-up troops. They have never trained with those troops. What are the Government doing to ensure that that situation is remedied?
The Opposition seem to be putting forward the argument that savings can be made in the numbers of the British Army of the Rhine. That point was postulated by the former Prime Minister the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), but perhaps he has not looked carefully at the Brussels Treaty. I am pleased that the Minister replied to the point that I put to him. He will not be surprised to know that I suspected what the answer would be. We should have to rip up the Brussels Treaty if we were to substitute reservists for our 55,000 regular troops in BAOR. Our NATO Allies would not allow that; nor would it be advisable.
In the second day's debate on the Defence Estimates the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) became more and more coy the more that I pressed him. He said that

what was proposed would be very difficult. I agree. It hardly sounds a firm foundation on which the Opposition can base savings to enable them to put all their eggs into one basket, namely, a massive increase in the Royal Navy. What about Northern Ireland or any other situation that would require the commitment of British forces? We cannot be certain that it would be only a naval conflict. We must keep a broad base to cover our commitments and not significantly diminish any one of our major capabilities. If we diminish on BAOR, provided that we could get the agreement of our NATO Allies, where would the troops in substitution for them come from?
The hon. Member for Thurrock accepts that she made a mistake. Not only the Americans keep more ground forces in West Germany than Britain. The Germans have 155,000 regular troops and a further 180,000 conscripts. We are the next largest contingent. The French have 46,000. Is the hon. Lady suggesting that the shortfall in British troops could be made up by the Federal Republic of Germany? From visits to Germany, I know that West German politicians do not want that. In addition, to increase German forces would be a major provocation to the Soviet Union and would be highly destabilising.
The only effective way to make significant savings is to proceed along the slow but vital path of negotiated disarmament. I was pleased that my hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces devoted a large part of his speech to the issue the other day. We need greater publicity for what the Government are doing towards disarmament. People want to know what is being done. When talking about the need for Trident and defence forces, we sometimes fall into the error of not specifying why we need them. We need them for greater security and so that we can proceed along the path of negotiated disarmament. That is the only way towards greater global security.
The McCloy-Zorin agreement, the
Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations",
was signed in September 1961 between the Soviet Union and the United States and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It is sad that it has fallen by the wayside. Can we not get back to that sort of agreement?
The first section states:
The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure: That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and
That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
The agreement talks about the creation of a standing United Nations peacekeeping force. The greatest tragedy of the Falkland Islands dispute is that a British task force was dispatched to do the work that a United Nations force should have done. That is what we must work towards. The problems of disarmament will not go away. Public opinion is geared firmly to that and demands action from the Government on disarmament. That is illustrated by the growth of the peace movement. Many people in that movement are misguided in the way that they seek to achieve disarmament, but the desire for disarmament is there.
Perhaps the greatest telling aspect is the terror—I do not believe that I use a euphemistic word—of the super powers that a third world war will occur not between them, but will start in the third world over which they have no control. Proliferation poses the greatest threat to the security of the world. I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends will continue to speak in public and press through those long hard negotiations the very raison d'etre for the retention of forces—ultimately to achieve disarmament.

Mr. Bob Cryer: It is inevitable that most speeches will start with comments about the Falkland Islands. Those who went there were brave. They did not run when presented with the threat of immediate death or destruction. They carried out their business effectively, and I recognise that. We must extend our sympathy to those who will be returning blind, paralysed, scarred or limbless and to the families of those who will not return. More than 1,000 lives were lost in the Falklands.
A fair proportion of the families who suffered losses will want to believe that the sacrifices were made for something permanent, but the likelihood is that over the next few years a move will be made to transfer sovereignty over the Falklands. Such a move was being negotiated before the act of war. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, discussed the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty with the Falkland Islanders.
The task force was not necessary. The Argentines could have been forced to give guarantees, if necessary, by the use of economic sanctions. Argentina is in a very difficult and dangerous economic situation. I regret that in applying the sanctions the banks were not as comprehensive in their support as they might have been. The banks got off comparatively lightly. The people, as always, took the brunt. They deserve the credit. The decision to send a task force was wrong, but there is no discredit on the people who undertook that difficult and dangerous task.
The cost has been enormous, not only in life and limb but in money—between £1 billion and £2 billion. The Government are coy about the expenditure involved.
I suppose we must be grateful that the Russians did not invade while a considerable part of our Army and two-thirds of our Navy were in the South Atlantic. The Secretary of State has from time to time pointed out that the real threat comes from the Soviet Union. I want to deal with that myth so sedulously perpetrated by the Government.
The White Paper, in page 25, states:
The Warsaw Pact has a substantial advantage over NATO in almost every respect.
That is not true according to the Institute of Strategic Studies, which in page 111 of its 1981 publication on the East-West theatre balance in Europe says that NATO has 2,860,000 troops and the Warsaw Pact 2,612,000. It points out that the Soviet Union has a large number of its divisions and men on the Chinese border, which indicates that they are not available for what is euphamistically called the European theatre, which comprises countries where people actually live.
The 1982 annual report of the American Defence Department states:
while the era of US superiority is long past, parity—not US inferiority—has replaced it and the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in strategic nuclear power.

According to that statement, there is a balance of conventional forces and strategic nuclear power, not an inferiority.
The position on tactical nuclear weapons, which are under the control of the Army, is obscure. I do not suppose for a moment that in this apothesis of democracy the Minister will enlighten us and tell the citizens who pay for defence expenditure where the money is going. It is generally believed that about 3,500 tactical nuclear weapons are in the hands of the Warsaw Pact, but, according to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, NATO has 7,000.
It was said in 1978 by the Pentagon—and it has not been contradicted since—that the Soviet inventory of tactical nuclear weapons "was probably much smaller." If, in respect of strategic nuclear weapons, and conventional forces and there is a balance in theatre nuclear forces, including Poseidon, the balance is only marginally in favour of the Soviets—as it is—and we embark on Trident, cruise and Tornado, which will have a nuclear weapon carrying capacity, the balance will swing markedly to the side of NATO and the West. No doubt the Soviet Union will immediately try to restore the balance and we shall again have notched up the nuclear escalation.
The difference between tactical, theatre and strategic nuclear weapons is purely arbitrary. Lord Mountbatten warned against the illusions that can be generated by nuclear weapons when he said that there is no possible use for nuclear weapons. There is no distinction between tactical, on which the Army depends so much, and the rest of the nuclear armoury that each side possesses in such abundance.

Mr. Best: I have Lord Mountbatten's speech. In it, he says:
To begin with we are most likely to preserve the peace if there is a military balance of strength between East and West." Does the hon. Gentleman also subscribe to that view?

Mr. Cryer: That is exactly what I have just pointed out. There is a military balance, but the Government and NATO say that there is not. They argue that there is an imbalance. The late Lord Mountbatten was therefore supporting the view that I have put forward.
The introduction of Trident, with its massive escalation of nuclear fire power, cruise missiles and Tornado will produce an imbalance that will continue the arms race.
Lord Mountbatten's speech has not been repudiated, although the Secretary of State used to say that he had had a chat with Lord Mountbatten who felt differently about it. That is not evidence that we can take into account because Lord Mountbatten unfortunately is no longer with us to comment.
The other myth on which I shall comment was neatly demolished by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark), who is the vice-chairman of the Conservative parliamentary defence committee. I have quoted this before, but it is worth quoting again. The hon. Gentleman said:
If one measures the extent by which the strength of the Soviet Union has been eroded in central Europe by defections of one kind or another since that high point at the time of the Berlin airlift, one sees that effectively, it has lost Austria, half of which it occupied, and Finland over which it exercised almost total dominance. It has lost, irreparably, Yugoslavia. It has lost Rumania in all but name. In Hungary, the regime has become more relaxed and more inimical to Soviet influence. Finally, there are threatening developments for the Soviet Union in


Poland. Seen from the Soviet side, this shows a steady pattern of retreat and disintegration."—[Official Report, 3 March 1981; Vol. 999, c. 193.]
That is not my view. It shows the Soviet Union not as a strong and burgeoning force, but as one in "retreat and disintegration".
Then there is the cost. The defence statement says that the Soviet Union is not prepared to enter into meaningful discussions about cost. Translated into ordinary language, that means that the Government call the Soviet Union a liar. They say that they do not believe the Soviet figures on expenditure and the Soviet Union is not reasonably prepared to defend itself. No member of the Government, if I called him a liar, would allow the start of any discussion or meaningful conference on such a basis.
The Secretary of State admitted to me:
Since the Soviet figures are so unreliable we have to make our own estimates of its expenditure and this is done in great detail every year by assessing the cost to the Soviet Union of all known items of spending and aggregating them for purposes of comparison according to the NATO definition of defence expenditure.
That was endorsed by Senator Nino Pasti of Italy in 1979. He wrote:
The truth is that NATO forces, both conventional and nuclear, are stronger than those of the Warsaw Pact countries. During the last ten years the Soviet Military budget has remained stable. My colleagues were unhappy about this situation, because they could not justify increases in their own expenditure. So they invented a 'pricing' system. It is easy to see how the figures were inflated to show higher Soviet expenditure".
Senator Nino Pasti is one of the generals who wrote a memorandum by the group, Generals for Peace and Disarmament, which was submitted to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It says:
During the first few years of its existence, NATO had no need of nuclear weapons in Europe. At the time, the Soviet Union did not use its conventional superiority as a threat against the politically and militarily weak Western European states. All the more, a military approach in the present time would not promise the Soviet Union any reasonable political, economic and military gains. On the contrary, this would be the first step to a nuclear holocaust. The Soviet leaders are well aware of that. Thus, they are serious about their will to negotiate and they can be taken by their word. There is a chance for the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.
That statement and many others making positive suggestions for a reduction in the level of nuclear weaponry was signed by the following retired generals—Gert Bastian of the Federal Republic of Germany, Johan Christie of Norway, Francisco da Costa Gomes of Portugal, who is a retired former President of the Republic of Portugal, Georgios Koumanakos of Greece, H. M. von Meyenfeldt of the Netherlands, Nino Pasti, whom I have mentioned, Antoine Sanguinetti of France and Michael Harbottle of the United Kingdom. Just because they are generals, it does not mean that they are authoritative, but it is a view that we cannot ignore. There is therefore an ex-military view that we must reduce expenditure on conventional and, particularly, nuclear weapons.

Mr. Blaker: Does the hon. Gentleman support the proposal of the United States for a one-third reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, as opposed to the Soviet position, which is for a freeze?

Mr. Cryer: It is important not to take an absolute position and say that either the United States or the Soviet Union has the sole solution. What is important, and it has

been brought about by pressure not from Governments but from the people, is that both sides should put forward a point of view. In negotiations, neither side will be proved absolutely right. Compromise is needed. Compromise can lead to an acceptance of reductions in nuclear levels The statements made by the Soviet Union and the United States have been the result, not of internal initiatives from the Government, but of the pressure of external events.
As I was saying, a massive cost is involved at a time when local authority services and central Government services are being cut. This defence statement gives an increase, for example, of £280 million in Army equipment alone, from £1,053 million in 1981–82 to £1,332 million in 1982–83. That is for land equipment which, presumably, is largely, if not wholly, for the Army. That is a massive escalation in equipment. I am sure that there are better alternative uses for that money. Last night, for instance, the House discussed two orders for the African Development Fund, in which about £24 million was to be allocated. It was a limited increase and, as several of my hon. Friends said, that was due to the limitation on funds allocated to the Ministry of Overseas Development.
Almost £2 billion goes to research and development for the Armed Forces. The hungry nations of the world do not need new means of extermination. They need water pumps, means of irrigation, and the basic means of producing and increasing the amount of food for their people who, by and large, go hungry each night.
We should compare ourselves with Japan. That country has renounced the use and deployment of nuclear weapons. Instead, it has put its research and development largely into peaceful purposes, with the results that we know so well. As a manufacturing nation, Japan is supremely well equipped and able to produce the goods and services that the nations of the world need.
The second statement says that exports of defence equipment have amounted to £537 million. We should think about this miserable international trade in arms. It is an affront to us and to the families of those who died in the Falklands war to realise that some of that equipment was sold by this country, under both Governments. The majority of the small arms equipment came from this Government. This Government's hands are by no means as clean as they would lead us to believe. It was only in August 1980 that the Minister for Trade, now the chairman of the Conservative Party, went on a mission to Argentina, which was then under military rule, under a junta, which our Government discovered was a Fascist military junta when it suited their convenience. However, at that time, the Minister for Trade wanted to encourage trade links, and at that time they were involved in selling arms.
A principle is involved here. We should be trying to diminish our dependence on arms sales. Instead, we should shift those resources towards the production of materials for peaceful purposes. We can do that if there is a political will. I know that there are 3 million people unemployed as a result of Government policies that are unlikely to change. However, if there is a political will there will be a way out of this wretched trade.
The results of the trade were apparent in the Falklands war. I viewed with contempt a representative of British Aerospace who on BBC television smugly said that the Sea Harrier would sell well after its performance in the Falkland Islands. We must beware of falling into the horrible trap of selling equipment on the basis that it has


been Falklands tested. If that were to be done, it would be selling equipment on the blood of those young men who fell during that tragic time.

Mr. Best: Would not the hon. Gentleman's efforts be better directed to seeking a treaty to ensure that there are no arms sales throughout the Western world, or even in the Soviet Union? Surely all he is advocating is that Britain should not sell arms, which simply means that our competitors will get there first.

Mr. Cryer: There is certainly an element of justification in what the hon. Gentleman says and I shall come to that point later.
I turn now to the United Nations second special session on disarmament. Out of the many pages of detailed accounts in the statement on the Defence Estimates there is only one page—page 25—on disarmament. The Government should place greater emphasis on disarmament.
I tabled two questions about two proposals that have been made at the United Nations second special session on disarmament. First, there was a proposal that there should be a world disarmament campaign. The Government have said that they will support such a campaign, and I welcome that. I hope that they will give it substantial financial support and facilities, although I suspect that they will not.
Secondly, there was a proposal that there should be a world disarmament conference. A conference is clearly different because there would be treaties that would be binding on the participating nations. The Government have said that they are not particularly keen on that idea. They are opposed to a conference because they prefer individual arrangements between countries—bilateral arrangements or other relatively narrow arms limitation treaties.
I support all attempts to reduce nuclear and other weapons. However, this United Nations proposal would do just what the hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) suggested in his intervention. It would establish a conference to enable nations to talk about world disarmament. The limitation of British arms sales would then be set in the context of discussions with other nations. Surely that is what the Government should be supporting and welcoming. A world disarmament conference could negotiate a reduction in both nuclear arms and the miserable sale of death in which too many nations participate with such tragic results.
Not only the Labour Party but countries throughout the world are pressing for such a conference, representatives of which were at the United Nations second special session on disarmament. Non-aligned countries told nuclear powers that they would be affected by a nuclear war. There were speeches on comments such as that of General Haig that a warning nuclear shot could be used in Europe. However, nuclear war would affect the non-aligned countries because the level of radioactivity would drift around the world breeding death and destruction wherever it went.
The non-aligned countries are saying that the nuclear powers should move down the road of disarmament. So, too, are the people. There is a large and growing peace movement. I was fortunate that the Keighley campaign for nuclear disarmament collected money to help towards my fare to attend the special session of the United Nations as

representative of a non-governmental organisation. I took part in a march of 1 million people from the United Nations building to Central Park. I was enormously inspired to see Americans from all parts of the United States taking part in that protest for peace.
On the previous Sunday 250,000 people had demonstrated in London for peace. They were saying that Governments must take action to stop the escalation in nuclear arms. It is a process in which this Government participate by accepting cruise missiles and by embarking on expenditure of £10 million on Trident. People will not accept it any longer. That is why the peace movement is growing apace.
About 2,000 people last Sunday took part in a demonstration near Harrogate, the Tory spa town with effete and gentle achitecture of a typical spa nature. On the moors above Harrogate there is a strange development called Menwith Hill. It was started by the United States army security agency and is now apparently run by the United States national security agency. It has never received explicit authority or approval from this Parliament. It is an area that comes under executive action. No one knows exactly what it is. Some people claim that it is an interception base to obtain information for the United States European operations. Others say it is the European communications centre of the United States army. It would be a prime target in any conflict in Europe.
If it is an interception base and if it is interfering in our telephone network—there is a GPO microwave tower nearby with a massive cable link from the tower to the base—it is an absolute disgrace and an outrage that it should continue to operate without any discussion or decision by Parliament. Those 2,000 people clearly wished to express the view that the base should be closed as part of the closure of United States bases in this country. They want to get rid of cruise missiles, the F-111s that carry nuclear weapons into and out of this country on a regular basis and also this base that exists without the authority of Parliament. Within our wonderful democratic system which is so widely praised that we sent an armada to the Falklands and also have nuclear weapons to protect it, I wish to know who is responsible for the base. Is it the Army? Or do I have to raise the matter on the Navy Estimates or the Air Force Estimates?
Is it perhaps one of those areas where no one says anything? If an hon. Member puts down a question there is a blocking answer that stops the elected representative from tabling questions in the Vote Office. It is known that this sort of thing goes on. Ministers raise their eybrows in a mock way, apparently surprised that anyone should actually question what is happening. I question it because people want to know what is going on. They want to know what is being done in their name. It is part of the pressure brought by people who wish to say "No" to nuclear weapons and to communications linked to the deployment of such weapons. They want the Government to make a positive move towards disarmament.
At the United Nations, the Japanese Prime Minister made an impressive speech. He concluded by saying that as a young man he had been a seaman. On board ship he had stared at the millions of stars in the night sky. Whatever one feels about a starlit sky, whether one takes the view that it is part of God's pattern or simply a mystery that one cannot understand, the Japanese Prime Minister said that, as far as we know, we are the only planet with life on it and yet we are trying our best to produce weapons


to destroy that life. He said that from that time he was a devoted supporter of peace and disarmament. My purpose is to persuade the Government to adopt the same role. By buying Trident and supporting cruise, their actions are directly opposed to the wishes of the people, who desire peace.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: As most of what must be said has already been said, I shall not detain the House for long. I associate myself with almost all of what my hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) said in his excellent speech. I differ from him only on his interpretation of the merits of the British forces rather than a United Nations force going to the Falkland Islands. It was better that British forces carried out that task.
I especially associate myself with what all hon. Members have said about those who have suffered because of the conflict. I disagree wholly with the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) on whether those lives were spent in a worthwhile cause. The fight for the Falkland Islands has immeasurably assisted the search for world peace and European security. The stand that Britain took to ensure that our sovereign territory could not be attacked with impunity will help to guarantee our future safety.
A substantive matter that was not dealt with today was a home defence force. I raise the matter because of the deep fear and concern that I feel and wish to share with the House. There are many ways in which we may be threatened in the future, especially by the Soviet Union, and no Government and no defence of which we are capable can consider all possibilities, but I ask the House to consider the following scene.
Let us suppose that, instead of having in the United States an Administration who are dedicated to peace and security in Europe, that country has an Administration who are isolationists, who believe that America can survive without a free, independent Western Europe, and who would not contemplate or command its people to make the sacrifice that America would be called upon to make to save Europe from Soviet attack.
If that were to happen, Europe would have to rely upon two back-up forces. First, there would be the conventional forces that we have in Europe, leaving aside American intervention. Secondly, there would be the deterrent value of our Trident missiles. If the Trident missiles failed to deter and Russia walked into Western Europe, how could we defend our shores?
My right hon. and hon. Friends know as well as I do the balance of conventional forces in Europe. I do not believe that in a conventional war Europe could hope to stop the Soviet Union reaching the Channel within a week; nor could we stop Soviet forces from crossing the Channel and invading our country. In the event of such a conflict, almost all of our forces would be committed to going overseas and fighting for the integrity of Europe on the German war front. Some divisions would remain in Britain, but not enough to make a significant impact on a full-scale Soviet invasion by sea and air.
The Soviets have the great advantage in Europe that they can and will attack without warning. If they do, our only hope would be a substantial home defence force which the Soviet Union was aware would fight to the last man in every town, village and street. That would be a much more effective deterrent than a nuclear weapon, which we could not use in those circumstances. It is right

to have a nuclear deterrent, because it is an additional factor that the Soviet Union must take into account, but we must bear in mind the defence that the Soviets are building against nuclear attacks. Vast works are going on to safeguard the civilian population against nuclear attacks. We must compare the steps taken by our potential enemies with the steps that we are taking, which are almost non-existent.
I do not wish to enter into a debate about whether civil defence should be controlled by the Home Office or by the Ministry of Defence, as I would wish, but I am certain that if we have a nuclear weapon against which the Soviet Union has taken steps to safeguard its people, and if it has a weapon that can do equal or greater damage and we have taken no steps to counter it, the deterrent factor of the likelihood of Britain firing its weapon must be undermined. It would be different if, to ensure that they could stamp out the freedom that they so dislike and fear on their borders, the Russians had to kill every man in Britain.
We should start to build a home defence force along the lines of the Home Guard, with a defensive commitment to individual communities or families. The advantages of local knowledge against an invading force are enormous. Such a force could De created at little cost and the deterrent value of our forces would be immeasurably and disproportionately increased as against the cost to the Exchequer.
My hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey mentioned the options open to the Government. He pointed out that we can make no savings in the Royal Air Force. I am sure that during our debate on the. Navy next week there will be widespread agreement on the Conservative Benches that we need a more efficient, better equipped and more expensive Navy than the present one. We cannot make any cuts in the Army. Even the hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald) failed to make out a case for saving by bringing back any part of the Army of the Rhine. She was probably right to say that unemployment would be improved if some troops were brought back from Europe, but the overall saving would be insignificant, because it will cost a great deal to increase the power of our Navy.
However, my hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey did not draw the only possible conclusion, which is that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State must be given more funds by the Treasury. We must make it clear in the House that we are prepared to pay the price, whether by increased taxation or borrowing. We must put defence needs first and find the assets with which to back them later. It is no good having two-thirds of the defence force that we need if the two-thirds are inadequate for the task ahead. I ant sure that my right hon. Friend will do everything that he can to persuade my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give him the necessary money. I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the excellent way in which he tried to increase the capacity of our three Services and the substantial success that he has had within narrow financial constraints.
The conclusion that should be drawn from the debate is that the extra finances must be found to increase the capability of the Navy and that the Army and the Air Force must be left at least as powerful as they now are.

Mr. John Cartwright: Like almost every other hon. Member, I should like to endorse what


the Minister said about the performance of our forces in the Falklands. It is understandable that much of the comment has concentrated on the skill and courage of our fighting men. I was glad that the Minister did not forget the achievements of those who tackled the appalling logistic problems to ensure that everything that was needed was in the right place at the right time. There can have been few military operations in which the teeth owed so much to the tail—it was an incredibly long tail. It was a successful feat of organisation which has been praised throughout the world and is something of which the people of Britain can rightly be proud.
I should like to refer to one problem that arises out of the Falklands campaign that I have raised with the private office of the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. The problem concerns some Falklands casualties in the Queen Elizabeth military hospital in Woolwich who had considerable difficulty in telephoning their families, some of them a long way away in Wales. They were having to share one pay telephone. I have persuaded British Telecom to make good the deficiencies of the equipment, but the problem now is that the soldiers concerned are facing substantial costs in telephoning their families. From a parliamentary answer, I understand that they are entitled only to one free telephone call. Many of them are making calls to their families in Wales, many of whom are suffering from unemployment. Therefore, I hope that something can be done to assist those soldiers to keep in regular contact with their families.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jerry Wiggin): I well understand the problem that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned. We have given some attention to it. If the hon. Gentleman has specific cases, I know that many welfare organisations will be happy to help out. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will draw my attention to any correspondence.

Mr. Cartwright: I am grateful to the Minister. I shall certainly follow up the matter.
I should like to concentrate on what the Minister said in the first part of his speech. I very much welcomed the details of improvements to our conventional capability in the central front in Europe. Unlike the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer), who has departed so rapidly after his speech, I believe that the most obvious danger of a Soviet attack exists in the central front in Europe because that is where there are major imbalances, certainly in conventional capability.
The hon. Gentleman claimed only on the basis of troops under arms that there was a conventional balance in Europe. It would be difficult to discover any authority which would suggest that there was a balance in terms of battle tanks, artillery or tactical aircraft. Every statistic that I have seen indicates clearly that the Soviet Union has a major superiority in those important areas. That superiority makes us vulnerable to the possibility of a rapid smash-and-grab thrust which exploits Soviet conventional superiority. In such a scenario, NATO would be forced to respond with tactical nuclear weapons or capitulate.
There are inherent dangers in relying so heavily on battlefield nuclear systems. Short-range arsenals have grown considerably since 1954 when NATO first introduced them. The defence White Paper lists short-range systems in the overall theatre balance. The NATO

1982 force comparison sets out in more detail the balance of short-range nuclear systems. It shows that NATO has about 1,000 nuclear capable artillery systems and about 100 Lance and Honest John missile launchers, whereas the Warsaw Pact has 300 artillery systems and 650 Frog and SS21 missile launchers. That shows a numerical superiority in NATO's favour, but it could easily be argued that the Warsaw Pact advantage of range and survivability in land-based missiles rules out that numerical superiority.
It is also true that there are short-range nuclear capable aircraft in Europe, atomic mines and all the rest of the paraphernalia of battlefield nuclear systems. There are about 7,000 systems on the NATO side, 5,000 of which are in the Federal Republic of Germany. There is always the spectre looming of the enhanced radiation warhead.
Is it likely that the short-range nuclear systems will be used? I have heard the NATO supreme commander, General Rogers, say clearly on a number of occasions that to resort to tactical nuclear weapons would lead inevitably to the use of strategic nuclear forces. Admiral Lord Hill-Norton, the former chairman of the NATO energy committee, made the same point in a statement in The Times on 18 August 1980, when he said:
once you cross the nuclear threshold you have taken an irreversible step which is almost bound to lead to a strategic nuclear exchange, which in turn is almost bound to lead to the end of civilisation.
That cold, realistic military assessment of the risk of escalation that flows from the use of short-range nuclear systems must raise some questions about our willingness to use them if the situation so requires.
There has been concern about political control over battlefield systems and a feeling that in the pressure of a battle, under threat from the Soviet Union, commanders might use the systems first and seek political assurance afterwards. We have been assured regularly that that could not happen, that there is full political control and that there would be consultation between the Allies before a decision was taken to use short-range battlefield systems. That is a little hard to understand or to believe. It would be an extremely time-consuming operation. To visualise the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers in the European capitals, where evacuation would probably be taking place, discussing whether they could take such a decision is a little hard. In the real world there is a strong risk that the decision would be postponed, or, because of concern about rapid escalation of nuclear warfare, it is likely that the short-range systems would not be used.
There is growing concern in Europe about the dependence on short-range nuclear systems. There is a desire to rethink the doctrine of flexible response. That doctrine grew out of a conventional inferiority. There is some debate on whether the weapons systems were produced to fit the needs of the doctrine or whether the doctrine was designed to suit the existence of weapon systems that were becoming available. There is lack of clarity about the circumstances in which battlefield nuclear systems would be used.
It was originally hoped that those systems would be a warning to the Soviet Union that NATO was determined to use the full range of nuclear weapons, but that was in the days when NATO had strategic nuclear superiority. That is a much less likely event today simply because the use of short-range systems on the NATO side will produce a similar response, with all the risks of escalation that I


have mentioned. The use of short-range systems could not bring military success and the Soviet Union would not be faced with unacceptable damage.
We should improve our conventional effectiveness and reduce our reliance on short-range tactical nuclear systems. That does not mean that we have to match the Soviet Union tank for tank, gun for gun or plane for plane. I agree with the hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald) that there is a feeling that tank commanders hanker after tank battles, as happened in cavalry battles in the past. They sometimes give the impression of regarding modern anti-tank weapons as unfair and unsporting. We should aim at building up our defensive capability to such an extent that we could hold a Soviet conventional attack at least in the early days. That does not always mean dramatic new weapons systems.
I shall quote one example from my experience on the Select Committee on Defence. The first matter that we considered was ammunition storage on the central front. We were not very happy about what we discovered. We were concerned about the delay in construction of forward storage sites. We were not happy about the arrangements for transporting ammunition from the rear zones. We drew attention to the differential levels of supplies of ammunition that appeared to be available to different national forces. We said in the report that, as a result of those differentials in ammunition resources
the Commander … would have to plan for a period of conventional warfare no longer than that able to be sustained by the Corps with the lowest level of supplies. He might therefore, be forced to recommend the premature introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the battle".
We strongly recommend that steps should be taken to achieve NATO-wide agreement on calculations of ammunition expenditure rates and stock levels. The response from the Ministry of Defence was not encouraging. It said:
In the end stock levels are a matter for individual nations to decide upon".
It is extraordinary that our strategy might, in some circumstances, depend on something as basic as ammunition storage and availability.
It should be admitted immediately that greater concentration on conventional capability, as opposed to nuclear capability, is not a cheaper option. The White Paper makes that clear. That is why I and my party support the 3 per cent. target, despite the difficulties that are involved in meeting it. We want that growth to go into conventional improvements rather than being siphoned off into super-sophisticated de luxe strategic nuclear systems that the country cannot afford.
It is not fair to suggest, as is sometimes argued by the nuclear disarmers, that conventional war is an easy option. We have seen recently that high technology modern weapons systems can have a devastating effect on the combatants, as was the case in the Falklands, or on infrastructure and population, as is the case in the Lebanon. An all-out conventional war over the Federal Republic of Germany is not an appealing prospect.
We are more likely to deter a potential aggressor if we make it clear that we have a powerful conventional strength than if we rely on nuclear weapons systems which are not credible in the last analysis.
That is why the Government and NATO should give high priority to a battlefield nuclear weapon free zone in Europe. That is just as urgent and as important as the START negotiations for strategic weapons and the INF

negotiations for theatre weapons. It could help to unstick some of the MBER negotiations. A battlefield nuclear weapon free zone, accompanied by a balance in conventional nuclear forces, would do much more to secure peace in Europe than the great gestures of unilateral disarmament that are now the policy of the official Opposition.

Mr. John Browne: I congratulate the task force. It was an epic victory and was of historic consequence. The conduct of these amphibious operations more than 8,000 miles from a home base and more than 4,000 miles from any base must be one of the most outstanding feats of arms in history.
I also congratulate and thank the people at home who supported the campaign. They are the people who worked on the ships, supplied the goods and organised the task force from its bases. I would also like to mention an element that has not been emphasised sufficiently—the role of leadership in the success of the task force. Great endeavours are not usually successful against such odds without determined and good leadership. From the Prime Minister to the commanders within the task force, the leadership was of outstanding quality.
I extend my sympathies to the families of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and merchant mariners who were killed, and to those who were severely wounded.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on getting the best out of our Armed Forces within the cash limits that have, in my view, been wrongly imposed on them. He has made the very best of the resources made available to him. Secondly, I am glad that he succeeded in preventing the incremental cost of the Falklands incident from falling on the normal defence budget.
The Army is just one part of our integrated Armed Forces. We must therefore view it in relation to our total Armed Forces.
As I have said before, I believe that defence is the prime duty of the Government. Ideally, defence expenditure should be based upon needs rather than cash limits, as I am sure many of my hon. Friends and certainly my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will agree. The reality is, however, that cash limits have been imposed upon us. Therefore, although I heartily support my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) in urging that we should fight for more cash resources for the Armed Forces, we must plan today on the basis of the resources that we actually have and adapt these resources to meet the threats that face us.
Three key internal political factors must be taken into account in developing any defensive plan. The quantity of total financial resources available for defence depends on two elements—first, our economic ability to generate the wealth and, secondly, our political will to spend a sufficient percentage of it on defence. The Ministry of Defence must decide what systems should be developed and how they should be deployed, but defence is only part of our total foreign relations. Indeed, defence is generally used only when diplomacy breaks down, as in the Falklands incident. Foreign policy must dictate where our defence resources should be deployed.
I believe that we face a major threat at this time. Finance and foreign policy must join and co-operate with defence to plan and balance our defence resources with our


defence needs. As I have said, we must work within the present limited financial resources. Moreover, the outlook for the American economy and interest rates there make it unlikely that, despite the pressure that I and my hon. Friends seek to exert, much more will be spent on defence in the short term.
It is true that defence spending has been increased by 3 per cent. in real terms. I congratulate not only the Government on maintaining that increase, despite adverse economic conditions, but the last Labour Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) on accepting it. It was absolutely right. Nevertheless, although 3 per cent. in real terms accounts for inflation, it does not cover what I would describe as technical escalation.
To maintain our defence ability, we must maintain the technical capability in terms of "technological escalation". It is like buying a car. In defence terms, it is no good just trading in one Marina and buying another if everyone else has gone on to a Jaguar. It is a matter not just of fighting inflation, but of the technological advance in weapons systems. That is why I believe that we must spend much more than 3 per cent. in real terms. Unless we do that, we shall not be able to keep up, and if we cannot keep up, effectively and relative to other major powers, we must accept effective cuts.
Where are the cuts to be made? Are they to be made in pay, in ammunition or in weapons systems? Are they to be made across the board in a general, quiet way, or will they be specific cuts in specific areas? I believe that we are already experiencing cuts in our relative military effectiveness, despite the increased expenditure in real terms. We must therefore reappraise our priorities in our defensive plan against what we as a nation are likely to be able to afford in relation to the threats that we face. Our defence priorities are the defence of the United Kingdom by both nuclear and conventional means within NATO. We make a major contribution to NATO with our Army on the ground. We have three armoured divisions and a committed Territorial Army division. We have a maritime role in the eastern Atlantic and commandos on the northern flank. In principle, I support all of this.
I believe that it is right to improve and maintain our independent nuclear deterrent, which I see as part of a modern integrated defence system. But I do have reservations about the balance between our armoured land forces on the Continent and our maritime role.
The defence of the United Kingdom is based upon NATO, and I agree with that. We should look at where the threats to NATO lie. I see three direct, internal threats and one external. First, there is the threat of a direct Warsaw Pact assault on the central European front. Then there is internal subversion and the Russian use of the peace offensive which is focused upon organisations such as the CND and the talk about nuclear-free zones. Hiroshima was an atomic-free zone, but that did not prevent the Americans from dropping an atomic bomb on it. Internal subversion is also aimed at creating divisions between the Governments of NATO by fostering mutual suspicion and mistrust. However, I believe that the external threat is more active and serious because NATO has vital interests outside its land mass. An example of that is the Gulf whence Europe's oil lifeblood comes.
Although a direct assault across the land mass of central Europe is a threat, I believe that it is one of the less serious threats. The Russians are cautious and would be most unlikely to attack a defended Europe, even if NATO's forces were not as sophisticated or numerous as their own. The Russians would not be likely to attack a Europe that was defended by both nuclear and conventional means.
Although central Europe is the least of our priorities, it draws most of our defence resources and the bulk of our Army. The external threat, on the other hand, is more serious. Yet NATO is neither prepared nor equipped to meet it. That is a serious fault, and it is our duty to ensure that it is corrected. The Foreign Office must help by bringing diplomatic pressure to bear so that NATO reassesses its resources and the threat that it faces. NATO should reallocate its forces to meet today's threats rather than those of the 1950s.
NATO must decide which nations are prepared and best equipped to accept a role external to NATO to meet the external threat. Great Britain is a prize contender for that role. Our history and present capabilities show that we are, if not the largest, the finest maritime nation. But even the battles of Crecy and of Agincourt, Marlborough's campaigns, the Napoleonic wars and the Second World War, continuing to Malaya and Borneo, and then to the Falkland Islands, show that we have never had a successful large Continental Army. When we tried to fight as a large, Continental Army in the First World War and in the Crimean war, we were relatively unsuccessful. The greatest strength of our Army lies in its infantry and its special forces under British command. Indeed, even our cavalry and more recently our armour have never been outstanding when measured against those of other major military nations. Yet the bulk of our Regular Army is deployed as a major Continental land force of three armoured divisions and we even thought of disbanding the commandos and the Parachute Regiment.
In addition, the bulk of our Army is deployed to meet the least likely threat to NATO on the central European front.
There is another problem—that of local NATO strategy. It is a strategy of forward defence. For political reasons, it is too far forward. The West Germans find it hard to accept the yielding of land in central Europe as a method of absorbing a Russian attack. I understand their feelings, but I do not accept the error that it causes in our defence strategy. First, it means that our forces are deployed so close to the East German border that we are within initial gun range of the Warsaw Pact. It does not have to move massive stocks of ammunition to its gun sites. It is already there, and we are within its range.
Secondly, we do not have the ability to manoeuvre to absorb the shock of a Warsaw Pact attack, to channel the attacking forces and to deliver a counter-stroke. An indirect approach in the defensive battle is denied by the very far forward defensive strategy. It renders our expensive armoured forces unnecessarily vulnerable to a Warsaw Pact attack. We must bring political pressure to bear on NATO to accept a more flexible land battle strategy.
Would it be possible to concentrate more on developing and building-up an effective battlefield strength in infantry-launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems? We could avoid much of the massive expenditure on tanks by doing that. If, with reasonable accuracy, an infantryman could knock out an enemy tank at 1,000


metres to 2,000 metres we could reduce the number of tanks. We could reduce one of the prime reasons for having such a massive weight of tanks relative to our land forces.
We should match our resources to the true needs of NATO. I agree with our basic defence strategy and that it should be based on NATO. Keeping a British force in Europe is vital to NATO's morale, but does it need to be an armoured force? If we concentrated on more sophisticated infantry weapons, we could divert the force from being effectively armoured and have one armoured division, two mechanised divisions and a TA division, with considerable cost savings.
I am totally opposed to withdrawing the Army from Europe. As I said, that would have a devastating effect on NATO morale and the cost saving per soldier would not be much. But converting from armour to an enhanced mechanised infantry capability would save money that could be used to meet an external NATO threat.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott): My hon. Friend makes an interesting point with which I partly agree, but at present there is no better anti-tank weapon than the tank. In 10 to 20 years' time we may have invented new missiles that can penetrate the Russian armour that is being introduced, but it is a technological gap that we are at present trying to fill.
The weight of fire power that could come down upon the infantry from the current generation of weapons is so huge compared with anything we may remember in the Second World War that it is difficult to conceive how to protect it unless it has armour to cover it and it is mobile on the battlefield. The point was made earlier about being tied into the fever at the front, but it is too involved a subject to deal with now.

Mr. Browne: I accept that, but surely we should be concentrating our minds more upon research and development. We should be developing infantry-launched missiles instead of concentrating solely on an updated tank. More resources and energy should go into the development of an infantry-launched system.
I accept my right hon. Friend's views on mobility and protection, but the modern armoured personnel carrier is a sophisticated vehicle and, at present costs, is a relative luxury. I believe that it can be slimmed down considerably and still give acceptable protection.
We should work much harder towards a NATO standard weapons system, especially in aircraft and tanks. If each nation wants to build its own equipment, why not have an agreement whereby weapons accepted by NATO can be built by each country to the appropriate specification and be interchangeable? The R and D costs could be paid back under a licence agreement, either to the country that carried out the research or to the multinational company concerned.
Ammunition and logistics should be set in supply for more than a short battle. It would be devastating to have an enormous expenditure on armoured equipment and armoured divisions in Germany only to find that there is only one week's supply of ammunition.
More use should be made of the Territorial Army. It is a highly efficient and cost-effective organisation. Its members have outstanding morale and dedication. In some senses they are more used to exercises than certain elements of the Regular Army. More attention should be

paid to recruitment in the Territorial Army. I know that it is up to establishment, but this is an area that would give a good return on increased expenditure.
As its cost is so high the Regular Army should be an elitist force. The officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers must all be made aware that they are the elite on the positive and on the cost side. Each individual in the Army should be made aware of how much it costs to put him in uniform and into an armoured personnel carrier, and of the value of the kit entrusted to him. This is done in civilian life. Men and women are made to realise what everything costs. That would be beneficial in the Armed Forces, too.
I urge increased expenditure on defence. However, in the absence of increased resources, we should amend our present plan in central Europe and concentrate more on the external threat to NATO. I see that threat as much more sinister and active than on the central front. At all costs, we must maintain our independent nuclear deterrent and our civil defence.
I wish my right hon. and hon. Friends good luck in fighting these battles at home.

Dr. McDonald: By leave of the House, I should like to comment on some of the interesting speeches that have been made during the debate.
I note with interest the remarks of the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Browne). I note that his views are shared on both sides of the House. Those views were also expressed by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Drake (Miss Fookes), the vice-chairman of the Conservative Defence Committee. They believe that, of the so-called threats facing NATO, access across the central front is the least likely.

Mr. John Browne: The hon. Lady should not misunderstand what I was saying. I was saying that the least likely threat is against a defended Europe, but we must still defend the central front.

Dr. McDonald: The Opposition Front Bench have never suggested that there should be an undefended Europe, still less an undefended United Kingdom. I underline that point, because it is important for consumption not only in the House but outside. The Labour Party is certainly not a pacifist party. It has stressed the need for adequate conventional defences. It is on that basis that we are examining the most effective deployment of the conventional forces that are available.
We believe that it is misplaced to emphasise the central front. The hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out that that is the least likely of the threats. In the debate on the defence White Paper hon. Members insisted that there are problems and conflicts in which we may have an interest and there are Third world countries that it may be necessary to defend because of their past associations with us. Therefore, events and conflicts outside the NATO area are also important. It is therefore vital that the forces at our disposal should be sufficiently flexible to meet any such problems as and when they arise.
Other hon. Members have rightly drawn attention to the fact that faced with a defended Europe and the problems within its own empire Russia is unlikely to embark on an adventure into Germany and to advance west. After all,


Russia has problems holding Poland and Romania, and belatedly it has tried to influence Yugoslavia, which it has already lost.
The central front is the least likely threat, and it is for that reason that in his radical review we wished that the Secretary of State had given more attention to that fact. He should have questioned the underlying presupposition of NATO's organisation of its defence forces. All that the Government have done in these debates has been to reiterate the threat to the central front. There has been no analysis—political, economic or military—of how that threat may have changed and developed, as we believe it has since the Second World War.

Mr. Nott: It is the one area in the world where we are most heavily outnumbered by the conventional forces of the Soviet Union. We are outnumbered 3 to 1 in armour, 3 to 1 in aircraft and 5 to 1 in missiles. It may be the least likely threat, but it is the one place in the world where we face ready forces that hugely outnumber our own.

Dr. McDonald: That poses two questions. First, there should be a proper assessment of the imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The right hon. Gentleman is aware that there is more than one assessment of the relative balance between the two. I shall not develop that argument now, but what he says is open to question.
Secondly, the conflicts that have arisen since the Second World War, of which there have been more than 140, have occurred outside the central areas. Many experts believe that a third world war is more likely to occur by the involvement of the great Powers in a conflict, very likely outside, or on the border of the NATO area. Some of us have argued from the Opposition Front Bench that the borders of Turkey are perhaps more vulnerable, bearing in mind the conflict between Iran and Iraq, Israel and the Lebanon, and so on. There are serious problems in that area. The great Powers have been drawn into conflicts, directly or indirectly, in those Third world areas. Such a conflict could lead to world war three, and that is the area of greatest concern. So the Government would have done well to present a more up-to-date analysis of the threat on the central front, in spite of what the Secretary of State has just said.
In my opening remarks I referred to the possibility of withdrawing the British Army of the Rhine. I want to point out that I was, of course, referring to the non-German standing armies. We come second in line to America in having the largest standing Army there. I think that there was some misunderstanding earlier in that regard.
It was suggested by the hon. Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Spicer) that our NATO Allies were waiting for us to withdraw our troops from the Rhine so that they could reduce their troops. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we make the greatest contribution from our defence budget to NATO, and that we are therefore in a position of some strength in negotiations with our NATO Allies. I said that this would have to be a matter of negotiation. One could not simply withdraw troops and leave a vacuum. There would have to be agreement with other member countries of NATO to fill the vacuum, thus distributing the burden more fairly. When one is the paymaster, one can lean on people.

Mr. Jim Spicer: How does one lean on people? What does one do when one is up against some of these

countries? It is perhaps not fair to mention them by name, but they are already welshing on their existing commitments. They are already pulling back. If the hon. Lady believes that we have the wherewithal to lean on them, that we are the paymaster, she lives in cloud-cuckoo-land.

Dr. McDonald: The hon. Gentleman should consider the facts, and the facts are that our contribution to NATO from our own defence budget is over 90 per cent. We pay the highest proportion of our budget to NATO. There would have to be a discussion, and we should have to point out that we were reducing, or further reducing, or withdrawing our troops. If people in NATO were worried about a possible gap on the central front, some arrangement would have to be made, some compromise would have to be reached over a fairer distribution of the expenditure.
The hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) asked whether we envisaged replacement by German troops. I entirely appreciate the political problems that are involved here. Such a move would be provocative not only to Russia, but to the countries of Eastern Europe, whose memories of the Second World War remain strong. Plainly, that would not be the way to approach the matter. One would have to look to other Continental countries which were perhaps in a better position to perform that task more cheaply.
In the course of the debate hon. Members have rightly expressed their concern about nuclear weapons. There was concern about the use of nuclear weapons by the armed forces on the central front. That was related to the need for adequate supplies of ammunition and conventional weapons there. That concern underlines the need to maintain adequate conventional forces, any reduction of which greatly increases the nuclear threat by lowering the nuclear threshold. The Opposition believe that strong conventional forces should be maintained to ensure that the nuclear option is not one which anyone would wish to exercise in the event of a major confrontation.

Mr. John Browne: The hon. Lady raises an interesting point, but by how much would our conventional forces have to be increased to equal our nuclear deterrent?

Dr. Mcdonald: Trident is not an independent nuclear deterrent. We could not use it on our own against Russia. It could not be accepted as a serious deterrent by Russia because a threat would invite annihilation by the Russians. It is unbelievable that the Russians could take up a threat by us alone—if that were possible—to use a weapon such as Trident.
Each Government must examine its needs for conventional weapons according to the nature of the threat and determine expenditure accordingly. That is why we have expressed our policy in the way that we have.
I want to reiterate some of the important questions that I raised in my opening remarks. What will be the cost of maintaining the British Army of the Rhine, of German civilian support, of variations in the exchange rate, of the need to modernise barracks, and of providing ourselves with adequate ammunition, storage and so on? We should like to have the details of those costs.
We are also concerned about equipment. There was an interesting exchange on one of my points about tank warfare. The Minister referred to the Rapier missile and he is aware that concern has been expressed about the


Army and the RAF having different specifications for that weapon? We must ensure that the Services have compatible systems.
The Royal ordnance factories merited one sentence and a list of the ammunition that was provided during the Falklands campaign. That was a passing reference which hardly compensated for the redundancies that were announced during the Falklands campaign and the resulting continuing uncertainty. The Government announced on 20 May that they plan to go ahead with privatisation in the future, which does nothing to allay the fears and anxieties of workers in those factories. They do not know that that will ensure the stability that they have enjoyed as a separate trading company for the Ministry of Defence in which capacity they have succeeded in faithfully meeting the Army's needs for such a long time. I hope that even at this late stage the Government will reconsider those plans.
I trust that in his reply the Minister will be able to answer some of the questions that have been raised, and tell us that the Government are now prepared to reconsider their overriding commitment, and the importance that they give to BAOR, and to look again at the view expressed by both sides of the House about the possibility of further reductions. Perhaps they should even consider ultimate withdrawal.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jerry Wiggin): In the course of today's debate, and during the course of the debates that we have recently had on the White Paper, our Service men in Germany and our NATO allies on the central front have, I am sure, been listening carefully as various hon. Members have sought to place in their minds a new threat. I do not mean the threat from the Soviet Union, which having occupied Afghanistan now supports the martial law subjugating the people in Poland and sits on NATO's eastern borders with its Warsaw Pact allies, outnumbering NATO by between two and five to one in tanks, artillery and aircraft. I am referring to the calls for massive cuts in BAOR, which must sap the spirit and confidence of our troops in Germany, and delight those in the East who wish to see this country's defence policy again characterised by cuts, cancellations and indecision, generated by an inability to decide what jobs we are to do properly with our finite resources.
We should be delighted if the Opposition Front Bench could explain how, with their massive cuts in defence spending, they could meet the extra commitments that they seem intent on advocating. Let us be in no doubt that their levels of defence spending would leave us not only without Trident but without an Army as well.
Therefore, I wish to make it clear that we shall not be reconsidering the option of withdrawing BAOR. The presence of our Army in Germany is vital for the political and military cohesion of the Alliance. That visible commitment to forward collective defence cannot be forgone.
The hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald) discussed the question of the costs of the British forces in Germany. They come to about £1,200 million, excluding equipment costs. As has been said on many occasions, this is 9 per cent. of our defence budget. Therefore, I am puzzled as to where the hon. Lady obtained the figure of 40 per cent. It could be that she is referring to the total cost

of European theatre ground forces, including those in this country, and all our air forces, and this strikes me as being a different figure from the cost of our forces in Germany.

Dr. McDonald: I made it clear that I was referring to precisely that. The 40 per cent. refers to the division of defence expenditure in terms of its principal roles. Defence of the central front, which obviously involves forces here as well, can be viewed as one of the principal roles. It was in those terms that I expressed the figure.

Mr. Wiggin: It is a fairly confused line of argument. At the end of the day, we are interested in the defence of the United Kingdom, and we believe that the greatest threat to us lies principally on the central front, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said in his intervention.
The hon. Lady asked me many detailed questions. It is not appropriate to discuss the Select Committee report tonight, but I can tell her that the cost of the barracks programme is about £90 million and that we do not have massive quantities of empty accommodation. I have been discussing that matter this morning. We have adequate storage for our ammunition in Germany, although some of it is not located quite where it ought to be. Therefore—we hope with some NATO infrastructure help—to be relocating some of our ammunition storage.
The question of the Royal ordnance factories is a semantic one. However, I believe that everybody has been thanked. If anybody, by some mishap, has not been spelt out, I cannot comprehend that people do not realise the gratitude that the Government have for all sections of the community and the vast numbers of people involved in all aspects of this operation.
I assure the House that it is not only in Germany where we are striving to keep our support organisation as lean as possible. We have reduced our costs there from about 11 per cent. to 9 per cent. We are doing this everywhere to enable us to invest our resources to the greatest extent possible in the teeth arms. We intend to avoid wasting resources on duplicating those support functions that the civil sector can provide. This is reflected in our White Paper, which this year includes an essay on the use of national resources in defence designed to stimulate thinking about how we should plan to harness the whole of our national resources to defend ourselves. The Times called this
the most important section
of
an attractively presented defence White Paper.
One way in which the military and civilians come together is in the Territorial Army. This makes one of the most cost-effective contributions to our defence. The Government are determined that this contribution should be increased. The measures that my right hon. Friend announced earlier in the year are intended to achieve this aim.
My hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) raised the question of regular reserves. It is a fact that those who have most recently retired from active service are the most likely to be able to return to active service. We have therefore established the individual reinforcement plan whereby, for some years, those who have recently retired will report annually. We keep their addresses. We can get to them quickly. They have some uniform and equipment and we pay them a bounty. Of course, we should like to be able to send them to Germany, but there has to be some limit on expenditure in this area. Their role in war will be


as casualty replacements. It is therefore not always possible to see a way of training them in the precise regiment in which they will serve or in the precise role that they will have to carry out in wartime.
My hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) mentioned the reserve commitment. I join him in saying that we in this country understand the requirement for the average citizen to contribute something in time of war. We saw this national virtue during the Falklands crisis. I hope that we are taking the necessary staeps to channel that virtue in the event of war.
The hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud) cast some unhappy aspersions on various aspects of the welfare of our forces. I accept that there can be improvement in community relations and domestic welfare. I am, however, happy that the Services work enormously hard on these aspects. I refer not only to the Army. All three Services go out of their way to mix with the community, to make their contribution and to be good neighbours. The hon. Gentleman said that they should be rich good neighbours. I am not sure about that. At least, they work hard at being good neighbours.
An enormous amount of time and trouble is spent on welfare. This is not always easy. There are problems. In all the organisations with which I have been connected, I do not believe that the Services can be surpassed in this matter. The hon. Gentleman's final contribution related to Number 2 dress. He recommended that the Army should make it more charismatic. This remark shows an element of ignorance about what happens in the services. There is to be a modified Number 2 dress. I was at the stores and clothing research and development establishment yesterday. It has done a large amount of work. An experiment has been carried out on this.
My hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey, in an excellent philosophical speech, mentioned a number of points on disarmement and gave an analysis that I would commend to those who did not hear it. He talked in a learned manner about the regular reserves.
My hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich also mentioned defending the home base. United Kingdom Land Forces recently did a study on that matter. We are basing our current plans on the assumption that, taking into account the Regular Forces stationed in the United Kingdom, plus the Reserves that will be allocated to UKLF, we shall have more than 80,000 troops equipped, trained and ready to go at the outbreak of war. I hope that that goes some way towards answering his point.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Spicer) asked me about parachuting. I have heard him ask that question before. He will find that the White Paper, in page 19, deals with the fact that we shall install the radar that is necessary for that capability. He rightly paid tribute to his regiment, and I join him. The Parachute Regiment was wonderfully brave and did a terrific job.
My hon. Friend also mentioned Northern Ireland. I went into more detailed comment on the Northern Ireland operations last week, so I shall not dwell on them now, but I should say that while the spotlight has been focussed elsewhere recently, our Forces in Northern Ireland have continued to carry out their duties in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary—duties which are often every bit as dangerous and difficult as those undertaken in the South

Atlantic—with their customary gallantry and dedication. I know that the House will wish to join me in reassuring them of our continuing gratitude and support.
The security forces continue to achieve notable successes and there have been some good finds of arms and ammunition on both sides of the border, while a welcome development in the campaign to bring men of violence to justice through the courts has been the successful prosecution in the Republic of Ireland of terrorists for offences committed in Northern Ireland.
The hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) mentioned his concern for the widows of Service men killed in Northern Ireland in the light of the success of the South Atlantic fund, which has now reached about £5 million. Separate charitable arrangements exist through the Army benevolent fund for troops in Northern Ireland and their dependants. The fact that the South Atlantic fund will remove the burden on those Service charities means that those who serve in Northern Ireland and their dependants will receive the same as or rather more than those who serve elsewhere.
The Army Dependants Assurance Trust provides funds for the dependants of those who are killed, and about 50 per cent. of the Army personnel killed in the falklands were members of that trust. The Army Board negotiated the scheme in 1972. It provides a tax-free benefit to dependants of soldiers who die, regardless of the cause, whether on or off duty. Over £10 million will be paid during the next 30 years to dependants of those who died in the Falklands who were members of the voluntary scheme.
The payments are in addition to the benefits payable under the Armed Forces pension scheme, which is the occupational scheme for all the Armed Forces. It provides pensions and lump sum grants for those who retire or who are invalided from the Services. In the case of widows, it provides for the continuation of the husband's full pay for three months from his death, if there are no children, after which the widow receives a pension from the Ministry of Defence and a war widow's pension from the DHSS, both tax-free and index-linked. In addition, she would be paid a substantial lump sum by the Ministry of Defence.
In cash terms the benefits payable under the Armed Forces pension scheme will vary according to individual circumstances, but, for example, a sergeant's widow with two children would receive a pension totalling more than £8,000 and a lump sum of more than £10,000. The details have now been put before the House, and there should be no criticism of the way in which we treat the bereaved.
I have picked up as many points as I can in this good debate, although the hon. Member for Keighley seemed to stray into the wider areas of disarmament and nuclear weapons, with which my hon. Friend the Minister of State dealt extremely well last week. While I share the hon. Gentleman's desire for peace, we differ in the method of obtaining it. I believe that strength and deterrence is the way to peace, but he believes that total disarmament is the way to it. History shows that in an ideal world he could perhaps obtain what he wants, but, sadly, we do not live in an ideal world. We both seek peace, and I acknowledge that.

Mr. Cryer: I do not seek total disarmament. I recognise the need for a conventional Army, Navy and Air


Force. Will the Minister answer my question about Menwith Hill? Is his section of the Ministry responsible, or is it the responsibility of the Navy or the Air Force?

Mr. Wiggin: While the hon. Gentleman was talking about Menwith Hill, he had the courtesy to admit that it was unlikely that he would obtain an answer. He will not obtain an answer from me now.
We have said much about the role of the Army and its equipment during the debate, but I should like to conclude by paying tribute to that most valuable and vital resource—our Service men and women. Their high standards of training, expertise and morale are the envy of other nations. We intend to ensure that none of those attributes is undermined.

Mr. Allen McKay: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Orders of the Day — STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.

Motion made, and question put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 73A (Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.)

TRADE UNIONS

That the draft Funds for Trade Union Ballots Order 1982, which was laid before this House on 14th June, be approved.— [Mr. Thompson.]

Question agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Thompson.]

Orders of the Day — Royal Dental Hospital, Tooting

Mr. Thomas Cox: I seek to try to find out from the Minister what is to be the future of the Royal dental hospital and whether it is to move to the facilities that exist for it at the St. George's hospital, Tooting. The issue is of great concern to that part of South London. I have the full support of the Wandsworth health authority and of the South-West Thames regional health authority for my case.
With the rebuilding of the St. George's hospital in Tooting we thought that we would in time see the development on this site of the Royal dental hospital and a move from its present home in Leicester Square. It is only following a report by the University of London working party of dental deans concerning the future of dental services for London that the future of the Tooting development has been put in doubt. It is a recommendation that is not accepted by many members of the medical profession and it is certainly opposed by large numbers of the general public as they become aware of the recommendations and their effects on dental services in South-West London.
It is my view, having become very involved in the issue as the local Member of Parliament, that a decision has been taken without consideration of the medical needs of the area that would have been covered by the dental school on the ground of possible—I stress the word "possible"—financial savings.
The stupidity of that line of thinking is that already within the St. George's hospital complex are the buildings in which the dental school can be developed. How often do we hear hon. Members saying to Ministers "What we need in our constituencies is the allocation of more money to rebuild or develop new services". St. George's hospital is not asking for that because we already have the facilities in terms of buildings. It is my understanding that no other use is envisaged for these buildings. They were built with this transfer in mind. I ask the Minister how much real consultation there has been with the region and the district health authorities on the issue. I think that there has been very little.
I ask that question because if one lists the reasons why the suggested move to Tooting should be supported, one finds it unbelievable that a recommendation could be made not to move to Tooting. No one can doubt that the present facilities at Leicester Square will not be adequate in the long term, but they would be at Tooting. Dental services in South-West London would suffer considerably if the move did not take place. The people affected would be children, the less well-off members of the community, the elderly and the physically handicapped who make use of the services either at Leicester Square or at Tooting.
If the move does not take place, there will be no major dental hospital in the whole of the South-West Thames region. It will be a departure from the policy of the DHSS to move hospital services from central London to other parts of the capital. The Charing Cross and St. George's hospitals are examples of that policy. If the move does not take place, people who need treatment will have to make long and costly journeys into Central London to get the

dental treatment that they need. No one can dispute that that could deter many people from getting the treatment that they need.
That is relevant when I point out that, unfortunately, we already have the worst dentist: population ratio of anywhere in Western Europe. At present, at both Leicester Square and Tooting about 150,000 patients are seen annually. In what is, unfortunately, a relatively poor part of London, we should do everything we can to provide services, not cuts or restrictions.
In 1979 the Flowers committee was asked to recommend what redevelopment of resources should take place for medicine and dentistry to maintain their present standards. In its report of February 1980, it said that the planned move of the Royal dental hospital and school from Leicester Square to Tooting, alongside St. George's Hospital, was to be welcomed and had its support. It believed that these arrangements should be implemented as quickly as possible. What has gone wrong with those proposals? They are just over two years old. They were suggested in February 1980.
The recommendations that the Flowers committee made must have been based on the fact that about £8 million had already been spent on providing the buildings in the new hospital complex at St. George's, Tooting. The British Dental Association report entitled
Dental Manpower Requirements for the year 2020
stated—it was considering population trends, among other things—that the conclusion which emerged from these projections was that the number of dentists now being trained was probably not excessive in relation to projected levels of need and demand.
No one can dispute that there is a need. The dental deans said that there could be a merger with Guy's and the resources and students of the Royal transferred to other dental schools. That neither faces the facts nor gives them. It says nothing about the extra accommodation that would be required to take the extra students.
The dental deans at King's are faced with an increase of students from 48 to 64 by 1986. In March they said:
This—
the increase in the intake—
would create many accommodation problems. Even Guy's said in April 1981 that there would have to be some minor alterations to the buildings if they took more students.
What will be the cost of those alterations and adaptations? Provision already exists at St. George's in Tooting.
Successive Governments have presented proposals that have not been thought out properly or costed. The dental deans' proposal comes within that category. Their case for making savings by not moving to St. George's has not been proven. There would be no long-term savings, for the reasons that I have given. One could not provide extra dental chairs per clinical dental student without incurring costs in expanding dental facilities. What would that cost be? Will the Minister give me some idea of it?
I have tried to outline why our dental hospital should go to Tooting, as everyone has been led to believe that it would. It is an excellent opportunity to complete the redevelopment of the health services of that hospital. Both the Wandsworth and the South-West Thames health authorities are prepared to meet their share of the costs involved. It would be extremely short-sighted of the Minister and his Department not to allow the development to occur.
The Minister should examine every aspect of the issue before making a decision. He should ensure that all the facts about costs and the needs of the areea ar fully considered. I invite him to visit St. George's to meet the senior medical practitioners so that he can familiarise himself with all the issues before taking a final decision on something that is crucial to South London.

The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Mr. Geoffrey Finsberg): The hon. Member for Tooting (Mr. Cox) has spoken with his usual vigour about a matter which I know concerns him greatly. I am also aware that a number of my hon. Friends and other hon. Members have received representations about the future of the Royal dental hospital and school. I am therefore glad to have this chance to clarify a number of the issues that have been raised.
The Royal dental hospital of London school of dental surgery is the oldest dental school in the United Kingdom and the second oldest in the world. The school was opened at 32 Soho Square on 1 October 1859, following the formation three years earlier of the Odontological Society of London and the concern about the problem of dental education and the need for a qualification in dental surgery. The House will recall the pictures that one occasionally saw of rather strange, unqualified people with pliers pulling out teeth.
In 1874, the hospital and school moved to larger premises in Leicester Square, but the growth of the two institutions soon necessitated the provision of a new building on an adjacent site. That building was opened in March 1901 and, as the hon. Gentleman knows, it is still used for the treatment of patients and the education of students. The hospital, which has 90 chairs, provides out-patient services in all the different specialties in dentistry. The School of Dental Hygiene is also based at Leicester Square, together with departments of prosthetics and an emergency day clinic.
Pioneer work carried on in association with the Royal dental hospital included the use of nitrous oxide anaesthesia, radiology and electrotherapy in dental surgery and, in later years, the application of clinical photography as an aid to dental education. A further innovation introduced by the Royal dental hospital was the provision of separate wards for dental patients in general hospitals. I understand that the school has always stressed the great importance of providing a general medical background for the study of dentistry.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for having spent a minute or two describing briefly some of the history and achievements of the hospital and school. At a time when the future of both the hospital and the school is in doubt, it is important that we reflect on what has helped to give those institutions the name that they have justifiably earned. With this long history of tradition and service to the public, it is quite understandable that people who are or have been closely identified with the hospital and school should be concerned about its future.
To some extent, staff associated with the hospital and school have lived with uncertainty about the future for many years. Plans for the rebuilding of both St. George's hospital, Hyde Park Corner and the Royal dental hospital and school go back as far as the early 1960s. Before I discuss the immediate future, it is important that I trace the development of plans for the rebuilding.
Following the publication in January 1962 of "A Hospital Plan for England and Wales", formal proposals were submitted to the then Minister of Health for the rebuilding of St. George's hospital and the Royal dental hospital, together with their associated medical and dental schools, using the combined Grove and Fountain hospital sites at Tooting.
This proposal envisaged rebuilding in four phases, extending over the period 1967–78, the accommodation for the dental school's pre-clinical departments being included in phase 1, with the main dental hospital and school accommodation in phase 2, which was scheduled for completion in 1970–72. It was agreed with the University Grants Committee and my Department that the school's intake of undergraduate students would increase from 45 per year to 64 per year when rebuilding was complete. In the event, as the hon. Gentleman well knows, planning, contract and financial difficulties extended the programme so that phase 1 was not completed until 1975–76. The pre-clinical school at Tooting provides accommodation and facilities for an annual intake of 64 students, which is in accordance with the plans to increase the size of the dental school.
The dental school's pre-clinical departments moved to Tooting in September 1976, and the pre-clinical course for dental students has been held there since October 1977. The original intention was to re-provide on the St. George's hospital development site all the facilities currently available at the Royal dental hospital in a separate phase starting simultaneously with phase 2A. In 1976, however, further financial restrictions necessitated a re-examination of the plans for phase 2 of the project, in the course of which it was decided that the dental hospital and school could not be incorporated in phase 2 and that no timetable could be decided for succeeding phases.
I can well understand how extremely frustrating this delay must have been for all those whose hopes rested on the original plans. That is not to say that my Department failed to recognise the difficulties under which staff were working at Leicester Square, and in 1978, at the request of my Department, the South-West Thames regional health authority undertook a study of the hospital's premises. Part of its report read as follows:
The premises are outdated, overcrowded and inadequate for their present functions. The services are old-fashioned and difficult to maintain. By modern standards of health and safety, working conditions, fire precautions and amenities for staff, students and patients are unacceptable.
The study noted a number of essential requirements: the creation of additional clinical space, the improvement of working conditions generally but particularly in technical laboratories; the improvement of facilities for the storage and handling of patients' records; the need for adequate fire precautions, including the provision of storage for flammable materials and gas cylinders and proper protection of means of escape; and extensive overhaul of the building itself.
It was estimated that at the then current prices the work would cost £2·75 million and would take about eight years to complete. As I ant sure the hon. Member will recall, in 1979, following further discussions between representatives of my Department, the school and hospital, the UGC and the regional and area health authorities, it was agreed that the financial and other implications of up-grading the Leicester Square premises to an appropriate standard were unacceptable, and that ways be examined of accelerating the move of the dental hospital and school to Tooting.
In March 1979, as the hon. Gentleman reminded us, the University of London's working party on medical and dental teaching resources was asked to recommend what redeployment of resources available for medicine and dentistry should be adopted to maintain the standard of medical and dental education and research in London. In its report, published in February 1980, it stated:
The planned move of the Royal Dental Hospital and School from Leicester Square to Tooting alongside St. George's Hospital is to be welcomed and has our support. We believe that these arrangements should be implemented as quickly as possible.
The hon. Gentleman asked "What has happened as a result?" The report was superseded by events.
A further report in October 1980 by the joint planning committee of the university court and senate led to a working party on medical costs which reported in February 1981. The report was translated into recommendations by the joint planning committee and was accepted by the senate and the court as univerity policy for medical schools. Among other proposals, it was decided to continue the expansion of St. George's hospital and medical school at Tooting. The future of the dental schools was referred to a separate working party on dental education in the University of London which reported in June 1981 with a series of options for the university for the re-organisation of dental education in London. Following that report, the joint medical advisory committee of the university set up in July 1981 another working party consisting of the dental deans of the university.
The working party produced a majority report recommending the merger of the Royal dental school with Guy's hospital medical school, redistributing some of the student load to other schools of the university. There was a minority report recommending the maintenance of the policy of rebuildng the Royal dental school at Tooting in association with St. George's hospital medical school. I understand that the university is likely to reach a final decision soon and that, as the hon. Gentleman knows, is where the matter rests at the moment.
The hon. Gentleman has made it plain that he feels that, had certain recommendations in the past been acted upon more quickly, we should not be debating this evening the future of the Royal dental hospital and school. But knowing the hon. Gentleman fairly well, I believe that he will recognise from the background information that I have given him the complexity of the issues and the need to ensure that whatever the decision, it is taken against the background of the need to ensure the best possible use of scarce capital and revenue resources and the changing needs of dental education.
My Department's position is, I hope, clear. During discussions last year with the South-West Thames regional health authority, it was impressed on my officials the difficulty that the regional health authority would be in

without some indication from the Department that it would be able to give more than the normal 35 per cent. of the capital cost of a teaching hospital scheme.
Recognising the region's problems, my Department agreed to increase its contribution to 45 per cent. or 50 per cent. provided—I stress that—that the University of London decides to confirm its original decision to transfer the school to Tooting. Dental hospitals exist primarily to provide facilities for dental education. I am sure that the hon. Gentlemen is well aware that in this country all dental hospitals, with the exception of the Eastman, are associated with undergraduate schools. If the University of London decides not to proceed with the transfer of the school, the need for a dental hospital in Tooting must also be questioned. We have not been convinced that there is a service need for a dental hospital on its own in an area where the ratio of general dental practitioners is really no worse than in other parts of London.
I recognise that if the university decides not to proceed with the transfer of the school, a number of additional important decisions will have to be taken. Arrangements would have to be made to ensure that satisfactory alternative use be found for the space already in use at Tooting by the dental school; and both the South-West Thames regional health authority and the Wandsworth district health authority would need to reconsider their strategy for the provision of dental services in that part of London. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that that will be done, and I will ensure that because of the university's key role in this matter—I cannot stress that too strongly—his anxiety and what he has said during this debate will be brought to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science.
From what the hon. Gentleman has said and from what I have said, no one has pretended, or will pretend, that this is an easy decision to make. I have been impressed by the immense personal efforts that have been made by senior staff associated with the hospital and school to ensure its future and by the testimonials from patients, both past and present, to the skilled treatment that they have received there. Whatever the decision, I hope that it will be the right one which serves best the future needs of dental education and of the patients.
That is all that I can say to the hon. Gentleman. He has clearly laid out before the House the problems that he sees arising in his constituency and in his part of London. I have tried to paint for him the wider picture to show him that the decisions are being taken in the light of the University of London's proposals and its belief in how the policy should operate. I have undertaken to see that my right hon. Friend's attention is drawn to what he said, and I hope that what I have said will be of some comfort to the hon. Gentleman and that he will feel that the decision will not be lightly taken.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at four minutes past Eleven o'clock.